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This study explored tolerance and intolerance in political discourse on Twitter 
during the U.S. 2016 election. It was a combination of social network analysis of four 
Twitter networks the day before the election, the day of the election, the day after the 
election, and four days after the election (November 7, 8, 9, 12) and content analysis of 
1,114 tweets from 40 largest clusters of the four networks. The study found significant 
differences between content frames (tolerant, intolerant, and neither) in relation to out-
degree centrality. However, there were no significant differences between tolerant and 
intolerant content in relation to in-degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and 
closeness centrality. Findings show similarities among the overall network structures 
across four days as all of the networks had low centralization (no hierarchical structure), 
low density, high modularity, and low reciprocity scores. The networks were not 
polarized; instead, they were divided into several small clusters with mixed 
conversations about both in-group and out-group candidates. This finding is in contrast 
with previous studies that found political discourse in online social networks is highly 
polarized (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Cha et al., 2010; Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Himelboim et al., 2017; Smith et al., 2014). Another major finding of this study was 
that Twitter users were more intolerant than tolerant and the percentage of intolerant 
tweets was doubled the day after and four days after the election.  
Keywords: Tolerance, intolerance, social network analysis, Twitter, political discourse, 
the U.S., presidential election 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Topic and Problem 
Media and communication technologies have played a foundational role in the 
formation and development of modern societies (Castells, 2015; Lowrey & Gade, 
2011a; Merrill, 2011). In order for democracy to function and justice to be maintained, 
citizens should actively take part in politics and political discussion (Castells, 1996; 
Fetzer & Weizman, 2006; Habermas, 2006; Huntington, 2006). Such political activities 
are highly dependent on communication and the related technologies, which play a 
crucial role in transmitting and shaping political information, beliefs, and opinions 
(Castells, 1996; Fetzer & Weizman, 2006; Gade, 2011; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 
1999; Shaw, 1996). Media and communication technologies are key for societal 
structures in providing the market place for free expression and exchange of opinions 
that shape political discourse (Castells, 1996; Laplante & Phenecie, 2010; Lowrey, 
2011; Schmuhl & Picard, 2005).  
With the rise of the Internet and growth of new forms of social networks, 
mediated political discourse has reached a new phase (Albrecht, 2006; Blumler & 
Kavanagh, 1999; Castells, 2015; Dahlgren, 2005; Larsson & Moe, 2012; Valenzuela et 
al., 2009). Networked media provide the opportunity for communication between 
many-to-many (Castells, 2009), which empowers the public to communicate instantly 
during important events not only in their local communities but also around the world 
(Muralidharan, Rasmussen, Patterson, & Shin, 2011). This function of networked media 
has toppled the hierarchal power of mass communication media, which was a 
communication between a one and many (Castells, 2009). Moreover, networked media 
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have provided people with a variety of media sources and choices anywhere, anytime, 
and in any format, which have empowered people to consume the kind of media that 
gratify them (Lowrey & Gade, 2011).  
Social media are the most dominant networked media that exist independent of 
traditional media machines (Gainous & Wagner, 2014). Social media allow individuals 
to both frame and spread their own content in addition to building and maintaining 
relationships and getting involved in self-presentation activities (Boyd & Ellison, 2007; 
French et al., 2012). Not only do people use social media (such as Twitter, Facebook, 
YouTube, etc.) to take part in socio-political discussions, but also to form such 
discussions by creating, sharing, and spreading information online (Arceneaux & 
Johnson, 2013; Castells, 2015; Himelboim et al., 2013; Himelboim, Smith, Rainie, 
Shneiderman, & Espina, 2017; Muralidharan, Rasmussen, Patterson, & Shin, 2011). 
These political discussions do not exist free of social and ideological beliefs and values 
even though online networks are independent of geographic and time boundaries 
(Altheide, 2004; Boyd & Ellison, 2007; French et al., 2012).   
Social media create what Mill (1861/1999) called the democratic environment 
for free expression where people can exchange ideas, debate over democratic priorities 
and learn different perspectives. News media have long been a vehicle for the product 
of free expression – political discourse (Merrill, 2011). In mass media age, news 
consumers were consumers only and their ability to participate in mediated political 
discourse was seldom visible (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Bennett, 2012; Domke et al., 
1999; Kraus & Davis, 1990). However, online media, in particular social media, have 
changed these conditions, allowing almost everyone to express ideas and opinions and 
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participate in political discourse (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Bennett, 2012). In today’s 
digital media, audiences have many choices of news and information, the ability to find 
news that fits their wants and biases, and engage through media with others who share 
their interests and views (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Castells, 2015; Lowrey & Gade, 
2011a). Thus, people can use media to create virtual communities, conversations and 
discourses, often with people like them (birds of a feather flock together) (Himelboim et 
al., 2013; McPherson et al., 2001). The abundance of media choices, audience 
empowerment, and ability to network with like-minded people create some new 
dynamics in political discourse that bring into question the importance of diversity of 
views and the role of tolerance in political discourse (Brandt et al., 2014; Crawford et 
al., 2013; Graham et al., 2009; Jost et al., 2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Skitka & 
Bauman, 2008; Wetherell et al., 2013). 
The concept of tolerance refers to willingness to respect differences in other 
people’s beliefs, actions, and practices and to communicate with people from diverse 
backgrounds (Locke, 1690/1963; Mill, 1861/1999; Stepan, 2000; Sullivan et al., 1979). 
It is the duty of all individuals, institutions, and authorities to respect other people’s 
rights to think, and believe in any way they want (Locke, 1963). In the virtual political 
discourse, people not only discuss the notions of tolerance and intolerance, but also they 
practice them in their online networking activities (Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman, 
2014). On the one hand, online networks are non-hierarchal platforms that encourage 
people from all backgrounds and demographics to join political discussions and reflect 
on other people’s thoughts and ideologies (Castells, 2015; Gruzd & Roy, 2014). On the 
other hand, these networks foster homophily between like-minded groups of people 
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who group together against people with values and beliefs different from their own – 
questioning the extent to which mediated groups hear or are aware of each other’s veins 
of thought and are tolerant of them (or not) (Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Himelboim et al., 
2013). In other words, based on the first argument, the Internet fosters diversity of 
thoughts, beliefs, and political activism among people across different virtual 
communities (Castells, 2012, 2015), which is very democratic and meets the notions of 
tolerance (Locke, 1963). However, the Internet also provides the opportunity for people 
to get connected to like-minded people on the basis of ideology, political view, religion, 
and so forth (Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman, 2014; Meraz, 2009; Tumasjan, 
Sprenger, Sandner, & Welpe, 2010), which enhances in-group homophily and 
intolerance for diversity and cross-group ties among online groups (Ali et al., 2011; 
Mislove et al., 2007; Yang & Self, 2015). Indeed, the new-found power and choice of 
digital media users also have a potential downside – that people are exposed to 
primarily those like them, seldom interact with those unlike them. Thus, digital media 
can be a fragmenting social force (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Lowrey & Gade, 2011; 
Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). 
Studies have found political polarization and homophily in social media when 
people share their political views on issues and events – a divide of people into two big 
clusters based on political ideology and expression of it (Gruzd & Roy, 2014; 
Himelboim et al., 2013). For instance, Himelboim et al. (2013) found that Twitter users 
are polarized in the liberal and conservative blocks when they share their thoughts and 
reflections on social and political issues. Also, there is evidence for cross-ideological 
ties, discourses, and exchanges among groups on Twitter (Gruzd & Roy, 2014). This 
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means that digital media provide freedom of choice to users, and the opportunities for 
people to connect with all types of others to engage in political discourse, yet many 
people use this freedom to connect with those like them (Gruzd & Roy, 2014; 
Himelboim et al., 2013). The result is that – despite the potential of a more diverse and 
enlightening political discourse – many people may do the opposite, limiting their 
media exposure to people and ideas that they agree with, and throwing stones at those 
with other opinions (Bennett, 2012; Himelboim et al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Lieberman, 2014). 
The U.S. presidential elections are the biggest political events the attract 
worldwide attention (Ankerson, 2015; Bezanson, 2012; Brousell, 2015; Adamic & 
Glance, 2005). The elections generate an abundance of political discourse, much of 
which is now created and shared through social media (Ankerson, 2015; Bezanson, 
2012; Brousell, 2015). Presidential candidates use social media as platforms to 
communicate their messages and plans with the public as part of their campaign process 
(Brousell, 2015). “Candidates have discovered the quickest way to make news is to put 
out a statement or comment in a social media post and avoid paying for ad space (Lang, 
2016, para.1).” Studies have shown evidence for tolerance and intolerance in political 
discourse on social media, which leads to polarization (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; 
Gruzd & Roy, 2012; Himelboim et al., 2013). The two-party political system in the U.S. 
(Republican vs. Democrats) is one of the main reasons behind polarization of American 
public in political discourse (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Haddadi, Benevenuto, & 
Gummadi, 2010; Hill & Hughes, 1988; Himelboim et al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Jansen et al., 2009; Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010; Pak & Paroubek, 2010; Sakaki, 
6 
Okazaki, & Matsuo, 2010). Tolerance and intolerance among the two parties have roots 
in the basic differences in their values and beliefs within the party and toward each 
other (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Habermas, 1994). Republicans view themselves as 
classic liberals, who emphasize individualism, limited government, and free enterprise 
(Habermas, 1994). Republicans are often associated with conservative/traditional views, 
who are change-resistant and believe in gradual progress with stable social and political 
structures and are more religious, anti-abortion, anti-homosexuality, and affirmative 
action (Dye & Zeigler, 1989; Levendusky, 2009). Democrats are known as 
contemporary liberals who favor bigger government and more regulation of businesses 
and social programs for under-privileged and poor (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Dye & 
Zeigler, 1986; Freeman, 1986). Democrats tend to be less religious, pro-abortion, 
advocates for minorities, immigrants, and homosexuals (Levendusky, 2009; Uggen & 
Manza, 2002). The Republican vs. Democrat polarization reaches its peak during the 
presidential election time that not only creates the environment for discussing tolerance 
and intolerance, but also the expression of both types of beliefs (Brandt et al., 2014).   
This dissertation is interested in exploring how online social network structure is 
associated with tolerance and intolerance in political discourse. In other words, the 
problem of this study is whether the network structure of online media contributes to 
social/political fragmentation and vice versa. The study will examine the relationship 
between social media network structure and the discourse of tolerance during the U.S. 
2016 Presidential Election on Twitter. Digital technologies have provided the software 
tools that not only collect data from virtual communications, but also analyze the 
structure and patterns of relationships in addition to the content of messages (De 
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Maeyer, 2012; Hansen et al., 2011; Lieberman, 2014). The study of online social 
network’s patterns and structure is also known as Hyperlink analysis, which explores 
how structure of network relations influences individual nodes and the whole system on 
the web (Barnett & Sung, 2006; Lusher & Ackland, 2011; Park, 2003). In recent years, 
more sophisticated software programs (e.g. NodeXL) have been developed, which have 
made online social network analysis easier, faster, and more comprehensive 
(Himelboim et al., 2017; Hsu et al., 2013). 
This study is a combination of social network analysis (SNA) and content 
analysis on political discourse on Twitter during the U.S. 2016 presidential election. 
Social network analysis explores the network structures, paths, centrality, and groupings 
between Twitter users during the election (Hansen, 2010; Hansen et al., 2011). Content 
analysis is used to analyze the content of tweets and find evidence for expression of 
tolerance and intolerance. Then, the study explores the connection between the network 
structure and tolerance/intolerance in the political discourse and measure of network 
centrality. 
Rationale  
This study seeks to explore the relationship between network structure and the 
discourse of tolerance. Previous studies have either focused on social network structure 
 (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Cha et al., 2010; Himelboim et al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 
2013; Himelboim et al., 2017; Jansen, Zhang, Sobel, & Chowdury, 2009; Kwak et al., 
2010; Pak & Paroubek, 2010; Sakaki et al., 2010) or discourse of tolerance (Caro & 
Schulz, 2010; Cote & Erickson, 2009; Coward, 1986; Nelson et al., 1997; Saito, 2011). 
Most of the social network studies on political discourse have explored political 
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homophily and polarization and have not considered tolerance and intolerance (Adamic 
& Glance, 2005; Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman, 2014; Pak & Paroubek, 2010; 
Smith et al., 2014). At the same time, most of the studies on political tolerance and 
intolerance have focused on issues that are characteristics of tolerant or intolerant 
political behaviors such as political partisanship, incivility in electoral campaigns, 
political outrage, right vs. left-wing competitions, and so forth (Brandt et al., 2014; 
Crawford et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2009; Jost et al., 2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; 
Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011; Wetherell et al., 2013). This study 
attempts to fill the gap by connecting those areas of studies together and examining 
their relationships. Also, this topic is timely, because social media, in particular Twitter, 
are used extensively in political discourse during the election time. Presidential 
elections are the biggest political events in which social media have been used 
profoundly (Robertson, Vatrapu, & Medina, 2010). Candidates use their social media 
accounts during their campaign to an extent that most information and ideas from the 
candidates are spread on social media before reaching the news media (Lang, 2016). 
The news media often reflect on the candidates’ social media posts and opinions later 
(Hjelmgaard, 2016; Lang, 2016). For instance, during the 2016 presidential election 
campaigns, Donald Trump was tweeting at 3:00 a.m., which was discussed in the news 
media several hours later after being shared and liked for several thousand times 
(Hjelmgaard, 2016).  
The nomination of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump as the presidential 
candidates for general election by Democrat and Republican parties heated the online 
political debates on the 2016 presidential election (Lang, 2016, Smith, 2016). Both 
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Clinton and Trump had controversial backgrounds and plans for future (Niose, 2016). 
Trump, for instance, is a multibillionaire Republication with a background in abuse of 
labor, groping women, using tax loopholes to avoid paying federal tax for many years, 
and refusing to make his tax returns public (Scherer, 2015; Zurcher, 2016). Clinton on 
the other hand, is an experienced democrat politician, who has been accused of 
betraying the American public as the Secretary of State by using her private email 
server for government business that includes emails on issues of national security 
(Graham, 2016; Rubin, 2016). She supported immigration reform that would provide a 
path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants and many of those who entered the 
U.S. illegally (Zurcher, 2016). In addition to these controversial backgrounds, the two 
candidates were flooded with thousands of posts on social media from their supporters 
and opponents, which included personal attacks from the candidates themselves on each 
other as well (DelReal, 2016; Hampson, 2016; Healy & Martin, 2016; Healy & 
Haberman, 2016; Walsh, 2016). 
Purpose  
 The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between online social 
network structure and tolerance and intolerance during the U.S. 2016 Presidential 
Election on Twitter. This is based on the assumption that with all of the egalitarian 
perspectives about online networks for being less hierarchal and more democratic 
environment for free expression and cross-group communication (Castells, 2003; 2015), 
there is evidence for homophilous activities among people in the online world (Ali et 
al., 2011; Mislove et al., 2007; Yang & Self, 2015). Previous research has demonstrated 
that the structure of the social networks may influence the extent to which political 
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discourse is tolerant or not (Brandt et al., 2014; Crawford et al., 2013; Graham et al., 
2009; Jost et al., 2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Wetherell et 
al., 2013).  
There are several factors that influence tolerance and intolerance in political 
discourse on social media, which have roots in broader notions of democracy, free 
speech, public sphere, and homophily. Social media provide the sphere for democratic 
political conversations among citizens, where anyone can say anything at anytime and 
in any format (Castells, 2015; Larsson & Moe, 2012; Tumasjan et al., 2010). Using 
social media, people can easily take part in political discourse by expressing their 
thoughts and opinions in relations to socio-political issues (Papacharissi, 2002). In such 
a democratic environment, everybody is expected to respect everybody else’s ideas, 
beliefs, values, and other differences, and to not express discrimination against 
individuals and groups on the basis of demographic differences and social and political 
dominance (Habermas, 1991; Papacharissi, 2002; Post, 1990). The primary goal of 
political discourse is that heterogeneous communities communicate their ideas and 
beliefs, so together they can form a common public opinion (Post, 1990). 
At the same time, factors such as the unlimited freedom of access to 
information, variety of media choices, and the empowerment of citizens as active 
participants of mediated communication encourage the citizens to largely engage in the 
communication activities that gratify them (Lowrey & Gade, 2011a). These factors are 
also related to socio-psychological factors such as homophilous and heterophilious 
beliefs and expressions toward people who are unlike one’s self (Ali et al., 2011; 
Mislove et al., 2007; Yang & Self, 2015). Existing literature on homophily in social 
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networks indicates that individuals are more likely to be connected with their 
homogenous groups rather than with those who are different from them (Himelboim et 
al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 2013). Persisting in one’s own group decreases the 
likelihood of information dissemination and cross-group discourses between 
demographically different people (Himelboim et al., 2013).  Studies have found 
homophily among users of social media, which can decrease cross-ideological ties 
between liberals and conservatives (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Himelboim et al., 2013). 
That is why homophily is considered a barrier against expansion of networks or cross-
group communications (Hargittai et al., 2008; Himelboim el al., 2013). 
Online political discourse creates virtual groups of people who identify 
themselves in relation to certain offline socio-political schools of thoughts, groups, and 
communities (Himelboim et al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman, 2014). 
Affiliation with certain socio-political groups increase the sense of in-group vs. out-
group or US vs. THEM among people (Beatty & Walter, 1984; Coward, 1986; Caro & 
Schulz, 2010; Cote & Erickson, 2009; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003; Sullivan et al., 
1993). Creation of such clusters provides the environment for expression of both 
tolerance and intolerance among citizens who take part in these discussions and express 
their thoughts and reflections either as individuals or as members of certain ideological, 
religious, political, and cultural groups (Bennett, 2012; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). 
Therefore, even though the networked media environment has created an egalitarian 
space for communication, where people from different groups, ideologies, backgrounds, 
cultures, and geographies can get together, it has become a platform for people with 
diverse sets of values and beliefs to find their like-minded individuals and form 
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homophilous virtual groups and express intolerance toward out-groups (Castells, 2003, 
2015; Himelboim et al., 2013).  
Moreover, staying in a specific ideological circle can increase the tendency for 
relying on the information from the members of the same circle diminishes the chance 
of knowing about other groups and individuals, which can reduce in-group tolerance 
toward members of other groups whose values and beliefs are different from one’s self 
(Beneke, 2006; Caro & Schulz, 2010; Cote & Erickson, 2009; Coward, 1986; Locke, 
1963; Saito, 2011; Van Doorn, 2014). Studies have shown that members of 
conservative political groups tend to rely on conservative news sources for information 
more than liberal news sources; and similarly, members of liberal political groups are 
more likely to use liberal news sources than conservative ones (Himelboim et al., 2009; 
Himelboim et al., 2013). From social network perspective, the strength of social 
networks depends on the number of weak ties, which often bridge unconnected 
networks with each other (Granovetter, 1973; Ibarra, 1992). Even though strong in-
group relationships increase the inner density of network, they decrease the chance of 
diverse relationships, which affect the flow of information across networks 
(Granovetter, 1973). Therefore, persistence in using partisan media as the primary 
source information can affect individuals’ levels of tolerance and intolerance, which can 
impact their communication behavior within and between groups (Gruzd & Roy, 2014; 
Himelboim et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 1997).   
Why Twitter?  
Twitter is known as one of the top social media for news and political discourse 
(Hansen et al., 2011; Himelboim et al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 2013; Himelboim et al., 
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2017). Twitter has become a powerful tool for political deliberation, in particular, 
during general elections and other political events (Tumasjan et al., 2010). Twitter is a 
media space for political news and discourse that includes citizen voices, not just news 
media (Himelboim et al., 2013). So, these voices are not bound to neutrality of 
journalism, and given the user ability to determine their social networks (their ability to 
engage in conversaion with those they want) and express their views on them, it is 
expected that the discourse will be more commentary, opinions and assessments of 
candidates and news media coverage of the campaign (Cha et al., 2010; Jansen, et al., 
2009). Twitter is even called a news medium that hosts millions of social relations in 
addition to spreading information across the globe (Kwak et al., 2010). Jansen, et al. 
(2009) call tweets “the electronic word of mouth” (p. 2169). One of the main reasons 
behind Twitter’s popularity is microblogging, which is a very popular communication 
tool among internet users (Pak & Paroubek, 2010). Twitter’s microblogging is different 
from traditional live news coverage because it provides the opportunity for public 
debates on news events in addition to its real-time news coverage (Sakaki et al., 2010). 
In other words, Twitter can cover “anything from intimate friendships to common 
interests, or even a passion for breaking news or celebrity gossip” (Cha et al., 2010, p. 
10). Twitter is the intersection between traditional news media and digital media for its 
usability as a news source and networked environment for connecting communities not 
only with each other, but also with news media, other social, political, economic 
organizations, and individuals and social and political actors (Hsu, Park, and Park, 
2013; Verweij, 2012).  
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The sample of this study was collected from Twitter during the days surrounding 
the 2016 presidential election (November 7, 8, 9, and 12). The data was collected from 
Twitter through NodeXL. NodeXL is a software program designed as a template in 
Microsoft Excel, which not only retrieves network data from social media into an excel 
sheet, but also analyzes the network structures and visualizes them in graphs (Fay, 
2016; Hansen et al., 2011; Himelboim at al., 2013). The sample for content analysis was 
collected from the 10 largest clusters of each of the four Twitter network. 
Summary 
The rise of digital media has brought revolutionary changes in the human 
communication and political discourse (Castells, 2015; Gade & Lowrey, 2011). In the 
networked media environment, there is a better chance for people from all places and 
demographics to form virtual discussion groups and play active role in politics 
(Castells, 2015; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Wetherell et al., 2013), which includes 
expressions of tolerance and intolerance. Studies have found homophily among online 
groups on the bases of ideological beliefs and other social, political, and cultural values, 
which indicate degrees of intolerance in the virtual world (Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Meraz, 2009; Tumasjan et al., 2010).   
This study is a combination of social network analysis and content analysis. 
Social Network Analysis is a theoretical and methodological framework for examining 
social structures and people’s activities including relationships patterns and implications 
of those relationships, information flow among individuals, groups and societies, and 
how these interactions and exchanges take place (Freeman, 2004; Kadushin, 2012; 
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Krebs, 2016; Van der Hulst, 2009). Another methodological framework that is used in 
this dissertation is content analysis, which is widely used in analyzing media content.  
  This dissertation explores how network structure explains the levels of tolerance 
in political discourses on Twitter social network during the 2016 Presidential Election. 
This is based on the assumption that with all of the egalitarian perspectives about online 
networks as less hierarchal and more democratic media, there is evidence that the 
structure of online networks can foster in-group homophily among online users against 
out-groups (Brandt et al., 2014; Crawford et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2009; Jost et al., 
2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Wetherell et al., 2013). 
This study is informed by a range of theories and literature on mediated 
communication, shift from mass media to digital media, social networks and social 
network analysis, political discourse, free speech, and tolerance and intolerance. This 
dissertation includes eight chapters. Chapter two focuses on the shift from mass media 
into digital media and ends with discussing online social media. Chapter three is on 
tolerance and intolerance in mediated political discourse. Chapter four reviews social 
network and social networks analysis and its main functions and features. Chapter five 
briefly summarizes the literature, connecting it to the problem of study that leads 
logically to the proposed study’s research questions. Chapter six is about the 
methodologies of this study. Chapter seven is on the results of the research conducted in 
this dissertation. And finally, chapter eight discusses the findings of this study in 




Chapter 2: From Mass to Digital/Networked Media 
 This dissertation seeks to understand the relationship between online social 
network structures and tolerance and intolerance as a political discourse on Twitter 
during the U.S. 2016 presidential election. Online social networks are one of the main 
outcomes of digital revolution in communication technologies through which not only 
can the public directly take part in political discussions, but also form political virtual 
discussion groups of diverse and like-minded members (Ankerson, 2015; Kietzmann, 
Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011; Schwartz, 2015; van Dijck & Poell, 2015).  
 The advent of digital technology and growth of networked media have changed 
the dynamics of mediated political communication unlike any time in history (Castells, 
2009, 2015. Networked media have empowered citizens to raise their voices and get 
heard (Merrill, 2011). Networked media mean more choices for the users, which 
provide the opportunity for use of sources that are from a variety of backgrounds, 
interests, values and beliefs (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Castells, 2009, 2011). 
Meanwhile, networked media environment encourages people to form social groups of 
like-minded and communicate similar ideas and interests, which emphasizes in-group 
unity for such people (Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Himelboim et al., 2013). In other words, 
given the amount of choices people have, they choose media that gratify them and 
group with others like them (Lowrey & Gade, 2011a; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). With the 
new-found power and choice of digital media, people are exposed to those primarily 
those like them, who have similar interest and media consumption habits (Arceneaux & 
Johnson, 2013; Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Himelboim et al., 2013). The trend to interact with 
like-minded people and stay in networks with individuals like one’s self increases the 
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chance that people seldom interact with those unlike them (Granovetter, 1973; Gruzd & 
Roy, 2014; Himelboim et al., 2013). Thus, despite the fact that digital media and 
communication technologies have given birth to new forms of communication (Castells, 
2003, 1015), they can be a fragmenting social force (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Lowrey 
& Gade, 2011a; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). 
The audiences have more control over the flow of information across groups 
compared to the mass era by having many choices to access plenty of sources in 
different formats and products at anytime, anywhere, and in any format (Albrecht, 
2006; Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Castells, 2015; Gurevitch et al., 2009; Lowrey & 
Gade, 2011a; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). The same media that empower citizens also 
empower political interest groups to publish, promote and circulate their ideas. 
(Gainous & Wagner, 2014).  
This chapter explores the transition from mass to digital media, focusing on 
online social networks and virtual communication, and political discourse among 
public. Overall, the growth of digital media has resulted in three main changes in 
mediated political communication: Empowerment of audience from a passive consumer 
into active participant; media fragmentation (Gade & Lowrey, 2011; Hindman, 2011; 
Merrill, 2011; Singer, 2011) and social networks and virtual communication among 
citizens where public/political debates take place (Bennett, 2012; Blanchard, 2004; 
Rheingold, 1993).  
Audience Empowerment 
The growth of networked media has shifted the exercise of control of 
information and relationship structure between news media and the audience (Singer, 
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2011). In the mass media era, the creation and flow of information were controlled by 
the news media and journalists (Gade & Lowrey, 2011). Journalists had access to the 
technology (e.g. printing press, production studios, etc.) that was not available for 
public (Gade & Lowrey, 2011; Singer, 2011). The mass era provided no basis for direct 
audience feedback; therefore, the public passively consumed the information they were 
provided by the mass media (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Bennett, 2012; Gade & Lowrey, 
2011). News media were the agenda setters and the watchdogs of government 
institutions to public, and journalists had social and political influence because of 
having access to powerful people and the elites (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001; Gade & 
Lowrey, 2011; Singer, 2011). Journalists were powerful sources of information because 
they had control over the means for information production such as sources and tools 
and technologies for gathering, producing, and delivering information (Bennett, 2012; 
Gade & Lowrey, 2011). 
However, digital media and communication technologies provide the 
opportunity for communication from many to many (Castells, 2003). In other words, the 
shift control to the audiences, made them active, interactive, and engaged in the entire 
process of information flow such as production, consumption, and spread (Castells, 
2009; Gade & Lowrey, 2011). Nowadays, the news media, citizens, and officials all can 
use the online media to communicate directly with each other (Gade & Lowrey, 2011). 
The digital media allow everyone to publish, which creates peer-to-peer mediated 
communication that is no longer filtered by media professionals. These changes have 
reshaped the flow of creativity, innovation, political mobilization, information 
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gathering, and content dissemination (Friedman, 2005; Gade & Lowrey, 2011; Singer, 
2011).  
Castells (2009) argues that the era of digital communication is the era of mass-
self communication, which includes new interactive communication processes. It is self-
communication, because it is self-directed, self-selected, and self-defined. It is mass, 
because it can reach a global audience.  
Online media have created flat platforms for communication among people, 
where anyone can create content – the rise of citizen-based media (Arceneaux & Johnson, 
2013; Gade & Lowrey, 2011). With citizen-based media, everyone can be a content 
producer, which has led to the rise of “potent grassroots journalism” (Gade & Lowrey, 
2011, p. 25). Nowadays “users are producers one moment and consumers the next” 
(Hansen, Shneiderman, & Smith, 2010, p. 13). The gratification of the online news on 
mobile phones provides opportunities for news consumption “anytime, anywhere, in any 
modality – audio, video, graphics, or text” (Dimmick, Powers, Mwangi, & Stoycheff, 
2011, p. 177). The timeliness of communication activities is a transition from “prime-
time” to “my-time” (Castells, 2009). The dramatic increase in the news sources have 
increased news consumption outside home than ever before (Dimmick et al., 2011). 
Online social integration and multitasking are other gifts of the Internet (Castells, 2009). 
The Internet as a powerful democratic tool has blurred the wall between 
professional content producers/journalists and other content producers (Lowrey & 
Gade, 2011; Witschge & Nygren, (2009). At the same time, people specialize their 
news consumption in the online world on the basis of political ideology and personal 
interests (Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2010; Olmstead, Mitchell, & Rosenstiel, 2011; 
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van Cauwenberge, d'Haenens, & Beentjes, 2010). Changes in the public consumption of 
news in the age of information abundance have increased people’s expectations to get 
content for free anywhere, anytime, and in any format (Gade & Lowrey, 2011). 
Technology has created opportunities for audience to participate in journalism in ways 
that public journalism enthusiasts welcome (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013). People are at 
the center of this paradigm, which has changed “the once-solid jar of elite media 
freedom” –shift from the hands of professional journalists to the hands of citizens 
(Merrill, Gade, & Blevens, 2001, p. 126).  
In sum, in the mass media era, the only people who created mediated public 
discourse were journalists, or those who worked for media organizations (Singer, 2011). 
The public had no way to use media to actively question news gathering of journalists 
(Gade & Lowrey, 2011). The one-way top-down communication platforms made the 
public the kind of consumers who could not interfere in the information production 
process (Gade & Lowrey, 2011; Singer, 2011). Indeed, journalists and news media had 
no access to a mediated audience (Lowrey & Gade, 2011a). So, any feedback provided 
(letters to editor of newspaper, or to news directors of TV/radio stations) was: a) delayed 
for days, often weeks, so the issue context is lost or forgotten, and b) filtered through 
media – the editors and news directors decided which letters to publish or broadcast 
(Chaffee & Metzger, 2001; Gade & Lowrey, 2011; Singer, 2011). Nowadays, not only 
do the citizens have control over the kind of information they want to consume and 
produce, but also they have the power to decide the information sources and platforms 
that gratify them (Gade & Lowrey, 2011). These opportunities have emerged as a result 
of audience fragmentation, which will be discussed in the next section.  
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Audience Fragmentation 
A major outcomes of the shift from mass media to digital media is demassification 
of audiences, which is also known as audience fragmentation (Gade & Lowrey, 2011; 
Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). Fragmentation is a result of technological developments that 
“allow and even encourage people to narrow the focus of their media consumption to 
pursue their individualized interests and needs” (Tewksbury, 2005, p. 332). It is about the 
relationship between the audience and information, which leads to increased choices and 
desires for personal gratification (Tewksbury, 2005). Overall, audience fragmentation has 
led to four main changes that are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs. 
First, audience fragmentation has changed the status of news media as the biggest 
or the most dominant source of information into a major source of information (Gade & 
Lowrey, 2011; Lowrey & Gade, 2011a; Singer, 2011). Traditionally, news media were 
the agenda setters and people perceived the mass media as the primary sources of 
information (Gade & Lowrey, 2011; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Mutz & Martin, 2001; 
Rogers & Kincaid, 1981; Wade & Schramm, 1969). However, with the rise of online 
media and the shift of power from journalists and media to the audience, citizens have 
unlimited access to diverse sources of information from all over the world from non-
traditional sources – grassroots, organizations, other social, political, and economic 
institutions, and so forth – in addition to news media (Castells, 2003, 2009, 2015; Gade 
& Lowrey, 2011; Hindman, 2011). Nowadays, there are other dominant sources of 
information or alternative media (such as government and other social and political 
institutions’ websites, social media, etc.) alongside news media that people refer to for 
information (Atton & Hamilton, 2008; Downing, 1984; Himelboim et al., 2013; 
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Lievrouw, 2011; McKenzie et al., 2012; Singer, 2011; Vickery & Wunsch-Vincent, 
2007). 
Still, studies have shown that news media have maintained their position as one 
of the primary and trustful sources of information in the digital world – a major portion 
of online discourse starts with sharing links from the traditional news media (more than 
30 percent) (Albrecht, 2006, 2007; Baum & Groeling, 2008; Gurevitch et al., 2009; 
Himelboim et al., 2013; Meraz, 2009; Tumasjan et al., 2010). This indicates that news 
media still play an important role in the agenda setting for public and political discourse 
(Albrecht, 2006, 2007; Baum & Groeling, 2008).  
Second, access to diverse sources of information and production facilities have 
provided the citizens with the opportunity for better democratic participation in 
information flow (Gade & Lowrey, 2011; Turner, 2005). The online media environment 
is a nonhierarchical space for cooperation, collaboration, friendships, peer-to-peer culture 
(egalitarian), and businesses (Turner, 2005). Decentralization of institutional media has 
made information production more democratic, which is like a new phase of 
enlightenment that may help in the emergence of the truth in a more complete way (Gade 
& Lowrey, 2011).  
Third, fragmentation of audience is also related to specialization of media outlets, 
which is about the kind of content or message media produce that meets the needs and 
wants of a certain group of people (Tewksbury, 2005). In other words, specialization is 
against the mass media era notion of producing a variety of media content and targeting 
large and diverse of groups of people (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011; Tewksbury, 2005). People 
specialize their news consumption in the online world based on their interests, ideologies, 
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and beliefs (Chafee & Metzger, 2001; Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2010; Olmstead et 
al., 2011; van Cauwenberge et al., 2010). Specialization is about people’s narrow focus 
on specific content and ignoring other messages (Tewksbury, 2005). 
Fourth, another outcome of audience fragmentation is the growth of partisanship 
among the public, which has increased the use of partisan information sources (Dimmick, 
2002; Gade & Lowrey, 2011; Hindman, 2011; Tewksbury, 2005). With the access to 
infinite amount of content, people customize their media use to fit their wants and needs 
(Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013). They seek media that gratify them, and they expect to be 
gratified by the media they use (Gade & Lowrey, 2011; Hindman, 2011). In other words, 
the active audiences of the digital age have access to diverse sources of information and 
communication networks (such as news media, partisan sources of information, 
grassroots, etc.), which facilitate the opportunity to engage in partisan news consumption 
and communication activities (Dimmick, 2002; Hindman, 2011; Mitchelstein & 
Boczkowski, 2010; Olmstead et al., 2011; Tewksbury, 2005; van Cauwenberge et al., 
2010). The infinite online media choices combined with people choosing media that fit 
their interests and biases, contribute to greater fragmentation (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001; 
Castells, 2009; Gade & Lowrey, 2011a; Hindman, 2011).  
In short, the Internet has made political discourse more inclusive, less mass, more 
fragmented, polarized, and specialized (Bennett, 2012; Dimmick, 2002; Hindman, 2011; 
Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2010; Olmstead et al., 2011; Tewksbury, 2005; van 
Cauwenberge et al., 2010). The tendency toward engagement in polarized communication 
processes can increase the chances for people’s involvement in interactions with like-
minded people (Gurevitch et al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 2013; Meraz, 2009; Tumasjan 
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et al., 2010). In other words, people tend to choose media that gratifies them (Lowrey & 
Gade, 2011), which puts them in contact with others via media who tend to be like-
minded, have similar interests and use media in similar ways (Himelboim et al., 2013). 
These connections create mediated social networks, which have been widespread with 
the growth of social media (Blanchard, 2007; Castells, 2003, 2015; Himelboim et al., 
2013; Lieberman, 2014; Tumasjan et al., 2010). Social media are used as platforms for 
deliberation in political discourse, where citizens and political actors can directly 
communicate with each other (Bennett, 2012; Tumasjan et al., 2010). When people have 
access to so many sources of information that are in-line with their own (in-group) values, 
beliefs, and practice, they will be less likely to seek information elsewhere, from sources 
which they disagree with (Bennett, 2012; Himelboim et al., 2013). Networks create 
groups that identify with a common idea, cause or interest (Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Himelboim et al., 2017; Lieberman, 2014).  
Online Social Networks 
Alongside other outcomes of the shift from mass media into digital media, the 
emergence of virtual communication has played a key role in the empowerment of 
audience as active participants in the public debates (Blanchard, 2007; Castells, 2003; 
Gleave, Welser, Lento, & Smith, 2009; Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 
2011; Rheingold, 1993). Virtual communication refers to sets of interaction and 
information exchange between people via the Internet and computer mediated 
communication (CMC) (Castells, 2003; Jones, 1997). Virtual communication has 
redefined the notions of public discourse, which is one of the most powerful phenomena 
in the digital age (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Kietzmann et al., 2011; Lieberman, 2014; 
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Mislove et al, 2007; Mangold & Faulds, 2009; Valenzuela et al., 2009). People use 
virtual space to discuss various issues and problems related to the social, political, 
economic, and cultural factors in their societies and around the world (Castells, 2015; 
Gleave et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 2011; Rheingold, 1993).   
Common virtual communication includes emails, chat-systems, web-based 
discussions areas, sews groups, virtual communities, forums, social media discussions, 
and so forth (Jones, 1997; Reich, 2010). Social network websites such as Twitter, 
Facebook, Myspace, and Instagram are online platforms for virtual communication 
(Reich, 2010). Before the emergence of social media, in particular, Facebook and 
Twitter, online or virtual communication took place in certain websites and blogs where 
people got together and formed virtual communities (Rheingold, 1993; Castells, 2003; 
Gleave et al., 2009). Hence, before discussing social media networks, it is important to 
briefly review virtual communities.  
Virtual communities. Virtual communities are “places where people meet” and 
are “tools” that facilitate communication between people who are physically and 
geographically far from each other (Rheingold, 1993, p. 50). The formation of virtual 
communities is related to four factors: 1) “a minimum level of interactivity,” 2) “a 
variety of communicators,” (3) “a minimum level of sustained membership,” and (4) “a 
virtual common public space (Jones, 1997, p. 5). Virtual communities gave birth to a 
new culture of socialization, which was different than the traditional friend-making 
processes. People started having new friends who did not live in their neighborhoods 
and were not necessarily from the same backgrounds as they were (Rheingold, 1993). 
Virtual communities connected isolated individuals from across the world to share their 
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thoughts, information, knowledge, problems, concerns, and so forth with each other 
(Rheingold, 1993).  
The main difference between real communities and virtual communities is that 
virtual communities are not dependent on a physical location or geography (Jones, 
1997; Reich, 2010). But other components of social communities such as kinship, 
shared values and religion can be part of online communities as well (Reich, 2010). 
Real communities are formed based on factors such as kinship, shared values and 
religion (Jones, 1997) among social groups who establish ties with each other in a 
geographic location (Reich, 2010). Virtual communities create the opportunity for the 
formation of social bonds across the globe without real physical settings (Katz et al., 
2004; Rheingold, 1993). 
In the physical world, sense of community (SOC) consists of “feeling of 
membership, influence, integration and fulfillment of needs, and shared emotional 
connections” (Blanchard, 2007, p. 827). Like real communities, developing the sense of 
community in the virtual world is necessary for bonding, and sharing thoughts, 
ideologies, feeling, happiness, sorrow, and so forth (Rheingold, 1993). Sense of virtual 
community (SOVC) is dependent on the feeling of membership, identity, belonging, 
integration, emotional attachment, and remaining in the community (Blanchard, 2007; 
Capece & Costa, 2010; Reich, 2010).  
Virtual communities create the environment for information exchange, civic 
engagement, educational and scientific activities, and entertainment (Turner, 2005). 
People carry public discussions in the virtual world on various topics such as human 
relationships, data, wealth, power, so forth (Turner, 2005). Studies have shown that, 
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blogs attracted like-minded people who share similar ideologies, professions, and 
hobbies (e.g., political ideology, religion, cooking, loving food, etc.) (Blanchard, 2004, 
2007; Yang & Self, 2015). In sum, virtual communities insist on certain levels of in-
group belonging among members, which suggests these groups tend to be like-minded, 
have similar wants and needs, and may perceive non-group members as outsiders 
(Blanchard 2004, 2007; Capece & Costa, 2010; Reich, 2010; Turner, 2005).  
With the rise of social media such as Twitter and Facebook, blogging and the 
trend of virtual communities declined, but they are still used by individuals and groups 
(not as much as social media) (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010). Social media 
are “a set of online tools that supports social interactions between users” (Hansen, 
Shneiderman, & Smith, 2010, p. 12). Social media have provided the opportunity for 
broader public discussions, which have bypassed the size, level, and capacity of virtual 
communities (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Duggan et al., 2015; Hansen, Smith, & 
Shneiderman, 2011; Lieberman, 2014; Smith et al., 2014). Nowadays, people use social 
media to create more instant larger virtual networks than the earlier virtual communities 
(Lenhart et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2014; Duggan et al., 2015), which will be in the next 
section.  
Social media networks. The term social media refers to digital internet-based 
technologies that are used as interactive platforms by individuals, groups, and entities to 
consume, create, share, and spread information, and engage in virtual public and private 
discussions (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Kietzmann et al., 2011; Lieberman, 2014; 
Mislove et al., 2007; Valenzuela et al., 2009; Mangold & Faulds, 2009). Individuals and 
groups use social media to “share, cocreate, discuss, and modify user-generated 
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content” (Kietzmann et al., 2011, p. 241). Social media are used for different purposes 
such as social interaction, content production, sharing information from other sources as 
well as other social and political gatherings (Ankerson, 2015; Castells, 2015; Duggan, 
Ellison, Lampe, Lenhart, & Madden, 2015; Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman, 2014; 
Valenzuela et al., 2009).  
Social media functions include an individual’s or entity’s presence by revealing 
all or portions of his/her identity, establishing relationships with others, sharing 
thoughts and information, establishing a reputation, engaging in conversation with 
others, and forming communities by creating or leading online groups (Kietzmann et 
al., 2011). Establishment of relationships on social media networks are defined as 
friendship, follower and following, and connections with whom the users interact 
through Posts, Tweets, Likes, Favorites, Comments, Messages, Retweets, Replies to, 
and Post Shares, (Ankerson, 2015; Cha et al., 2010; Himelboim et al., 2013; Himelboim 
et al., 2017; Hansen et a., 2011; Lieberman, 2014; Smith et al., 2014).  
According to a study, the top 10 most dominant and popular social media in 
October 2016 were:  Facebook (more than 1.7 billion users), YouTube (more than 1 
billion users), Instagram (500 million users), Twitter (313 million users), Reddit (234 
million users), Vine (200 million users), Ask.fm (160 million users), Tumbler (115 
million users), Flicker (112 million users), and Google+ (111 million users) (Hainla, 
2016). In addition to being a social practice, social media deal with notions of 
personalities and other social factors (Hansen et al., 2010).  Not only do people use 
social media to share their good moments with others, but also to raise their voices 
against institutions, governments, companies, and politicians, and other individuals 
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(Ankerson, 2015; Castells, 2015; Duggan et al., 2015; Kietzmann et al., 2011). As a 
result, the reputations of individuals, in particular celebrities and politicians, and 
companies and institutions have become associated with social media (Kietzmann et al., 
2011). Social media differ from each other on the basis of size of producer and 
consumer, pace of interactions, genre, control of basic elements, types of connections, 
and retention of content (Hansen et al., 2010).  
Political organizations and politicians are among the most dominant users of 
social media as an attempt to reach their public and gain their trust (Ankerson, 2015; 
Cha et al., 2010; Lenhart et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2014; Smith et al., 2014). In addition, 
social media inform people about the most recent, trending, and viral issues, events, and 
individuals from around the world via news feeds (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). 
Therefore, social media discussions have become the most popular and the 
biggest form of social and political discourse in the virtual world (Arceneaux & Weiss, 
2010; Duggan et al., 2015; Hansen et al., 2011; Lieberman, 2014; Smith et al., 2014). 
People widely use hashtags on social media to talk about topics and evens around them 
or the issues they are interested in (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Hansen et al., 2011). 
Hashtags are created by users based on the issues related to events, ideas, and people 
that interest them (Lieberman, 2014). These conversations are different from virtual 
communities, because they occur at a certain time on certain issues, people, and events 
among individuals who are not necessarily friends or followers of one another 
(Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Hansen et al., 2011; Lieberman, 2014; Smith et al., 2014). 
In other words, people do not need to be members of a certain virtual community in 
order to communicate with members of that group (Lenhart et al, 2010). A simple tag 
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(mention) and hashtag can connect people and ideas from different parts of the world 
(Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010; Lieberman, 2014).  
Despite all these facilities and opportunities for democratic free exchange of 
ideas among citizens, social media network structures are mixed products of their 
designers’ innovative-business models (Castells, 2003; Sunstein, 2017; Xiang & 
Gretzel, 2010). In other words, different kinds of social media are designed by their 
developers in ways that shape people’s communication patterns differently. For 
instance, Twitter has been designed as a microblog in which people can express their 
opinions in less than 140 characters, while YouTube is designed for video sharing, and 
Facebook is designed for a wide range of socialization. All of the social media platform 
operate under certain algorithmic systems that specialize the users’ exposure to different 
kinds of content and sources, which technically deprive them from seeing content from 
sources they are not visiting a lot (Agichtein, Castillo, Donato, Gionis, & Mishne, 2008; 
Aggarwal & Zhai, 2012). These kinds of technological programs, help social media 
businesses to find patterns of communication and interests among their users, and sell 
them on advertisers (Romero, Galuba, Asur, & Huberman, 2011; Xiang & Gretzel, 
2010). However, these programs and designs act against the main arguments about the 
Internet being a flat space for free and democratic exchange of thoughts and ideas 
among people free of all kinds of filters (Isaac, 2017; Sunstein, 2017).  
At the same time, social media owners claim they are advocates of democracy 
and freedom of expression in their platforms. Twitter even sued the government in order 
to block the government’s demand for unmasking of accounts that were critical of 
Trump (Isaac, 2017). Scholars like Sunstein (2017) suggest that social media owners 
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should act responsibly in relation how social media are used. Social media owners 
cannot just say they are platforms, because they are more than just free platforms for 
exchange of information. 
Social media structures were widely used by some organizations and individuals 
for the spread of fake news during the U.S. 2016 presidential election (Isaac, 2017). The 
abundance of fake news during the U.S. 2016 election resulted in some serious actions 
by social media entrepreneurs such as Facebook’s Zuckerberg to hire a high profile 
editor to handle the fake news problem (Benton, 2017; N.A., 2017).  
Twitter. Twitter is the most popular microblogging medium, which has become 
a virtual hub for communication and a dominant platform for political dialogues among 
heterogeneous groups of people (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Himelboim et al., 2013). 
Twitter was established by three young technologists in 2006 as a medium in which 
posts/Tweets are limited to 140 characters (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Himelboim et 
al., 2013; Hsu et al., 2013). Twitter is a media space for political news and discourse 
that includes citizen’s voices in addition to links from news media (Himelboim et al., 
2013). It is even called a news medium that hosts billions of social relations in addition 
to spreading information across the globe (Kwak et al., 2010). Twitter can cover 
“anything from intimate friendships to common interests, or even a passion for breaking 
news or celebrity gossip” (Cha et al., 2010, p. 10). But it is a powerful tool for political 
deliberation, in particular, during general elections and other big political events 
(Tumasjan et al., 2010). Twitter’s microblogging is different from traditional live news 
coverage of political events because it provides the opportunity for public debates on 
news events in addition to its real-time news coverage (Sakaki et al., 2010). According 
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to Lieberman (2014), polarized networks are among the most popular forms of Twitter 
networks, which are often formed on politics and political issues. Political polarization 
occurs when people are split into two groups on an issue –two dense clusters with little 
interconnections (Lieberman, 2014). During such political polarizations in online 
political discussions, members of one cluster demonstrate intolerance toward members 
of the opposing cluster through Tweets, Retweets, and information sharing. Such 
expressions emphasize the notions of US versus THEM among members of two clusters 
(Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman, 2014).  
Twitter users have both in-degree (being followed, retweeted, mentioned, or 
replied to) and out-degree (following, mentioning, or replying to) ties (Himelboim et al., 
2013; Himelboim et al., 2017; Lieberman, 2014). The existence of in-degree and out-
degree ties not only demonstrate the kind of ties established between the users, but also 
they give information about dominance and popularity of certain actors in the network 
(Hsu, Park, & Park, 2013; Krebs, 2016; Kadushin, 2012). Some Twitter profiles tend to 
be more dominant than most accounts and their tweets are more likely to be circulated 
by other users (Hsu et al., 2013). 
In short, social media networks are the most popular and interactive forms of 
virtual communication (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Duggan et al., 2015; Hansen et al., 
2011; Lieberman, 2014; Smith et al., 2014). Not only have they enabled citizens to 
easily and actively take part in the information production process, but also to form and 
lead public and political debates on issues, events, and people (Kwak et al., 2010; 
Tumasjan et al., 2010). Twitter is one of the top social media that has been used for 
social and political discourse, in particular during big political events such as elections 
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(Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Duggan et al., 2015; Hansen et al., 2011; Lieberman, 2014; 
Smith et al., 2014).  
Summary 
This chapter reviewed the shift from mass media to digital media. Overall, the 
transition from mass into digital media includes audience empowerment, fragmentation, 
and emergence of social media networks (Bennett, 2012; Gade & Lowrey, 2011a; 
Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2010; Singer, 2011). The emergence of online social 
networks is a major outcome of the shift from mass media to digital media, which has 
provided the public with a new space for social and political discourse, and playing 
active role in political decision makings (Gleave et al., 2009; Reich, 2010). Social 
media have given a new face to the public discourse by providing the people with 
highly interactive platforms for communicating their ideas, problems, and concerns with 
other citizens, actors, and organizations (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Duggan et al., 
2015; Hansen et al., 2011; Lieberman, 2014; Smith et al., 2014). Factors such as 
empowerment of audience, abundance of choices, and audience fragmentation – all may 
impact public discourse and the level of tolerance on social media (Himelboim et al., 
2013; Lieberman, 2014). The next chapter will explore mediated political discourse, 







Chapter 3: Tolerance and Intolerance in Online Political Discourse 
This dissertation explores how online social network structures contribute to 
tolerance and intolerance among people in political discourse on Twitter. “Political 
tolerance is greater in stable democracies that have endured over time,” with well-
developed socioeconomic status, where the citizens have more opportunities to involve 
and use their civil liberties for democratic activism and where free speech is guaranteed 
as a right of citizens (Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003, p. 2). The two-party system in the 
U.S. has created natural basis for two-pronged discourse – Republican vs. Democrat or 
Conservative vs. Liberal (Hill & Hughes, 1988; Himelboim et al., 2013). Tolerance and 
intolerance among the two parties have roots in the basic differences in their values and 
beliefs, which leads to political polarization among the U.S. public that reaches its highest 
level during the presidential election (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Dunlap & McCright, 
2008; Gruzd & Roy, 2012; Habermas, 1994; Wallace, 2009). In the U.S. 2016 election, 
the candidates campaigned in ways that highlighted the political system in the country 
(Berenson, 2016; Bradner, 2016; Tumulty. Rucker, & Gearan, 2016). The way the 
candidates for the general election, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, were interacting 
with each other reflected the deep intolerance between parties (Bradner, 2016; Tumulty. 
Rucker, & Gearan, 2016).   
Mediated political discourse has evolved with the shift from mass media to 
digital media. Traditionally, mediated political discourses such as presidential election 
campaigns and debates were solely handled by journalists and news media (Baum & 
Groeling, 2008; Bennett, 2012; Domke, McCoy, & Torres, 1999; Kraus & Davis, 
1990). Nowadays, political discussions find their ways into social media where people 
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continue talking and reacting over the problems and issues of their interests related to 
the elections and campaigns (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Bennett, 2012). As a result, the 
notions of free speech, public sphere and political discourse have also evolved with the 
dramatic growth of digital communication technologies (Vergeer, 2012; Bennett, 2012). 
Not only can citizens actively and directly take part in political discourse with other 
citizens, but also they can interact with political actors and the news media at very large 
scales (Vergeer, 2012; Wallace, 2009).  
The virtual sphere is a new marketplace of ideas in which citizens engage in 
exchanging their thoughts and opinions with each other in order to bring changes in 
their real societies (Schmuhl & Picard, 2005). It is a place for self-expression (Jones, 
1997), where ordinary individuals and groups directly reach out to each other 
(Grossman, 1995; Papacharissi, 2002; Rash, 1997). The emergence and use of virtual 
space in public discourse have changed the structure of public affairs (Castells, 2015; 
Grossman, 1995; Jones, 1997; Papacharissi, 2002; Rash, 1997). Free speech and factors 
such as tolerance and intolerance are prominent components of political discourse in 
virtual sphere (Beneke, 2006; Bezanson, 2012; Caro, 2011; Caro & Schulz, 2010; 
Drucker & Gumpert, 2009). Like the real world, political discourse in the virtual space 
is associated with expression of ideas and thoughts that foster democracy and freedom 
of speech among diverse groups of people. At the same time, people use the virtual 
space to express their prejudice and hatred toward those different from them on the 
basis of ideology, political view, and so forth (Cha et al., 2010; Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Lieberman, 2014; Pak & Paroubek, 2010; Smith et al., 2014).  
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Considering the free speech and democracy, political discourse in the virtual 
world becomes a way for expression of both tolerance and intolerance.  This chapter 
first, discusses the importance of freedom of speech and then tolerance and intolerance 
in political discourse in virtual political sphere and the role of framing in expression of 
tolerance and intolerance. The next part of the chapter briefly reviews the U.S. political 
discourse and the media. The last part of the chapter is an overview of the U.S. 2016 
presidential election and the political discourse on it.  
Free expression and democratic political discourse 
The term freedom of expression or free speech refers to speaking, seeking, 
receiving, and spreading any information and ideas through any medium (Beneke, 
2006; Barendt, 2005). The philosophical notions of free speech deal with the idea that 
human beings are rational creatures who are created equal, and that they should be 
granted unlimited freedom to express their ideas and thoughts even if those thoughts are 
against the dominant beliefs and practices in a society (Caro, 2011; Gordon, 1993; Mill, 
1861/1999; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956; Sullivan et al., 1993). Locke 
(1713/1988) argued that free expression is a natural right, as much an inherent right of 
humanity as the air we breathe. Milton (1918) defined freedom of speech as a multi-
faceted right that includes the right to express, seek, receive, impart, and disseminate 
information and ideas by any medium. Milton emphasized that truth emerges from open 
discussions when people freely put their ideas and knowledge in open encounter.   
Freedom of speech, as a democratic right, enables citizens to actively take part 
in political discourse and communicate their thoughts and opinions without the fear of 
government retaliation or censorship or social pressure from other people (Akdeniz, 
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2002; Bhuiyan, 2011; Emerson, 1963; Post, 1990; van Mill, 2002). Discourse is a form 
of interaction that plays an important role in political communication among people, 
which is related to individuals’ access to certain referential power and control of it (van 
Dijk, 1997). Such power and control enables individuals and groups to shape public 
opinions and dominant ideologies (van Dijk, 1997). Political discourse is a form of 
public discourse that deals with socio-political issues in a democratic society (Wodak, 
1989). Connolly (1993) defined the term political discourse as political thought 
consisted of framing of political reflection, and “judgments or commitments that are 
conventionally sanctioned when these criteria are met” (p. 2). Some of the most 
influential political discourse occurs in informal communications among family, 
friends, and peers, in classrooms, restaurants and bars, even churches (Van Renesse, 
Birman, & Maffeis, 1996). It also takes place in the form of political debates, speeches, 
hearings, and other kinds of interactions (Connolly, 1993; Wodak, 1989). In the United 
States, the First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech for all citizens, which 
encourages the citizens to express all kinds of ideas and beliefs in public (Beneke, 
2006). 
Considering the right of free speech, the idea that the public should be closely 
involved in societal issues has roots in democratic ideals and active participation of 
citizens in public affairs (Papacharissi, 2002). These roots grew from 17th and 18th 
century Enlightenment philosophers’ thoughts that individuals should be allowed to 
speak their thoughts and opinions freely so the truth emerges as a result of confrontation 
of different kinds of information (Locke, 1690/1963; Milton, 1918). The primary goal 
of political discourse is that heterogeneous communities communicate their ideas and 
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beliefs freely “so that a common democratic and public opinion maybe formed” (Post, 
1990, p. 603). Political discussions involve exposure to politically dissimilar 
perspectives (Sullivan et al.,1993). According to Mill (1884/1973), “It is hardly possible 
… to overstate the value . . . of placing human beings in contact with other persons 
dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with which 
they are familiar” (p. 594). Discussion partners should have different opinions and 
views so they can communicate those differences (Mill, 1884/1973). The Founding 
Fathers of the United States took these ideas into practice by encouraging the American 
colonies for outspoken political criticism in order for the colonies to get their 
independence (Schudson & Tifft, 2005).   
In order for political discourse to happen, there is a need for a marketplace, 
public sphere, where people can freely exchange their ideas and thoughts and 
standpoints (Papacharissi, 2002; Schmuhl & Picard, 2005). The idea of public sphere 
first emerged in the 18th century when citizens began discussing their problems in social 
gatherings and made their voices heard by the authorities (Habermas, 1991). Before that 
time, all issues related to public life were controlled or belonged to the state, authorities, 
and the ruling class (Fraser, 1990; Habermas, 1991). The term public sphere was coined 
by the Frankfurt School philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, in 1962 in his book: The 
structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois 
society. He defined public sphere as a domain of social life where public opinion is 
formed via rational public debate. According to Habermas, informed and rational 
discussions can lead to public agreement and decision making that best represent 
democracy. Democratic governments provide the sphere for political discourse where 
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all citizens, from different backgrounds and demographics can equally participate in 
public affairs and raise their voices for development and change in society (Habermas, 
1994). In such an ideal public sphere, everybody respects everybody else’s ideas, 
beliefs, values, and other differences, and there is no discrimination against individuals 
and groups on the basis of demographic differences and social and political dominance 
(Papacharissi, 2002). The public sphere is a place where ideas are expressed and 
debated (Merrill, 2011).  
Media and communication technologies play a crucial role in political discourse 
by providing the public with the marketplace or sphere to communicate their thoughts, 
problems, and concerns (Castells, 2015; Merrill, 2011). The public media are often seen 
to serve for citizens’ participation in public policies and issues in a democratic society 
(Merrill, 2011; Schudson & Tifft, 2005). From the early days of the print and broadcast 
media, the media played crucial roles in informing and educating the public about issues 
and events – social, political, economic, cultural, and so forth (Dimmick et al., 2011; 
Schudson & Tifft, 2005; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). In American society, the print media 
played a foundational in mobilizing American colonies to get their independence, form 
a new nation, and develop as new form of politics (Schudson & Tifft, 2005). The 
invention of the telegraph enhanced the quality, speed, and spread of news media and 
information flow during the Civil War politics in the second half of the 19th century 
(Schudson & Tifft, 2005). In the early 20th century, the advent of radio led to the 
emergence of broadcast media, which brought political leaders and their voices to 
households and people could hear political elites’ voices on public issues (Schudson & 
Tifft, 2005). A decade later, the development of the television gave a new dimension to 
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broadcast media and political discourse (Adams, 1983; Albrecht, 2006; Schudson & 
Tifft, 2005). The television pioneered hosting political debates between the candidates 
for political positions among which the presidential election debates have been one of 
the most watched broadcast shows of all time (Adams, 1983; Albrecht, 2006; 
Druckman, 2003; Jamieson, 2011).  
Despite the services of mass media, the public could not directly participate in 
mediated political discourse due to lack of direct access to mediated communication 
process and flow of information (Gade, 2011; Merrill, 2011). Mass media 
communication was largely a one-way process – media spoke, audience listened, with 
little opportunity for providing feedback (Lowrey & Gade, 2011). In other words, the 
public mainly listened, viewed, or read the mediated political discourse, but they could 
not directly take part in it or form their own political discourse beyond their family and 
friends’ circles (Castells, 2015; Jones, 1997; Papacharissi, 2002). 
Networked media have provided the public with the communication tools, 
spaces, and platforms through which they can form public and political debates beyond 
geographic, cultural, and other physical boundaries (Blumer & Gurevitch, 2001; 
Castells, 2015). This new public sphere is called cyberspace, virtual space, online space, 
and social media environment, where traditional mythic narratives of progress meet the 
desire toward self-fulfillment and development (Ankerson, 2015; Grossman, 1995; 
Jones, 1997; Rash, 1997). Virtual sphere is a place for interaction among individuals 
and groups who exchange their ideas and beliefs regarding real life events and issues 
(Castells, 2015). 
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There are two ideas about the potentials of digital communication technologies 
for democracy. First, virtual space is a new marketplace of ideas where people engage 
in exchanging their thoughts and ideas with each other for social, political, and 
economic benefits (Schmuhl & Picard, 2005). Virtual space can create the environment 
for formation of virtual town squares where conversation among citizens and citizens 
and authorities can take place in a matter of seconds (Ankerson, 2015; Papacharissi, 
2002; Vergeer, 2012). The virtual public sphere is a place for self-expression (Jones, 
1997), where little-known individuals and groups directly reach out to citizens and 
change the structure of public affairs (Papacharissi, 2002). “Acquiring and dispersing 
political communication online is fast, easy, cheap, and convenient (p. 14).  
The second idea suggests that the potential of digital communication 
technologies can easily be undermined. The digital age with its endless choices and 
citizen activities, encourages people to seek media they want (Albrecht, 2006; 
Gurevitch et al., 2009; Lowrey & Gade, 2011a; Sobieraj & Berry, 201). This kind of 
empowerment has made the citizens to expect much more from these media and often 
consume the kind information that fits their ideologies and beliefs (Adamic & Glance, 
2005; Himelboim et al., 2013; Mislove et al., 2007; Wojcieszak, 2011). This results in 
the formation of clusters of people with common interests communicating together 
online (Cha et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2014; Pak & Paroubek, 2010; Smith et al., 2014). 
They communicate with like-minded others, which can easily mean they seldom hear 
views that conflict with their own, or know that they can express views that others in 
network will agree with (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Himelboim et al., 2013). The 
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network structure of online discourse, especially social media networks, can easily – 
and for many does – become an echo chamber (Lieberman, 2014; Smith et al., 2014). 
The majority of participants tend to remain in the groups with similar 
political/ideological orientations (Himelboim et al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Wallace, 2009). Such groupings of people with like-minded others create the idea of in-
group vs. out-group perception among people (Caro & Schulz, 2010; Cote & Erickson, 
2009; Saito, 2011). The concept of in-group vs. out-group in political discourse on 
social media is discussed in how people of opposing political ideologies interact with 
each other in political discourse (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Lieberman, 2014; Himelboim et al., 2017).  
There are clusters of liberals versus conservatives, where members of one group 
show less patience for expressions of the opposite group (Himelboim, et al., 2013; 
Lieberman, 2014). Such impatience toward expressions of opposition groups’ thoughts 
conflicts with the notions of freedom of speech and democratic political debates. In 
other words, the virtual space can create the environment for expression of hate speech 
that facilitates discriminatory conversations among people (Arthur, 2011; Fisher, 2001). 
These ideas regarding the virtual space a public sphere for free expression of ideas and 
political discourse bring up the discussion of tolerance and intolerance in the online 
world, which is discussed in the following section.  
Tolerance  
The word tolerance is synonymous with acceptance, endurance, open-
mindedness, patience, fortitude, stamina, indiscrimination, and unprejudiced (Merriam 
Webster Dictionary, n. d.). According to Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, the word 
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tolerance means the “willingness to accept feelings, habits, or beliefs that are different 
from your own,” or “the ability to accept, experience, or survive something harmful or 
unpleasant.” From a Lockean perspective, tolerance is about respecting other people’s 
“inward beliefs” (e.g. religion) and providing an environment for free practice of 
religion rather than prosecuting or punishing other individuals because of their faiths 
(Locke, 1690/1963, p. 12). Tolerance is “the result of experiences which are 
characterized by heterogeneity of ideas, or direct or various exposure to other ways of 
life and other ways of defining situations” (Borhek, 1965, p. 89). Tolerance is about “a 
willingness to ‘put up with’ those things that one rejects” (Sullivan et al., 1979, p. 785). 
Thus, “one is tolerant to the extent one is prepared to extend freedom to those ideas one 
rejects, whatever these ideas might be” (Sullivan et al., 1979, p. 784). Moreover, 
“tolerance is a person’s willingness to support the civic and political rights of fellow 
citizens with whom [he or] she disagrees” (Hiskey, 2013, p. 1). 
Cote and Erickson (2009) define tolerance as “complex, stemming from a 
combination of social networks, voluntary association activities, and individual 
attributes” (p. 1664). Cote and Erickson argue that tolerance is a form of social capital. 
While “Social capital is a social network experience producing some positively valued 
outcome” tolerance is often considered the result of such an outcome (p. 1665). This 
means that more contacts with different groups of people encourage individuals to 
“interact, cooperate, share valued experiences, come to like” members of those groups 
and think positively about them (p. 1665).  
Furthermore, tolerance is about rejection of prejudice at the cognitive level and 
acceptance of differences at the social level (Habermas, 2004). Prejudice often consists 
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of stereotyping the beliefs of out-groups, negative evaluation of the members of the out-
group, and “a predisposition to act negatively toward the group” (Sullivan et al., 1993, 
p. 5). Tolerance fosters co-existence of communities and reciprocity between them 
including respect for freedom of expression, freedom of association, and self-obligation 
to behave tolerantly (Habermas, 2004). Also, tolerance entails the “acceptance of the 
differences between others and ourselves that we would rather fight, ignore, or 
overcome” (Van Doorn, 2014, p. 905). It refers to accepting that our own world views 
are not the only versions of the truth, and “we must also tolerate those who express the 
ideas, despite their ‘otherness’” (Lewis, 1988, p. 17).  
In addition, tolerance refers to cross-group communication among diverse 
groups of people (Cote & Erickson, 2009; Sullivan et al., 1993). Cross group interaction 
increases the opportunity for people to learn about groups different from them and 
become more tolerant toward those people (Cote & Erickson, 2009). Cross-group 
interaction can increase tolerance among people (Caro & Schulz, 2010; Cote & 
Erickson, 2009). Interaction with diverse groups of people results in individuals’ 
positive social orientations toward out-group people and the individuals tend to become 
more willing to accept people different from themselves (Caro & Schulz, 2010; Cote & 
Erickson, 2009; Saito, 2011). Tolerant individuals are willing to cooperate with out-
group people, support them in their socio-political activities, value their socio-political 
efforts, accept them in their own group, and like them –tolerance (Cote & Erickson, 
2009; Sullivan et al., 1993). Voluntary association activities widen individuals’ social 
network and increase interaction and flow of information across different groups (Cote 
& Erickson, 2009; Putnam, 2000). Voluntary associations are viewed as “‘schools for 
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democracy’ where people learn a range of civic skills and virtues as they take part in 
and govern their special interest groups” (Cote & Erickson, 2009, p. 1671). It is also 
true that associations are established on the basis of a certain identity, belief, and other 
characteristics and demographics that can foster competition with groups different from 
one’s own, which can increase intolerance for out-group members (Cote & Erickson, 
2009). In other words, voluntary associations are often established to enforce 
homogeneity among people –churches, neighborhood organizations, etc. (Mutz & 
Mondak, 2006).  
Furthermore, political tolerance among people differs on the basis of education, 
(Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003). Studies have shown that people with higher levels of 
education tend to be more tolerant toward people who are different from them (e.g. 
minorities) compared to those who have less education (Beatty & Walter, 1984; Cote & 
Erickson, 2009; Gex-Collet, 2012; Hazama, 2011; Hiskey, 2013; Sullivan et al., 1993). 
As democratic citizens, if people want to enjoy their own freedoms, they need to be 
equally tolerant of others’ freedoms as they themselves expect those other individuals to 
be tolerant of theirs (Mill, 1861/1999).  
Drawing from the above literature, in this study, tolerance is a form of cognitive 
and emotional social capital, which enables individuals to endure each other’s 
ideologies, social and cultural values and beliefs, and biological and physical 
differences, and do not express discriminatory ideas, attitudes, and behaviors toward 
them.  
In the virtual world, tolerance refers to cross-group communication and 
expression of acceptance, openness to interact and make friends with diverse people and 
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sources of information, and respect toward people different from one’s self on the basis 
of ideology, personal beliefs, and demographics (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Himelboim 
et al., 2013). 
Intolerance 
Tolerance and intolerance are at the two ends of a spectrum –meaning they are 
the opposite of one another (Lewis, 1988; Locke, 1690/1963). Intolerance includes all 
those behaviors and actions that are in violation with tolerance –unwillingness to accept 
those who have different beliefs and values from one’s self (Locke, 1690/1963; Sullivan 
et al., 1979). For instance, interfering in other individuals’ ideological or religious 
beliefs is an act of intolerance, which can also include discrimination and prejudice 
against them only because of their personal opinions and values (Coward, 1986; Yang 
& Self, 2015). 
There is no clear definition for intolerance in the existing literature. Reviewing 
some court cases and literature on tolerance, intolerance can be defined as 
unwillingness to accept (rejecting) those who have different beliefs and values from 
one’s self (Locke, 1690/1963; Sullivan et al., 1979), which deals with discrimination 
and prejudice against other people (Coward, 1986; Yang & Self, 2015). It can be 
expressed in different forms of defamation, hate speech, name calling, attempt to attack 
violently, attempt to provoke outrage, cursing and swearing at someone, discriminating 
against one’s demographics or beliefs and values, and the use of fighting words (Smith, 
N.A; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942; Snyder v. Phelps, 2011; Teeter & Loving, 
2008; Texas v. Johnson, 1989). It also refers to an intent to threaten, display of symbols 
that arouses anger, alarm or resentment, invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional 
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distress, accuse someone of a crime, and attack their personal business and reputation 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011; Smith, N.A; Teeter & Loving, 2008; Texas v. Johnson, 1989). 
Or it refers to the rejection of views/acts of either in-group or out-group and resorts to 
language that expects or demands the group to think or act differently (Locke, 
1690/1963; Mill, 1861/1999; Sullivan et al., 1979).  
Intolerance increases social distance among groups and communities and 
decreases the chance for formation of cross-group ties (Coward, 1986; Lewis, 1988). 
This is because getting stuck in one’s own group decreases the motivation for being 
involved in diverse social networks and associations (Cote & Erickson, 2009).  
Intolerance in the virtual world refers to the tendency to communicate and make 
friends predominantly with those like one’s self (Yang & Self, 2015). Such tendency for 
grouping with likeminded people often results in the usage of like-minded sources of 
information, and expressing dislike and discrimination toward those different from them 
(Himelboim et al., 2013; Yang & Self, 2015).  
Levels of tolerance and intolerance vary among people on the basis of individual 
attributes and characteristics such as political ideology, sociocultural beliefs, attitudes, 
religion, education, and membersip in minority groups (Cigler and Joslyn, 2002; Cote & 
Erickson, 2009; Erickson, 2004; Habermas, 2003; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003).   
There is a strong association between religion and political intolerance that even 
the discourse of tolerance began from religious intolerance in the 17th century (Beatty & 
Walter, 1984). Religion has been a key source of intolerance in the history of humanity 
(Coward, 1986). Religion has given birth to religious discriminations and formal 
persecution (Coward, 1986; Fichtner, 2008; Kaplan, 2009). Religious discrimination is 
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different from other types of discrimination, because it is not on the basis of biological 
or physical differences (e.g. race, gender, or physical disabilities), rather, it is about 
differences in people’s inward values and beliefs (Coward, 1986). From a psychological 
perspective, even though most people follow the faiths of their parents and ancestors, 
individuals choose whether to be part of a religious group or not (Coward, 1986). Such 
individual pride can be a symptom of blindness to others or others’ perspectives 
(Coward, 1986; Djupe, 2015; Hiskey, 2013).  
Intolerance can be observed in the expression of ideological differences between 
individuals or groups (Brandt et al., 2014; Coward, 1986; Caro & Schulz, 2010; Cote & 
Erickson, 2009; Djupe, 2015; Graham et al., 2009; Hiskey, 2013; Saito, 2011; Skitka & 
Bauman, 2008; Van Dijk, 2003; Wetherell et a., 2013). Van Dijk (2003) defines 
ideologies as belief systems used “as the basis of the social representations of groups” 
that include “any kind of socially shared mental representation” (p. 207).  Ideological 
differences play important roles in individuals’ and groups’ perceptions, expressions, 
and behaviors toward those who are different from them (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & 
Hanson, 1998; Brandt et al., 2014; Jussim et al., 2013). The main political ideologies in 
the last two centuries have been socialism, liberalism, conservatism, communism, green 
politics, and so forth (van Dijk, 2003). Contemporary political ideologies in the U.S. are 
often defined in relation to broad dimensions of liberal and conservative or left-wing 
and right-wing (Brandt et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2009; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; 
Wetherell et al., 2013). Individuals tend to group with those who follow political 
ideologies and parties that fit their own thoughts and beliefs and oppose those who 
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choose groups and parties that are different from their own (Berry et al., 1998; Brandt et 
al., 2014; Sullivan et al., 1993; van Dijk (2003).  
Whether members of one group have tolerance or intolerance toward a group 
different from them can influence the group to respond accordingly (Cote & Erickson, 
2009; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, & Russen, 2000; Pettigrew, 1998). Such response is 
called reciprocity in social psychology, which suggests that satisfaction of individuals 
from other people in social relationships encourage the individuals to offer similar 
response in exchange (Rook, 1987). In other words, if members of group A are tolerant 
toward group B, the members of group B will also show tolerance toward group A –
meaning tolerance increases tolerance and intolerance increases intolerance (Cote & 
Erickson, 2009). Therefore, if the first group shows intolerance toward the other group, 
the response will more likely be the same (Cote & Erickson, 2009). People who hold 
conflicting ideologies see each other as opponents (Benhabib, 1996). If people limit 
their social interactions with like-minded others, it will lead to polarization and growth 
of extremism due to lack of knowledge about multiple political perspectives (Sunstein, 
2001).  
Competition and lack of personal contact foster intolerance among individuals 
and groups, because they see each other as threat (Cote & Erickson, 2009). Political 
intolerance includes disliking or discriminating against individuals and groups who 
have dissimilar values, threatening their security and safety, and violating their moral 
values (Brandt et al., 2014). For instance, people agree that members of their opposing 
groups should be banned from a public office (e.g. being the U.S. president), banned 
from speaking out their ideas and organize public rallies, and banned from teaching in 
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public schools (Sullivan et al., 1979; Sullivan et al., 1993). People also agree that 
members of their opposing groups get fired from their jobs or outlawed, their 
communications are monitored by government, and books written by them are removed 
from libraries (Sullivan et al., 1979; Sullivan et al., 1993). Intolerant individuals tend to 
have pessimistic views about the future of their out-groups and are resistant toward 
accepting members of the out-group in their own groups. In other words, people often 
have double standards when it comes to out-group people in relations to themselves–
fostering the US versus THEM or liking the in-group and disliking the out-group (Cote 
& Erickson, 2009). However, the perceptions toward their own beliefs and practices 
(e.g. ideological, political, religious, etc.) are more positive compared to the perceptions 
toward others’ beliefs (e.g. atheists, communists, homosexuals, militarists, racists, etc.) 
(Beatty & Walter, 1984). Another factor that plays a key role in shaping tolerance and 
intolerance in political discourse is framing (Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003), which is 
discussed in the following section. 
The Role of Framing in Discourse of Tolerance 
Tolerance and intolerance in political discourse involve framing of in-group 
versus out-group people, in which individuals express liking or disliking and support or 
discrimination toward people who are different from them (Peffley & Rohrschneider, 
2003; Sullivan et al., 1979; Sullivan et al., 1993). Framing refers to the process by 
which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their 
thinking about an issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). Framing is the process of 
describing or defining certain attributes of issues, people, or events (Coleman & 
Banning, 2006; Entman, 1993; Goffman, 1974; Lang and Lang, 1983; McCombs & 
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Estrada, 1997; Wanta and Wu, 1992; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004). Framing can be used 
in “making new beliefs available about an issue, making certain available beliefs 
accessible,” or making beliefs applicable or “strong” in people’s evaluations (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007, p. 111). Entman (1993) argues that framing “involves selection and 
salience,” as he says: 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (p. 52) 
Frames are aspects of issues that can contain both verbal and nonverbal 
attributes, which make communication more effective (Coleman & Banning, 2006; 
McCombs & Estrada, 1997). Friedland and Mengbai (1996) define frames as “bridge[s] 
between… larger social and cultural realms” (p.13). Frames “prescribe” an issue, then 
“define the problems” based on “common cultural values” and then make “moral 
judgments” about the problems (Entman, 1993, p. 52).  
In the communication process, frames are produced by communicators in the 
context of keywords, concepts, metaphors, stereotyped terms, symbols, phrases, and 
images (Bliss-Carroll, 2016; Entman, 1991,1993; Pavalanathan & Eisenstein, 2015). 
Words and images have the capacity to stimulate the media message in favor or against 
political competitors (Entman, 2004). These words and images can frame world events 
as highly “understandable,” “memorable” and culturally influential (p. 6). Furthermore, 
Chong and Druckman (2007) call frames “adjectives” that are stronger, “superior,” 
applicable, and often convey “exaggerations,” “symbols, endorsements, and links to 
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partisanship and ideology” (p. 111). Political frames are used to emphasize problems 
without discussing the solutions, or to reinforce negative aspects of an issue more than 
the positive sides of it (Entman, 2003).  
Studies have shown that in the framing of in-group versus out-group, people 
tend to express their tolerance and intolerance as following. First, people often have 
positive tone in talking about in-group individuals by expressing their support, respect, 
acceptance, pride, love, good wishes, and excitement toward them (Hardisty, Johnson, 
& Weber, 2009; Schubert & Otten, 2002; Shah, Brazy & Higgins, 2004; Powell, 
Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005; Tropp & Wright, 2001). Second, in contrast to in-group 
framing, people often tend to have negative tone toward out-group by expressing 
discrimination, criticism, disrespect, rejection, jittery, hatred, dislike, hostility, and 
shame (Hardisty et al., 2009; Schubert & Otten, 2002; Shah et al., 2004; Powell et al., 
2005; Tropp & Wright, 2001). For instance, people from one group framed members of 
other groups as outsiders and dangerous terrorists and criminals who should not be 
allowed to exercise their democratic rights (Brandt et al., 2014; Peffley & 
Rohrschneider, 2003; Sullivan et al., 1979; Sullivan et al., 1993; Yang & Self, 2015). 
The next section reviews tolerance and intolerance in the U.S. political discourse.   
U.S. Political Discourse  
In the U.S., political discourse is centered around two main schools of thoughts 
that usually define the interests of the two parties. The two-party political system in the 
U.S. (Republican and Democrat) often creates polarized political discourse among 
public (Hill & Hughes, 1988; Himelboim et al., 2013). Tolerance and intolerance 
between the two parties have roots in the basic differences in their values and beliefs 
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(Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Habermas, 1994). Republicans are known as conservatives 
who trace their roots to classical liberalism of the 18th century, in which philosophers 
like John Locke, Adam Smith, and Tomas Jefferson “affirmed their faith in the rational 
abilities of humans to determine their own destinies” (Dye & Zeigler, 1986, p. 33). 
Based on this school of thoughts, “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain alienable Rights [and] that among these are Life, Liberty and 
pursuit of Happiness” or property (p. 33). Classic liberalism “asserted the dignity and 
worth of the individual” and suggested a limited government formed with the consent of 
the governed people to protect their individual liberty (p. 33). This school of thoughts is 
also closely related to capitalism as an economic ideology and emphasizes the rights of 
individuals to make contracts, trades, and bargains with very limited government 
intervention (Dye & Zeigler, 1986). As a result, Republicans claim they are true 
liberals, because they emphasize individualism, limited government, and free enterprise 
(Dye & Zeigler, 1986). Also, Republicans tend to be more religious, antiabortion, anti-
homosexuality, and resistant to affirmative action (Levendusky, 2009).  
On the other hand, Democrats are known as contemporary liberals that emerged 
in the 20th century who value “individual dignity, civil rights, due process of law, and 
equality of opportunity” (Dye & Zeigler, 1986, p. 34). Democrats recognize that some 
people are not as capable or motivated to exercise their talents or intellects toward 
individual development or economic gain (Dunlap & McCright, 2008). Furthermore, 
not all individuals are created economically equal, nor are there equal opportunities for 
people of different socio-economic strata (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Freeman, 1986). 
These are the reasons for the positive power of government and why Democrats tend to 
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favor more government regulation of businesses and more social programs for under-
privileged and poor (Dye & Zeigler, 1986; Freeman, 1986). Democrats tend to be less 
religious, pro-abortion, advocates for minorities, immigrants, and homosexuals (Uggen 
& Manza, 2002).  
Following the two-party ideology, individuals, political actors, and groups and 
organizations express their ideas, reflections, and beliefs toward each other that include 
elements of tolerance and intolerance as listed above (Himelboim et al., 2009; 
Himelboim et al., 2013; Hill & Hughes, 1988; Wallace, 2009). Studies have shown that 
both liberals and conservatives show similar intolerance toward each other (Adamic & 
Glance, 2005; Brandt et al., 2014; Himelboim et al., 2013). Conservatives are more 
likely to consume conservative news media and grassroots media and get involved in 
the conversations with like-minded people online (Himelboim et al., 2009; Yang & 
Self, 2015). In contrast, liberals tend to consume more traditional news media 
(Himelboim et al., 2009).  Also, there are differences among liberals and conservatives 
in their discussions of news articles, social, political, and economic topics, and political 
figures (Adamic & Glance, 2005). For instance, conservatives tend to refer to 
conservative news media and grassroots information sources, while liberals largely use 
mainstream news media as their sources of information (Adamic & Glance, 2005).  
These differences and disagreements between Republicans and Democrats lead 
to a stronger in-group agreement within each party (Cote & Erickson, 2009; Habermas, 
2004; Lewis, 1988; Van Doorn, 2014). News media largely cover political issues and 
events in accordance with Republican vs. Democrat analogies, which reinforces 
political polarization in political discourse –e.g. CNN and FoxNews (Hindman, 2011). 
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Moreover, in recent decades, the number of partisan news media has increased and 
these outlets cover issues and events in ways that is in favor of their own party and 
against the opponent party (Hindman, 2011). According to Hindman, by such emphasis 
on polarized ideologies and values by the mainstream news media, the citizens are 
exposed to polarized information even if they do not identify as Republican or 
Democrat. For instance, the coverage of elections in news media largely takes place like 
a horse-race, in which the main focus is on winning and losing of candidates 
(Farnsworth & Lichter, 2010). 
 Thus, most political discussions in the U.S. become polarized, and such 
polarization not only creates the environment for discussing tolerance and intolerance, 
but also for expressing them (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Brandt et al., 2014; Gruzd & 
Roy, 2012). Political polarization reaches its peak during the last week of presidential 
election (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Gruzd & Roy, 2012). Himelboim et al. (2013) 
studied cross-ideological political discussions on Twitter during 2010 midterm elections 
and found that there are not many cross-ideological political discussions on Twitter. 
Presidential Elections and Mediated Political Discourse  
The news media are regarded as the fourth branch of government alongside 
executive, judiciary, and legislative branches (Farnsworth & Lichter, 2010; Merrill, 
2011). Political campaigns and elections are among the biggest events covered by the 
news media in the forms of political debates, news, and entertainment (Farnsworth & 
Lichter, 2010). Media are important means of communication for political events such 
as elections and candidates largely dependent on the media in oder to directly 
communicate their messages with citizens (Bezanson, 2012; Kraus & Davis, 1976). 
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Since the mid-1900s, the candidates have largely used news media to spread their 
messages to voters (Farnsworth & Lichter, 2010). The primary work of traditional 
media in mediated political discourse has been hosting political debates, political talk 
shows, and coverage of election campaigns and the elections (Farnsworth & Lichter, 
2010). The advent of digital media and audience fragmentation for traditional media 
have led to a dramatic decline of the audiences of mass media (Hindman, 2011). 
Nowadays, presidential election campaigns largely take place in the virtual world, 
where the candidates and political actors can directly target their publics (Scharl & 
Weichselbraun, 2008; Schwartz, 2015; Vergeer, 2012; Wallace, 2009).   
In the digital age, citizens have substantially different access to candidates and 
other citizens than the mass media age, when citizens had to rely more on legacy news 
media for information (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010; Vergeer, 2012). Nowadays, citizens 
have direct access to information about candidates and their advocates, which enables 
them to not only become informed about the candidates and their goals and strategies, 
but also to express their personal thoughts and reflections regarding the candidates 
(Scharl & Weichselbraun, 2008; Vergeer, 2012; Wallace, 2009). This is why political 
actors, organizations, parties, and candidates all try to have an existence on social media 
in order to have a voice among the public (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010; Vergeer, 2012). 
In general, media consumption and engagement in socio-political discussions on social 
media are related to people’s ideological, political, religious, and cultural beliefs, which 
can influence their tolerance and intolerance toward others (Agiesta, 2016; Lieberman 
2014; Smith et al., 2014; Yang & Self, 2015). The discussions on political issues, 
events, and actors on social media often lead to the emergence of two dense clusters of 
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people, with little interconnection between them, who are split in their opinion on 
certain issues (Lieberman, 2014).  
The U.S. 2004 presidential election was the first election in the United States in 
which blogs were used profoundly during the campaigns (Adamic & Glance, 2005; 
Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010; Scharl & Weichselbraun, 2008; Vergeer, 2012; Wallace, 
2009). The 2008 presidential election in the U.S. was the first presidential election in 
which social media such as Facebook and Twitter were used for political campaigns 
(Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010). Young adults, especially, first voters, used video sharing 
websites not only for getting campaign information but also for sharing the information, 
exchanging ideas and viewpoints, and expressing support for their favorite candidates 
(Kohut, 2008; Smith & Rainie, 2008). Most observers viewed Barak Obama’s success 
as an outcome of his social media campaign (Gruzd & Roy, 2012; Kushin & 
Yamamoto, 2010).  
 Twitter has become one of the most popular social media for political discourse 
during presidential elections (Ankerson, 2015; Cha et al., 2010; Conover et al., 2011; 
Gruzd & Roy, 2012; Jansen et al., 2009; Kwak et al., 2010; Pak & Paroubek, 2010; 
Sakaki et al., 2010; Schwartz, 2015). Political discourse on Twitter often takes shape 
around users’ political affiliations, which create the environment for debating against 
the opposing groups and in favor of one’s own group (Himelboim et al., 2013; Meraz, 
2009; Tumasjan et al., 2010). Twitter tags and hashtags (#) are largely used by Twitter 
users through which the users associate themselves with people, issues, and events 
either as advocates or opponents (Cha et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2014; Pak & Paroubek, 
2010; Smith et al., 2014).   
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The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election and Political Discourse  
The 2016 election was the 58th presidential election in the United States for 
electing the 45th president of the country (Jackson, 2017). Hilary Clinton was the 
candidate from the Democratic Party (from six candidates) and Donald Trump was the 
Republican Party candidate (from among seventeen candidates) (Andrews, Bennett, & 
Parlapiano, 2016a; Andrews, Lai, Parlapiano, & Yourish, 2016b). The success of 
Clinton and Trump in the primary elections helped them come out as their parties’ 
candidates for the general election highlighted the political division in the country 
(Killough, 2016; Niose, 2016). The candidates carried on a campaign with nasty 
personal attacks, in which much of their own discourse revealed little tolerance for the 
other (Killough, 2016). Given that such tone was set by the candidates themselves, it 
would appear logical that the same negative, personal and out-group attacks appeared in 
the citizens’ discourse (Killough, 2016; Niose, 2016).  According to a CNN/ORC Poll, 
8-in-10 Americans said that during 2016 election the country was divided more than 
anytime in the past several decades (Agiesta, 2016). More than 200 newspapers 
endorsed Clinton and less than 20 newspapers endorsed Trump (Sillito, 2016). 
Both Clinton and Trump had controversial backgrounds and plans for future 
(Killough, 2016; Niose, 2016). Some voters called both Clinton and Trump “evils,” and 
preferred to vote for the one that looked “the lesser of two evils” (Long, 2016, para. 1). 
Trump for instance, is a multibillionaire who did not release his finances, in particular 
tax papers (Barstow, Craig, Buettner, & Twohey, 2016). Documents investigated by 
The New York Times indicate that in 1995, Trump declared a $916 million loss on his 
income tax returns, which “could have allowed him to legally avoid paying any federal 
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income taxes for up to 18 years” (Barstow et al., 2016, p. 1). He has been the first 
Presidential election candidate in the U.S. history who hid his finances from the public. 
Also, Trump did not distance himself from his businesses during the presidential 
election campaigns (Venook, 2016). 
Trump was accused of sexual assault and abuse of labor (Scherer, 2015). During 
the campaigns, Trump proposed plans for refugees and immigration in the U.S., which 
included building a wall on the U.S. border with Mexico as a way of preventing South 
Americans from entering the U.S. soil illegally (Scherer, 2015; Zurcher, 2016). He also 
suggested a temporary ban on entrance Muslims to the U.S. for national security of 
Americans (Zurcher, 2016). Trump’s immigration policy was a response to the 
Democrats’ immigration policy (during Obama’s presidency) that helped five million 
undocumented immigrants from South America and accepted more than 2,000 Muslim 
immigrants from Syria and Iraq (Berman, 2014; Shear & Cooper, 2017). 
Clinton on the other hand, was accused of betraying the American public as the 
Secretary of State by using her personal email dealing with controversial international 
issues such as the attack on the U.S. embassy in Libya (Graham, 2016). Clinton not 
only supported friendly immigration policies, but also suggested that the number of 
Syrian refugees settled in the U.S. should increase from 10,000 to 65,000 (Zurcher, 
2016). Clinton supported racial equality, in particular, she advocated regulations that 
could benefit African Americans (e.g. laws that reduce police brutality) (Zurcher, 
2016).  
The majority of Republicans supported Trump, which helped him get the GOP 
support for representing the Republican Party (Roberts & Owen, 2016). Some of the 
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high-profile Republicans who supported Trump were Sarah Palin, John A. Boehner, 
Dick Cheney, Mitch McConnell, and Rand Paul (Krishnakuma & Bellantoni, 2016). It 
was not until the release of a tape from 2005 on October 7, 2016, on mainstream media 
that some top Republican politicians distanced themselves from Trump (Fahrenthold, 
2016; Roberts & Owen, 2016). In the tape, Trump used misogynist terms about kissing, 
grabbing, and having sex with women without their permission (Fahrenthold, 2016). In 
his conversation with Billy Bush on the tape, Trump says that “when you’re a star, they 
let you do it…you can grab them by the pussy” (para. 1). Hours after the release of the 
tape, prominent members of Republican Party started backing away from Trump and 
said they were not supporting Trump for presidency (e.g. Paul Ryan, Condoleezza Rice, 
and so forth) (Samuels, 2016). Some major Republican donors even asked Trump to 
give them their donated money back (Samuels, 2016). Furthermore, seventy-eight 
Republican politicians, donors and officials announced their support for Hillary Clinton 
(Blake, 2016). 
Both Trump and Clinton heavily relied on social media, in particular Twitter, 
during their campaigns (McCormick, 2016; Rubin, 2016). However, Trump heavily 
relied on social media, especially Twitter, to discuss his standpoints regarding the issues 
and topics discussed in mainstream media and among the public (Rubin, 2016). He used 
social media as a direct platform to communicate with his target public that he even 
argued that “social media has more power than the money they spent” (McCormick, 
2016, para, 2). He even tweeted at 3 a.m., which became a time for his controversial 
attacks on his political rival and her supporters (Rubin, 2016). 
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The primary election campaign began in April 12, 2015, in which 23 candidates 
(6 candidates from Democratic Party and 17 from Republican Party) started 
campaigning (Berenson, 2016; Bradner, 2016; Tumulty. Rucker, & Gearan, 2016). Over 
the coming months, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders came out as the top candidates 
running for the Democratic Party nomination, and Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Marco 
Rubio, and John Kasich as the top candidates for the Republican Party who competed in 
the primary elections (Andrews et al., 2016a; Berenson, 2016; Bradner, 2016; Tumulty. 
Rucker, & Gearan, 2016). Among the Democratic Party candidates, Clinton won in 34 
states and Sanders won in 23 states, which led to Clinton’s victory in the Democratic 
National Convention by winning 2,220 delegate counts while Sanders only won 1,831 
(Andrews et al., 2016a). Therefore, on July 26, 2016, the Convention officially 
nominated Clinton for 2016 presidential election and Tim Kaine as the nominee for vice 
president (Chaves, Stracuqlursi, Kelsey, 2016).  
Among the top four candidates from Republican party, Trump won in 41 states, 
Cruz in 11 states, Rubio in three states, and Kasich in one state, which led to Trump’s 
victory in the Republican National Convention by winning 1,447 delegate counts while 
Cruz, Rubio, and Kasich only won 551, 167, and 161 delegate counts (Andrews et al., 
2016a. Thus, on July 22, 2016, the Convention officially nominated Trump for 2016 
presidential election and Mike Pence as the nominee for vice president (Brander, 2016).  
 During the campaign for general election between Clinton and Trump, both 
indulged in personal attacks on each other’s characters, values, and moralities (Healy & 
Martin, 2016; Walsh, 2016). For example, Trump attacked Clinton using the allegations 
against her husband, former president, Bill Clinton, arguing “Hillary Clinton was 
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married to the single greatest abuser of women in the history of politics” (Healy & 
Haberman, 2016, para. 8). Trump called her a “nasty” woman who criticized the women 
claimed to be victims of sexual misconduct with her husband (Healy & Haberman, 
2016). He also called her an unstable, incompetent, liar, criminal, and robot who does 
not look presidential (DelReal, 2016). He named her “crooked Hillary” (Hampson, 
2016, p. 19) and questioned her mental health (DelReal, 2016). Clinton on the other 
hand, attacked on Trump’s past comments on women and minorities such as his 
comments on the former Miss Universe (Wolfgang, 2016). 
Despite all the controversial issues and scandals, Trump became the 45th 
president of the United States by winning more than 30 states including nine swing 
states (Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Nevada, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) (Bradner,2016). Clinton only won in more than 20 states 
while winning the popular vote by nearly 3 million people (Bradner,2016; Berenson, 
2016). The election results were unlike what polls predicted –Clinton’s victory 
(Berenson, 2016; Bradner, 2016; Tumulty. Rucker, & Gearan, 2016). Trump’s win led 
to street protests across U.S., and the protestors chanted that Trump is “not my 
president” (Ali & Hassan, 2016, para. 2). Some protestors demonstrated against 
Trump’s victory by shutting down a major highway in Los Angeles and some Interstate 
5 in Oregon and burning and American flag in Washington (Ali & Hassan, 2016). 
Social media, in particular Twitter, was inundated with posts and conversations 
expressing concerns about the election results. Some celebrities like Katy Perry and 
Rosie O’Donnell even uploaded “simple black profile and header photos to their Twitter 
timelines to protest President-elect Donald Trump” (Gibbs, 2016, para, 2). Hashtags 
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were created on Twitter that demonstrated the creators’ reaction toward the election 
results –such as #Twitterblackout, #NotMyPresident, and #StillWithHer (Gibbs, 2016).  
Summary 
In the discussion of political discourse in a democracy, free expression becomes 
an essential element (Mill, 1861/1999). Tolerance is a foundational component of 
freedom and free expression in political discourse in a democracy (Bezanson, 2012; 
Caro, 2011; Caro & Schulz, 2010). The two-party system in the U.S. has created natural 
basis for two-pronged discourse – Democrat vs. Republican, which leads to political 
polarization among the U.S. public, in particular, during the presidential elections 
(Adamic & Glance, 2005; Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Gruzd & Roy, 2012; Habermas, 
1994; Hill & Hughes, 1988; Himelboim et al., 2013; Wallace, 2009). Such polarization 
shows tolerance and intolerance among the followers of the two parties in how they 
view themselves in comparison to the opposing group (Adamic & Glance, 2005; 
Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Gruzd & Roy, 2012; Habermas, 1994; Wallace, 2009).  
Traditionally, mediated political discourses such as presidential elections’ 
campaigns and debates were solely handled by journalists and news media (Baum & 
Groeling, 2008; Bennett, 2012; Domke, McCoy, & Torres, 1999; Kraus & Davis, 
1990). Nowadays, political discussions find their ways into social media where people 
continue talking and reacting over the problems and issues of their interests related to 
the elections and campaigns (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Bennett, 2012). As a result, the 
notions of free speech, public sphere and political discourse have evolved with the 
dramatic growth of digital communication technologies (Vergeer, 2012; Bennett, 2012). 
Not only can citizens actively and directly take part in political discourse with other 
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citizens, but also they can interact with political actors and the news media at very large 
scales (Vergeer, 2012; Wallace, 2009).  
In the U.S. 2016 election, the candidates represented the very polarized political 
system and the deep intolerance between parties (Bradner, 2016; Tumulty. Rucker, & 
Gearan, 2016). The 2016 election was also the most popular political event on social 
media, and the candidates predominantly used Twitter to communicate with their public 
rather than traditional media (Ali & Hassan, 2016; Berenson, 2016; Bradner, 2016; 
Gibbs, 2016; Tumulty, Rucker, & Gearan, 2016). Yet, social media have enabled the 
public to recreate similar polarized and homophilious social networks based on certain 
political and ideological values (Brandt et al., 2014; Jussim, Cain, & Cohen, 2013; 
Wetherell et al., 2013). The next chapter explores social networks and the structural 













Chapter 4: Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
This dissertation explores the relationship between online social network 
structure and the Twitter users’ tolerance and intolerance toward each other in political 
discourse during the U.S. 2016 presidential election. Previous chapters reviewed the 
evolution of mediated political communication as a result of the shift from mass media 
to networked media, and tolerance as a form of free speech in mediated political 
discourse, in particular on virtual political sphere. This chapter focuses on social 
networks and social network analysis (SNA), and explores the important functions and 
features of social media networks. The chapter begins with a broad discussion about 
social networks. Next, it talks about online social networks and their key functions and 
features based on the existing literature.  
Social Networks  
Social networks have been the foundation of human societies since the 
beginning of human civilization, without which human relationships cannot exist 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Scott, 2012). A social network is “a set of relationships,” 
which contains a set of objects or nodes and the description of relationships between 
them (Kadushin, 2012, p. 14). Social networks are made of actors (individuals, groups, 
entities, etc.) or nodes that communicate with each other and establish relationships 
(Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Traditionally, networks exist in all social 
ties from family, village, and kinship to society and the entire world system (Kwak et 
al., 2010). Networks exist in many formats such as natural (e.g. neural networks) and 
human-made such as group and cross group networks, inter-organizational networks, 
and so forth (Monge & Contractor, 2003).  
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Social network analysis (SNA) is the study of interactions, ties, and exchange of 
information and goods between individuals, groups, communities, organizations, 
societies and so forth (Scott, 2012; Kadushin, 2012). Study of networks goes back to 
centuries ago (Barabasi, 2002; Milgram, 1967; Wellman & Hampton, 1999). In 1736, 
mathematician Leonhard Eulor was one of the first individuals who used graphs in 
order to solve problems for bridges and land masses (Barabasi, 2002). The second half 
of the 20th century was a time of dramatic progress for SNA. In physical social 
networks, geographic location, class, profession, co-working, nationality, school, and so 
forth are among the core predictor variables for the formation of social ties between 
individuals (Kadushin, 2012). The study of social networks explores patterns of 
relationships among interacting units in social, political, and economic systems 
(Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Understanding about the patterns of relationships in these 
systems helps in explaining how and why social network structures form in certain 
ways that influence social and political discourses (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Bodin & 
Crona, 2009; Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Gruzd & Roy, 2012; Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Wallace, 2009).   
The Internet has given birth to new forms of social networks that have expanded 
social relationships beyond physical and geographic boundaries (Valenzuela et al., 
2009). Online social networks not only help the existing social relationships, but also 
provide the basis for new types of social ties, which enable people to find new friends; 
relationships and locate sources of information and spread them, and form virtual 
discussion groups and communities (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Gruzd & Roy, 2014; 
Mislove et al., 2007). 
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One of the foundational factors in social networks is the power law distribution 
(Adamic & Huberman, 2000; Barabási & Albert, 1999). Power is a process in society, 
which enables actors to influence the decisions of other actors (Castells, 2009). Power 
law is a relationship between two quantities in a self-regulating and interactive system, 
in which a relative change in one quantity brings in a proportional relative change in the 
other quantity (Adamic & Huberman, 2000). Power law distribution is not like a normal 
distribution, in which the mode, median, and mean are the same and the majority of the 
cases fall one standard deviation below and above the average (Barabasi, 2002). 
Instead, in power law distributions, the mode, median, and mean are very different from 
each other (Barabási & Albert, 1999). The majority of nodes fall below the average and 
with an increase in the population, and a few get a vast share of the audience (Adamic et 
al., 2001). The distance between the highest and the lowest positions will go up with an 
increase in the sample size (Barabasi, 2002).  
Foundational Features in Social Network Structure 
All networks consist of nodes and their ties in the forms of groups and 
subgroups that are known as clusters, cliques, and sub-groups (Hanneman & Riddle, 
2005; Wasserman & Faust, 2009).  A node is a connection point, an intersection, an 
individual, an actor, or an entity that establishes ties with other nodes and form a social 
network (Scott, 2012). There are two kinds of social networks based on the kinds of 
actors (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). First, one-mode network refers to the networks that 
have actors of the same level or general type – e.g. a friendship network of 6 people 
(Kadushin, 2012). Second, in two-mode or binary networks ties are established between 
nodes that belong to two different sets (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Two-mode 
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networks are also known as network affiliation – e.g. a group of people are members of 
different clubs (Kadushin, 2012). 
Relational ties or edges are connections between nodes, which show an activity, 
bonding, or exchange between them (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Ties show activities 
between actors such as sharing, delivery, and exchange of resources (Kadushin, 2012; 
Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Relational ties can be formed for resources including 
information, cooperation, social support, advice, money, and so forth (Kadushin, 2012). 
There are two kinds of ties in social networks: directed and non-directed relationship 
ties (Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Directed ties show in-degree and out-
degree relationships and whether or not they are reciprocal (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). 
In-degree refers to the number of ties coming to the node and out-degree is the number 
of ties from a node to outside (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Directional ties are the ones 
that indicate whether a connection is coming to a node (in-degree tie) or going to a node 
(out-degree ties). In-degree and out-degree ties in directional networks are shown with 
arrows (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Kadushin, 2012). Non-directed ties indicate 
dichotomous relationships that do not show the direction of the flow (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005). They just show whether a relationship exists or not (Kadushin, 2012). On 
Twitter, ties are directed that include following and being followed, retweeting and 
being retweeted, mentioning and being mentioned, replying and being replied to, which 
create short paths of connection between people with long distances from each other 
(Himelboim et al., 2017; Lieberman, 2014). These short paths of connections are 
established through a few people who connect the otherwise disconnected clusters or 
groups in a network (Himelboim et al., 2017). 
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Geodesic distance among the nodes in a network is an important factor that 
shows how close they are to each other (Choi, Thomee, Friedland, Cao, Ni, Borth, & 
Poland, 2014; Ghosh & Lerman, 2010; Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). 
Geodesics or short paths are often used to measure network metrics in order to make 
assumptions about the flow of information through the network’s shortest paths (Krebs, 
2016). Different paths give different interpretations about information flow in a 
network. Thus, “it is important to be on many efficient paths in networks that reach out 
to various parts of the extended network (Krebs, 2016, para. 9).” The well-integrated 
nodes in a network of paths have both local and distant information from different 
sources (Krebs, 2016).   
The smallest sub-set in a social network is a dyad, in which two nodes are 
connected to each other. Cliques are subgroups with three or more nodes (Wasserman & 
Faust, 2009). Cliques are sub-sets of networks, in which actors are more closely 
connected to each other than they are to other members of the network (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005; Kadushin, 2012). Clusters are subgroups in a network, which have more 
connected nodes with one another compared to other nodes outside the subgroups 
(Scott, 2012). Clusters form areas of high density in social networks based on similarity 
of social behaviors and interactions (Scott, 2012; Schaeffer, 2007). Clustering 
coefficient measures the degree to which nodes or individuals in a network tend to bond 
together (Zhou & Wang, 2005).  
Network centrality. Centrality is a key factor in social network structure, which 
is about actors’ location in a network and is synonymous with importance and 
prominence (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Network centrality is the “relationship 
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between the centralities of all nodes can reveal much about the overall network 
structure” (Krebs, 2016, para. 7). But “networks of low centrality fail gracefully” (para. 
7). There are different kinds of degree centrality: In-degree and out-degree centrality 
(for directed ties), degree centrality (for undirected ties), betweenness centrality, and 
closeness centrality (Krebs, 2016; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). 
In-degree and out-degree centrality. In-degree and out-degree centrality 
measures mean different things in different networks (Freeman, 1979; Kadushin, 2012; 
Wasserman & Faust, 2009). For instance, in a mutual-tie network, in-degree and out-
degree centrality are equal (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). But in a communication 
network, in-degree centrality is associated with popularity, which deals with the 
identification of the most active and important actors based on the number of in-coming 
connections an actor receives in a network (Barnett & Sung, 2006; Freeman, 1979; 
Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). The actor is more powerful if those in-
degree connections are also powerful actors (Kadushin, 2012). Such actors are the 
recipients of the highest number of incoming links (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). On the 
other hand, out-degree centrality in such a network denotes less popularity, because the 
people with highest out-degree centrality scores are the ones who nominate so many 
people as their friends but those people may not respond mutually (Wasserman & Faust, 
2009). In Twitter networks for instance, people with high in-degree centrality are the 
ones with the highest number of followers and people with high out-degree centrality 
scores are the ones who follow others. People who heavily follow others on Twitter are 
the ones who are exposed to tweets from those they follow while those messengers do 
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not directly see the posts of their followers (Himelbiom et al, 2013; Himelbiom et al, 
2017; Lieberman, 2014).   
At the same time, in a trade relationship between countries, the most powerful 
countries are the ones with the highest scores for out-degree centrality, because they are 
the biggest exporters (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). In contrast, countries with the 
highest in-degree centrality are the biggest importers, which often does not stand for 
economic power in trade (Wasserman & Faust, 2009).  
Degree centrality. Degree centrality is a measure for undirected ties, which is 
about the number of links or direct connections of a node in a network (Freeman, 1979; 
Wasserman & Faust, 2009). It deals with the number of opportunities and alternatives a 
node has compared to other nodes (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The actor with the most 
direct connections in a network is called the hub, who is the most active node of the 
network, which gives him/her the maximal centrality index (Krebs, 2016; Wasserman & 
Faust, 2009). Where the connections lead and how they connect the otherwise 
disconnected are important factors and if a node has so many direct connections with 
those who are already connected to each, it is not so powerful for the central node 
(Krebs, 2016). Simply, the number of in-degree and out-degree ties of the nodes 
suggests that certain actors are more central than others (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  
Based on Freeman’s approach, degree centrality is measured according to in-
degree and out-degree and the overall centralization of the graph (Freeman, 1978). But 
having the same degree does not necessarily make actors equally important (Hanneman 
& Riddle, 2005). Bonacich (1987) proposed that more connections do not necessarily 
mean more power for the central node; instead, nodes become more central and 
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powerful when they are connected to other powerful nodes. A node is central when it 
has more connections in its neighborhood (Bonacich, 1987). If there are fewer 
connections in an actor’s neighborhood, the actor is more powerful (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005). 
CD(ni) = d(ni) =Xi+= ƩXij = ƩXji 
                              j            j 
CD(ni) is the actor level degree centrality index, which indicates the number of lines 
incident with the node in the graph (in-degree) (Wasserman & Faust, 2009).  
Betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality is number of times a node or an 
actor acts as a bridge along the shortest path between two other nodes or actors (Krebs, 
2016; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). It is about a node having a tie to each node in the 
network and that there is no third actor involved in between this node and all other 
nodes – or how likely an individual is to be the most direct route between two people in 
a network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Nodes that are located between two important 
constituencies play the brokers’ role in the network –connecting to people who are 
disconnected otherwise (Krebs, 2016). Without such nodes, the ties between important 
actors will be cut off – affecting the information and knowledge flow from other 
networks and clusters (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Krebs, 2016). “A node with high 
betweenness centrality has great influence over what flows – and does not – in the 
network” (para. 5).  
                     CB (ni) = Ʃ gjk(ni)/gjk 
                         j = i 
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In the above formula, betweeness centrality equals to sum of the number of geodesic 
links between that contains I number of actors or nodes, ni, divided by the number of 
geodesic links between j and k.  
Closeness centrality. Closeness or distance is the average length of the shortest 
path between a node and all other nodes in a network. When an actor is closer to all 
nodes compared to other actors, he/she reaches everyone in a network faster than others 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Lieberman, 2014). Such nodes have the shortest paths to 
all other nodes and therefore are closer to everyone (Krebs, 2016). Such positions give 
these nodes the chance to monitor the information flow in the network, because they 
have the best visibility in “what is happening in the network” (para. 6). When the 
number of paths between the central nodes and other nodes goes up, the centrality 
scores of the central nodes decrease (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). An actor is central 
when he/she can quickly interact with all other actors in the network (Wasserman & 
Faust, 2009).  
                      g                       -1 
Cc (ni) = [Ʃ d(ni, ni)] 
                     j = i 
 
In the above formula, d(ni, ni) is the number of lines in the geodesic linking of actors i 
and j. And Ʃ d(ni, ni) is sum of distance from all other actors, which is taken over all 
j ≠ I (Wasserman & Faust, 2009).  
Network density.  Network density deals with interconnectivity among 
individuals in a network (Himelboim et al., 2017). It is “a function of pairwise ties 
between actors or between events,” which is at the heart of a community, social support, 
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and high visibility (Wasserman & Faust, 2009, pp. 29-315). Density helps with the 
transmission of information, ideas, rumors, and diseases (Kadushin, 2012). Dense 
communities are cohesive, good sources of social support, and effective transmitters 
(Kadushin, 2012). Network density is about the proportion of all possible ties – sum of 
all ties divided by the number of possible ties. It gives insight about the speed of 
information flow among nodes, social capital of actors and social constraint (Hanneman 
& Riddle, 2005).  
Network reciprocity. Reciprocity is about whether the relationship between 
actors are two-way (Lieberman, 2014). It is the ratio of the number of pairs with 
reciprocal ties with the number of pairs with any ties (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
Reciprocity is an important factor in directional ties, because one person may have a 
relationship with another person, but that person may not have the same relationship 
with him/her (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). For instance, a Twitter tie is reciprocal when 
two users follow each other, which will enable both sides to have each other’s tweets on 
their Twitter pages (Lieberman, 2014). In non-directional ties, when person A becomes 
friend with person B, both of them are connected. Facebook relationships are examples 
of non-reciprocal ties (Conroy et al., 2012; Reich, 2010; Schwartz, 2015; Xenos et al., 
2014). 
Homophily in Social Networks 
Homophily is an important factor in the structure and flow of information in 
both offline and online social networks (Kadushin, 2012; McPherson et al., 2001; 
Valenzuela et al., 2009). Homophily refers to the preference of individuals in building 
social ties with those individuals and groups whom they have certain similarities (e.g. 
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race, sex, age, ethnicity, religion, ideology, class, culture, education, geographical 
location, and so forth) (French et al., 2012; Kwak el al., 2010; Louch, 2000). 
Homophily is the tendency of people to connect with those who have similar 
demographics, ideological, and behavioral characteristics as their own – embedding the 
folk proposition that “birds of a feather flock together” (Kadushin, 2012; McPherson et 
al., 2001; Valenzuela et al., 2009). Being in certain social networks and staying away 
from others networks influences individuals’ personal characteristics and behavioral 
patterns, because they are only exposed to certain resources and social ties that are not 
much diverse (Ibarra, 1992). At the individual level, homophily occurs on the basis of 
ideology, religion, age, sex, race, and so forth, when people group with those who 
follow the same political view, religious belief from similar age, sex, and race 
(Lazarsfield & Merton, 1978). At the group level, the definition of homophily depends 
on whether companies, groups, and organizations are friends or competitors (Kadushin, 
2012). For instance, people from different Christian denominations come together under 
the umbrella of Republican party (Kadushin, 2012).  
Political ideology is a prominent factor for homophily in online social networks 
(Adamic & Glance, 2005; Himelboim et al., 2013; Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). Adamic 
and Glance studied the linking patterns and discussion topics of political bloggers 
during the last two months before the U.S. 2004 presidential elections. They analyzed 
top-40 political blogs to explore the degree of interaction between liberal and 
conservative blogs, and there were differences in the structure of the two communities. 
They also studied single day snapshots of over 1,000 political blogs. Adamic and 
Glance found that conservatives were more interconnected and dense compared to 
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liberals because of linking to each other more than liberals (Adamic & Glance, 2005). 
Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) studied how online discussion spaces facilitate exposure 
to political disagreement among groups in political discourse. They surveyed more than 
1000 Americans reporting participation in chat rooms or message. Their findings 
suggested that cross-cutting political discourse in online groups occurs only 
incidentally, because politics is not the central purpose of the discussion space. 
Additionally, religion can also influence individuals’ behaviors in social relationships, 
and religiosity of friends affects people’s self-religiosity, which helps in predicting their 
antisocial behavior (French et al., 2012). Race and ethnicity are other predictors of 
homophily in online networks although online environment is less dependent on socio-
cultural boundaries (Ellison et al., 2007).  
Online Social Networks 
The Internet and its related technologies have elevated human communication 
into a new stage –virtual communication – which is based on social networking in the 
online world (Castells, 2015; Papacharissi, 2002; Katz & Rice, 2002). Formation of 
online social networks are dependent on users who create their own presence, decide 
and define how to present themselves in social contexts (Cheung et al., 2011). Online 
networks play important roles in the formation of ties with strangers in addition to 
maintaining social relationships among old friends who know each other in real life 
(Mislove et al., 2007).  
 Social media are the most dominant and popular platforms for online social 
networking (Lieberman, 2014; Valenzuela et al., 2009). Social media are used for 
different purposes such as social interaction, content production, and sharing 
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information from other sources in addition to social and political gatherings on pages 
and events (Ankerson, 2015; Himelboim et al., 2013). People widely use tags and 
hashtags on social media to talk about topics and events around them or the issues 
(Hansen et al., 2011).  
 Social media have enabled users to not only connect with friends and 
acquaintances, but also raise their voices on any issues and ideas they are concerned 
about (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Himelboim et al., 2013). Facebook and twitter are the 
top social media for political communication, which have attracted a lot of attention in 
big political events such elections from politicians, citizens, and the news media 
(Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Castells, 2015; Himelboim et al., 2013; Muralidharan et 
al., 2011). Donald Trump even claimed that his victory in the U.S. 2016 election was 
because of his heavy use of Facebook and Twitter (McCormick, 2016). 
 Facebook was originally developed as social network platform for college 
students in 2004 and soon became a global phenomenon with more than 1.5 billion 
users (Conroy, Feezell, & Guerrero, 2012). The structure of relationships on Facebook 
is in the form of friends, followers, groups, and tags, which help people not only help 
people connect with each other, but also share their thoughts, reflections, and all kinds 
of content (e.g. text, photos, videos, graphics, hyperlinks, etc.) with others (Conroy et 
al., 2012; Reich, 2010; Schwartz, 2015; Xenos et al., 2014). In a comparative study of 
Facebook users in Australia, U.S. and the UK, Xenos, Vromen, and Loader (2014) 
found that Facebook use has a strong positive correlation with political engagement.  
Twitter as the most popular microblogging medium has become a virtual hub for 
political discourse (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Himelboim et al., 2013). Twitter has 
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received an enormous amount of attention of social network analysis scholars, who 
focus on phenomena such as hashtags, Twitter accounts, brand, public policy, and so 
forth (Lieberman, 2014). Twitter users have both the Indegree (the people following) 
and Outdegree (friends the person follows) ties (Lieberman, 2014).  
In online social networks, more diverse ties between groups, clusters and 
cliques, represents tolerance (Caro & Schulz, 2010; Cote & Erickson, 2009; Himelboim 
et al., 2017). In contrast, dense clusters and groups of homophilious actors who are 
willing to mainly communicate with those like themselves are evidence for intolerance 
(Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman, 2014). Himelboim et al. (2013) studied Twitter 
networks of 10 controversial political topics during the 2010 midterm election, and 
discovered several homogeneous clusters of self-connected users based on their political 
orientations. The content analysis of the tweets of the clusters’ members showed that 
Twitter users are unlikely to be exposed to cross-ideological content. Himelboim and 
colleagues found that Democrats and Republicans do not communicate with each other 
on Twitter on controversial political topics.  
Summary 
 This chapter was an overview of the social networks and social network 
analysis, and the main factors and features in social networks and online social 
networks. Social networks are at the core of human relationships and consist of nodes 
that establish ties and relationships in the forms of cliques, clusters, groups, and 
communities (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Kadushin, 2012; Scott, 2012). Homophily is 
another factor in social networks that refers to individuals’ tendency to build social ties 
with those like them (Kadushin, 2012; McPherson et al., 2001; Valenzuela et al., 2009). 
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Online social networks are new phenomena developed with the rise of digital 
communication technologies, which have played an important role in public political 
discourse. Similar to offline social networks, online network structures are influenced 
by factors such as power and previous social relationships and ties, which lead to 
formation of homophilous and less tolerant groups and clusters in the online world 
(Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman, 2014). The next section of the literature review 

















Chapter 5: Research Questions  
This dissertation explores the relationship between social media networks and 
tolerance and intolerance in political discourse during the days surrounding the U.S. 
2016 presidential election campaigns. First, this study explores the structure of the 
social networks, and then, it explores how the discourse on the networks is framed in 
relation to tolerance (or intolerance). 
Literature suggests that communication in social media often occurs in 
homophilous ways, in which like-minded people stay connected to each other and stay 
away from those different from them (Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Lieberman, 2014). In political discourse on social media, people of similar ideologies 
tend to be friends and followers of each other, not of those from opposing camps (Gruzd 
& Roy, 2014; Himelboim et al., 2013). The problem of this study is whether the 
network structure of online media contribute to social/political fragmentation. 
To study the problem, the first three chapters (after the introduction) explored 
literature in several relevant areas including sociology, mass communication, political 
communication, and social network analysis. Chapter 2 was an overview of the shift 
from mass media to digital media has changed the dynamics of political discourse by 
empowering citizens to not only take part in political decisions, but also to form virtual 
political discussion networks (Castells, 2009, 2015; Merrill, 2011). Networked media 
provide the public with more choices and variety of information anywhere, anytime, 
and at any platform, which gives more control to consume the kind of media that gratify 
them (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Castells, 2009, 2011; Lowrey & Gade, 2011a; 
Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). The empowerment of citizens by the networked media and 
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abundance of media choices create the opportunity for them to stay in the virtual groups 
with like-minded people, interact with them, and consume information from like-
minded sources (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Himelboim et al., 
2013). The tendency to interact with people whom one shares certain values, beliefs, 
and demographics with increases the chance that the people seldom interact with those 
unlike them (Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Himelboim et al., 2013). Social media as the new 
communication platforms have increased the chance that people often communicate 
with close friends and those like them rather than those different from them (Gainous & 
Wagner, 2014). A new phenomenon that has emerged with the birth of social media is 
virtual public (political) discourse, a new market place of ideas, in which citizens 
directly and actively form and participate in important public and political discussions 
by expressing their ideas with other citizens and political actors (Gruzd & Roy, 2014; 
Himelboim et al., 2013).  
Chapter 3 reviewed literature on free speech and tolerance and intolerance in 
political discourse in general, and the U.S. political discourse and the 2016 presidential 
election in particular. Political discourse is a form of public discourse that deals with 
socio-political issues in a democratic society, which includes public action and reaction, 
reflection, judgment and commitment toward or against certain issues, events, and 
actors (Connolly, 1993; Habermas, 1994; Wodak, 1989). Free speech is a key element 
of democratic rights that allows individuals to communicate their thoughts and opinions 
without the fear of government and other sources’ retaliation or censorship (Akdeniz, 
2002; Bhuiyan, 2011; Emerson, 1963; van Mill, 2002). For a democratic political 
discourse to take place there is a need for a free public sphere where people can freely 
82 
demonstrate their ideas and opinions even if those ideas and opinions are controversial 
(Habermas, 1994; Mill, 1999; Post, 1990). The need for a democratic and free public 
sphere brings the ideas of free speech and tolerance (Caro, 2011; Gordon, 1993; Mill, 
1999; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956; Sullivan et al., 1993). Tolerance among 
citizens creates the sphere for acceptance and respect toward those different from one’s 
self and expand the diversity of ideas and thoughts among individuals and groups 
(Bezanson, 2012; Caro, 2011; Caro & Schulz, 2010; Drucker & Gumpert, 2009). 
Tolerance and intolerance have been visible in mediated political discourse during the 
U.S. presidential elections (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Himelboim et al., 2013). Online 
social networks on such political discourse have been polarized in previous elections 
(Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman 2014; Smith et al., 2014). 
Chapter 4 focused on social networks and social network analysis (SNA) as well 
as key functions and features of online social networks. Social networks have been the 
foundation of human societies since the beginning of human civilizations, which 
consists of interconnected relationships between nodes or entities in the form of groups, 
communities, and so forth (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Kadushin, 2012; Scott, 2012; 
Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Online social networks are pretty much like the offline 
social networks except for the fact that online communication is not dependent on 
physical and geographic space (Arceneaux & Weiss, 2010; Blanchard, 2007; Castells, 
2003; Ellison et al., 2007; Lieberman, 2014; Mislove et al., 2007; Papacharissi, 2002; 
Singer, 2005; Valenzuela et al., 2009). Homophily is a factor in online social networks, 
which is about the tendency of people to stick with the groups and individuals who 
share values and beliefs as their own (Ellison et al., 2007; French, Purwono, & Rodkin, 
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2012; Ibarra, 1992; Kwak el al., 2010; Louch, 2000; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and 
Cook, 2001; Rogers & Kincaid, 1981; Shalizi & Thomas, 2011). Emphasizing on being 
close to like-minded people and establishing homophilious networks can improve in-
group intolerance against outgroups and decreases tolerance to diversity of thoughts in 
the online world (French et al., 2012; Kadushin, 2012; Kwak el al., 2010; Louch, 2000; 
McPherson et al., 2001; Valenzuela et al., 2009). While staying with like-minded 
people who one already knows can increase in-group ties, it makes the group deprived 
of better diverse connections and sources of information (Caro & Schulz, 2010; Cote & 
Erickson, 2009; Ellison et al, 2007; Saito, 2011).  
Other topics discussed in chapter four were the main features social network 
structure such as centrality, density, and reciprocity. Network centrality is about actor’s 
location in the network, which indicates that the powerful actors in a network are the 
ones with highest number of in-degree ties (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Kadushin, 
2012; Krebs, 2016). Network density is about the proportion of all possible ties in 
network, which shows the interconnections between nodes (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; 
Kadushin, 2012). Reciprocity refers to whether relationships between nodes are two-
way or not (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Lieberman, 2014).   
To explore the relationship between social media network structure and tolerance 
and intolerance during the U.S. 2016 election, the research questions are proposed in two 
different categories. The first category consists of research questions about the network 
structure and group/cluster structures. The second category of research questions are 
about the content and relationship of content with network structure.  
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 Social network structure is identified by nodes and edges, centrality or location of 
actors in the network, direction of ties, and network reciprocity and density (Hanneman 
& Riddle, 2005; Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). In other words, actors 
become powerful in a social network based on the number of incoming ties (in-degree 
connections), direction of connections (betweenness centrality), closeness to all nodes 
(closeness centrality), and closeness to the most important nodes (Krebs, 2016; Barnett 
& Sung, 2006; Freeman, 1979; Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Thus, the 
following research questions are posed for the Twitter network structure during the 4-day 
sample on the U.S. 2016 presidential election.   
RQ1a: How was the Twitter network structured the day before the U.S. 2016 
presidential election? 
RQ1b: How was the Twitter network structured on the day of the U.S. 2016 
presidential election? 
RQ1c: How was the Twitter network structured the day after the U.S. 2016 presidential 
election? 
RQ1d: How was the Twitter network structured four days after the U.S. 2016 
presidential election? 
Previous studies have found that because of political homophily in online social 
networks, online discourse takes shape in the form of clusters or groups within a 
network, in which individuals tend to communicate with like-minded others (Adamic & 
Glance, 2005; Himelboim et al., 2013; Himelboim et al., 2017; Lieberman, 2014). 
People group together on the basis of ideology, political opinions, cultural values, and 
so forth (Hill & Hughes, 1988; Himelboim et al., 2013; Wallace, 2009). In these 
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clusters, people often talk about issues, events, and individuals by using in-group and 
out-group frames, which distinguish them from other groups (Adamic & Glance, 2005; 
Himelboim et al., 2013; Himelboim et al., 2017; McPherson; Mislove et al., 2007; 
Wojcieszak, 2011). Hence, the following research questions are posed: 
RQ2a: The day before the U.S. 2016 presidential election, what were the in-group 
characteristics of dominant clusters within the network?  
RQ2b: On the day of the U.S. 2016 presidential election, what were the in-group 
characteristics of dominant clusters within the network? 
RQ2c: The day after the U.S. 2016 presidential election, what were the in-group 
characteristics of dominant clusters within the network? 
RQ2d: Four days after the U.S. 2016 presidential election, what were the in-group 
characteristics of dominant clusters within the network? 
Online political discourse consists of frames between people in the form of in-
group vs. out-group expression of thoughts and opinions (Brandt et al., 2014; Peffley & 
Rohrschneider, 2003; Yang & Self, 2015). Twitter political discussions often take shape 
around users’ political views and interests, which create the environment for debating 
against the opposing groups and in favor of one’s own group through their tweets, 
replies, retweets, mentions, and information sharing (Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Lieberman, 2014; Meraz, 2009; Tumasjan et al., 2010). The following research 
questions are on the frames of tolerance and intolerance in the U.S. 2016 presidential 
election. 
RQ3a: The day before the U.S. 2016 presidential election, how was the content framed 
in terms of tolerance and intolerance in the 10 largest clusters?  
86 
RQ3b: On the day of the U.S. 2016 presidential election, how was the content framed 
in terms of tolerance and intolerance in the 10 largest clusters? 
RQ3c: The day after the U.S. 2016 presidential election, how was the content framed in 
terms of tolerance and intolerance in the 10 largest clusters? 
RQ3d: Four days after the U.S. 2016 presidential election, how was the content framed 
in terms of tolerance and intolerance in the 10 largest clusters? 
Staying in like-minded group often decreases tolerance of outgroup individuals, 
which can result in less involvement in diverse social networks and associations (Cote 
& Erickson, 2009). In contrast, interacting with diverse groups of people who are 
different from one’s own group increases tolerance in individuals, which can increase 
one’s positive feelings toward out-group people (Caro & Schulz, 2010; Cote & 
Erickson, 2009; Saito, 2011). Based on social network theory, in-degree, out-degree, 
and betweenness centrality can explain how the location of certain individuals in social 
networks make them either foster cross group communication or decrease it (Hanneman 
& Riddle, 2005; Krebs, 2016; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). 
In-degree centrality measures in a communication network, such as 
conversational networks on twitter, is associated with popularity, which deals with the 
identification of the most active and important actors based on the number of in-degree 
connections (Barnett & Sung, 2006; Freeman, 1979; Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & 
Faust, 2009). These in-degree connections are established when other people retweet, 
reply to, or mention these popular users (Hansen et al 2011; Himelboim et al 2017; 
Lieberman, 2014). In contrast, out-degree centrality in such a network denotes less 
popularity, because the people with highest out-degree centrality scores are the ones 
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who retweet or mention others or reply to their tweets (Hansen et al 2011; Himelboim et 
al 2017). Such users are heavily exposed to tweets from those they follow while those 
messengers do not directly see the posts of their followers (Himelbiom et al, 2017; 
Lieberman, 2014). From a tolerance and intolerance point of view, users with higher in-
degree centrality might be more tolerant than those with low in-degree centrality, 
because they are connected with more diverse groups of people compared to users with 
higher out degree centrality. This is because people with higher out-degree centrality 
actively choose to communicate with those they want to while those with high in-degree 
centrality are being chosen (Hansen et al 2011; Himelboim et al 2017). Based on the 
existing literature, online media users tend to interact with like-minded people more 
than those different from them (Hansen et al 2011; Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman, 
2014), which denotes intolerance toward outgroup.  
Nodes that are located between two important constituencies have higher score 
for betweenness centrality and play the broker’s role in the network, which makes them 
powerful (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Krebs, 2016). Without such nodes, the ties 
between important actors will be cut off –affecting the information and knowledge flow 
from other networks and clusters (Krebs, 2016). Betweenness centrality can predict how 
tolerant or intolerant people are in their interactions with in-group and out-group 
people.   
Political tolerance includes individuals’ interactions with people from different 
ideological beliefs and backgrounds and respecting them (Cote & Erickson, 2009; 
Coward, 1986; Yang & Self, 2015), which suggests that such individuals will have 
higher betweenness centrality acting as a bridge between two otherwise disconnected 
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nodes or actors (Krebs, 2016; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Without such nodes, the ties 
between important actors will be cut off – affecting the information and knowledge 
flow from other networks and clusters (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Krebs, 2016). 
Considering tolerance and intolerance in relation to degree centrality and betweenness 
centrality, the following research question is asked.  
Closeness or distance is the average length of the shortest path between the node 
and all other nodes in a network. Actors with higher closeness centrality are closer to all 
nodes compared to other actors and can reach everyone in the network faster than others 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Lieberman, 2014). Closeness centrality enables nodes to 
monitor the information flow in the network, because they have the best visibility in 
what is going on in the network (Krebs, 2016). Lower closeness centrality means more 
distance or paths between the central nodes and other nodes and that the actor cannot 
interact quickly with other actors in the network (Wasserman & Faust, 2009).  
RQ4: What is the association between tolerance and intolerance and measures of 
network centrality such as in-degree and out-degree, betweenness centrality, and 









Chapter 6: Methodology 
 This dissertation seeks to explore the relationship between online social network 
structure and tolerance and intolerance in political discourse on Twitter during the U.S. 
2016 presidential election. This multi-method approach is a combination of social 
network analysis or hyperlink analysis and content analysis. Social network analysis is 
used to explore the network structures and relationships between Twitter users during 
the U.S. 2016 election. Content analysis is conducted on the tweets to find evidence for 
tolerance and intolerance in political discourse during four days around the election, 
including election day election. Then, the relationships between the network structure of 
the discourse and the content of the discourse itself are explored. This chapter, first 
explains the procedures for social network analysis including data collection and 
sampling. The second part of the chapter focuses on identifying network clusters and 
the in-group characteristics of the largest clusters in the networks. The third part of this 
chapter explains the process for content analysis of the tweets and the measures and 
variables.  
Social Network Analysis 
The first part of this study is social network analysis, which explores structural 
relations of online networks (De Maeyer, 2012; Himelboim at al., 2013). Social network 
analysis for online networks was originally developed for measuring scholarly or 
academic activities on the web – using regression analyses (ordinary least squares) to 
measure structural bonding of hyperlinks and characteristics of websites and their actors 
(Lusher & Ackland, 2011). Online social network analysis is used to examine the 
structural relationships between individuals and how their positions in the network 
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affect their attitudes and behaviors (Par, 2003). Using hyperlinks, SNA predicts how the 
structure of network relations influences individual nodes in online network (Barnett & 
Sung, 2006; Lusher & Ackland, 2011; Park, 2003). This study analyzes the structural 
properties of the Twitter networks during four days surrounding the 2016 presidential 
election. Some of the main concepts that help in understanding the structure of social 
networks are centralization, density, modularity, and isolates, which are briefly 
explained in the following section.  
Network centralization. Network centralization is an aggregate metric, which 
describes how centralized a network is (Freeman1979; Hansen et al 2010). It is “the 
degree to which the centrality of the most central point exceeds the centrality of all 
other points” (Freeman, 1979, p. 227). In other words, centralization, as a measure, 
shows how central the most centralized nodes networks are compared to other nodes 
(Freeman1979; Himelboim et al., 2017). Centralization is calculated by dividing the 
differences between the largest value and every centrality point over the maximum 
possible sum of differences of “n” points in a network (Freeman1979). Centralization 
score ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the most centralized network and 0 being 
non-centralized network (Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). A more 
centralized network has one or a few very central nodes and if these nodes are damaged 
or taken away, the network will be divided into sub networks (Krebs, 2016). Centralized 
networks often have many edges coming from a few nodes and spread across the entire 
networks, which indicate network hierarchy (Hansen et al., 2010; Himelboim et al., 
2017). This means that a few people are the hubs in the network who play the role of 
gatekeepers. In contrast, there is little variation between the number of nodes and edges 
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in decentralized networks – non-hierarchical (Hansen et al., 2010). Less centralized 
networks can sustain even if they lose some of their nodes (Krebs, 2016). In-degree 
centralization means that one or a few nodes in the network receive a lot of connections 
from many other nodes in the network or have more in-coming ties (e.g. followers, 
retweets, mentions, replies, etc.) than the rest of the nodes in the network 
(Freeman1979; Himelboim et al., 2017). A high out-degree centralization means that 
one or a few users initiate a large proportion of the links or ties by following, 
retweeting, mentioning, and replying to others (Himelboim et al., 2017).  
Density. Network density is an aggregate metric that describes the level of 
interconnectedness in the overall network (Hansen et al., 2010; Himelboim et al., 2017). 
It is the ratio of the number of observed connections in the network divided by the 
number of possible connections (Hansen et al., 2010). It is a quantitative measure for 
showing cohesion, solidarity, and membership among the nodes (Hansen et al 2010). A 
low density score means loosely connected nodes, and high density score means highly 
interlinked nodes (Himelboim et al., 2017). More interconnectivity (greater density) 
means a higher chance of information exchange and more interaction among users 
(Hansen et al 2011; Himelboim et al., 2017). Low density can either be a result of 
“sparse but connected set of users or a network of isolated with a few clustered 
subgroups of users” (Himelboim et al., 2017, p .6).  
Modularity. Network modularity is a measure of quality of clustering that 
measures the extent to which nodes within clusters are interconnected with themselves 
but the clusters are disconnected from other clusters in the network. Modularity 
measure ranges from 0 to 1 –  a 0 modularity meaning the nodes are very divided within 
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their clusters and 1 meaning the nodes are very unified. Network density and 
modularity, together, explain how divided or unified a network is. A network with a 
high density score and low modularity is a single dense group or a unified community. 
Conversely, a network with low density and high modularity has “a few highly 
intraconnected clusters that are loosely interconnected” (Himelboim et al., 2017, p. 4). 
Isolates. Isolates are important elements of a network structure, which are users 
that are not connected to other users in the network (Himelboim et al., 2017). In Twitter 
networks, isolates are the users who tweet about a certain topic, but do not mention or 
reply to others and are not retweeted, mentioned or replied to by others. The proportion 
of isolates in a network is calculated by dividing the number of isolate users over the 
total number of users in the network (Himelboim et al., 2017). The proportion of 
isolates varies from 0 to 1 – 0 meaning no isolates and 1 meaning a total of divided 
network.  
Research population and sample. The U.S. 2016 presidential election was on 
Tuesday, Nov. 8. The population of this study includes all of the Tweets related to the 
U.S. 2016 election on November 7, 8, 9, 12. The current software programs are not able 
to draw a random sample from the millions of online Tweets; they can only collect a 
snapshot of the most recent posts or tweets at a specific point of time (Himelboim et al., 
2013). Therefore, the data sampling of this study is not based on traditional sampling 
methods. 
Twitter is a network for conversation based on topic rather than users (e.g., 
Facebook, YouTube, etc.) and sampling on networks is determined by key search terms 
(Himelboim et al., 2013; Himelboim et al., 2017). For the purpose of this study, the 
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term “election” was chosen because it is broad enough to be included in almost every 
political tweet during the days surounding the election. Also, the term election is neutral 
and it decreases the possibility that the sampling emphasizes partisanship. The reason 
for not collecting the sample using partisan terms is because such terms create a degree 
of homophily just by their names, and if the goal is to see how discourse creates itself 
organically, then the partisan terms are not the best. It is important to search based on 
topics instead of hashtags, because not all Twitter users are aware of those hashtags 
when they post – “a hashtag is announced for planned events, not everyone knows 
about it” (Hansen et al., 2011, p. 9). 
The time frame of this study includes four snapshots: the day before election 
(November 7, 2016), election day (November 8, 2016), the day after the election 
(November 9, 2016), and four days after the election (November 12, 2016). The reason 
for including three other days to the sample’s time frame was to see the differences in 
political discourse immediately before the election, during the election, and after the 
election. In other words, people continued talking about election, voting, and election 
results the days after the election (Berenson, 2016; Bradner, 2016; Tumulty et al., 2016). 
In addition, the 2016 presidential election was followed by a range of anti-Trump protests 
across the U.S. that generated an abundance of ongoing election-related public discourse 
on Twitter, some of which are part of the sample collected after the election day (Ali & 
Hassan, 2016; Berenson, 2016; Bradner, 2016; Gibbs, 2016; Tumulty et al., 2016). In 
particular, the reason for including November 12 in the sampling time frame was that this 
day was the first Saturday after the election with numerous planned protests across the 
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country (Bradner, 2016; Gibbs, 2016). Therefore, these protests would create additional 
election-related discourse on social media, in particular Twitter. 
At the beginning, it was unclear which time of the day was the most appropriate 
to draw the sample. Thus, using the term election, five samples of election networks were 
collected at five different times on November 7, 8, 9, 12. These sample snapshots were 
collected at 8:00 a.m., 12:00 p.m., 4:00 p.m., 8:00 p.m., and the final minutes of the day 
(11:50 p.m.) central time. As Table 6.1 shows, in all four days, the samples from 8:00 
a.m., 12:00 p.m., 8:00 p.m., and 11:50 p.m. are consistently smaller than the samples from 
4:00 p.m. In other words, the snapshots from 4:00 p.m. are consistently the largest 
throughout the four days. In addition to the consistency in network size, the data at 4 p.m. 
would capture the discourse from various regions of the country during the day. The 4:00 
p.m. sample was used because it had the most election discourse compared to the samples 
from other times of the four days.  
   Table 6.1: Twitter Networks in 5 Points of Time Four Days around the Election 













































Note: the minutes in parentheses indicate the amount of time each data set was    
retrieved via NodeXL 
 
NodeXL. NodeXL software was used for data collection from Twitter. NodeXL 
is a software program designed as a template in Microsoft Excel, which can retrieve 
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data from online networks (Hansen et al., 2011). It is a powerful tool for social network 
analysis not only by importing the structure of the networks created on social media into 
an excel sheet, but also analyzing and visualization of the data (Fay, 2016; Hansen et 
al., 2011; Himelboim at al., 2013; Himelboim at al., 2017). NodeXL also includes 
features for summarizing and manipulating the data (Fay, 2016). It was initially released 
in 2008 as a free tool for analyzing social media networks, and since 2015, NodeXL Pro 
has been released with a fee and more features for importing larger data sets 
(http://NodeXLcodeplex.com, 2015). NodeXL Pro can collect up to 20,000 tweets at a 
time, analyze the structure of social networks, information flow, and the measures and 
algorithms needed for understanding the networks (Fay, 2016). Also, NodeXL can 
calculate both general graph metrics of the data (e.g. density, number of components 
and isolates) and node-specific metrics (e.g. in-degree, out-degree, betweenness, and 
closeness centrality) (Hansen et al., 2011; Himelboim at al., 2017). Structural factors 
such as in-degree, out-degree, degree (in undirected networks), betweenness, and 
closeness centrality help in finding whose posts reach the most users in the network, 
who are the most active actors in the conversation, who are the peripheral members in 
the network, and who bridges across the groups in the network (Hansen et al., 2011; 
Himelboim at al., 2017). 
The network data retrieved from Twitter via NodeXL includes tweets, mentions, 
and replies (Hansen et al., 2011). Public/political discourse on Twitter communication 
platform often occurs either by retweeting/reposting or sharing other people’s posts or 
mentioning or replying to them (Himelboim at al., 2017). A tweet is a content 
consisting up to 140 characters including words, mentions, hashtags, pictures, stickers, 
96 
emojis, and URLs (Bliss-Carroll, 2016; Himelboim et al., 2013; Himelboim at al., 2017; 
Pavalanathan & Eisenstein, 2015). A retweet is reposting of a tweet by another Twitter 
user, which starts with the RT@ sign and the name of the original author (e.g. RT 
@nytimes, RT @Realdonaldtrump, RT @wikileaks, etc.). A reply is a tweet that is 
written in response to someone else’s tweet, which starts with .@ sign and the 
receiver’s name (e.g. .@Hillary Clinton, .@GlobaEdmonton, etc.).  
Phases of Analysis 
Analyzing network structure. As mentioned earlier, the first part of this 
dissertation research is on the overall network structure in the four networks. The 
overall network structure deals with issues such as network size, edges, centralization, 
density, modularity, and isolates. NodeXL can calculate all of the above measures 
except centralization. Network centralization was calculated on UCINET after copying 
each of the network edge lists from NodeXL into UCINET. UCINET is a software 
program used widely for social network analysis (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  
There were a total of 38,647 nodes (or individual users) and 34,800 edges (or 
connections among nodes) in the entire four-group sample. All of these nodes and edges 
generated 7,434 tweets, 1,382 replies, 9,817 mentions, and 20,014 retweets, 8,025 of 
which are unique retweets (See Table 6.2). As shown in Table 2, 22.82 percent of the 
data was unique content (Tweets and retweets). However, 51.79 percent of the content 
was duplicate and 25.40 percent of the data were mentions, which made a total 77.19 




   Table 6.2: Total Population, Nodes, Edges, Tweets, Replies, Mentions, and Retweets 




























































































Percentage     19.24% 3.58% 25.40% 51.79% 
 
Clusters. The second part of network analysis was about identifying the in-group 
characteristics of the clusters. Applying Wakita-Tsurumi algorithm on NodeXL 
identifies clusters in each of the four networks (Wakita & Tsurumi, 2007). Wakita-
Tsurumi algorithm is an improved version of Clauset Newman Moore (CNM) 
algorithm, which identifies network clusters by putting members in the clusters that 
they best fit based on their patterns of interactions and interconnections (Himelboim at 
al., 2013). But CNM is designed for small networks while Wakita-Tsurumi algorithm is 
developed for larger networks (Wakita & Tsurumi, 2007). This method puts the 
majority of users in a few major clusters and some smaller ones (Himelboim at al., 
2013). As Table 3 shows, there are 13,177 clusters in the entire four-group sample, in 
which 2,762 clusters belong to the sample on November 7, 5,004 clusters belong to 
November 8, 3,437 clusters to November 9, and 1,974 clusters belong to the sample on 
November 12.  
In addition to identifying clusters, some calculations were done on Microsoft 
Excel to find out the type of content in the data. These calculations found that more than 
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half of the data in all four networks were retweets or duplicates. Duplicate content is the 
shared information that people repost from other sources without adding or deleting 
anything in them. Table 6.3 illustrates that on November 7, about 30 percent of the 
content was unique (26.46 percent tweets and 3.98 percent replies) and 59.56 percent of 
were retweets, 28.92 percent of which were unique retweets and 40.64 percent were 
duplicates. This means that from all of the content on November 7, 59.36 percent was 
unique and 40.46 percent was duplicate. On November 8, about 32 percent of the 
content was unique (28.67 percent tweets and 4.02 percent replies) and 67.31 percent of 
it was duplicate, 28.32 percent of which consisted of unique retweets and 38.99 percent 
duplicate. This means that from all of the content on November 8, 61 percent of them 
were unique and 39 percent of them were duplicates. 
       Table 6.3: Total Nodes, Clusters, Tweets, Replies, Retweets and Unique Tweets  






















































































Total 13,177 7,434 1,382 20,014 28,830 8,025 11,989 16,841 
Percentage  25.79% 4.79% 69.42% 100.00% 27.84% 41.59% 58.41% 
 
On November 9, about 29 percent of the content was unique (23.45 percent 
tweets and 5.46 percent replies) and 71.09 percent of it were retweets, 27.06 percent of 
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which were unique retweets and 44.02 percent were duplicates. Thus, from all of the 
content on November 9, 55.98 percent of them were unique and 44.02 percent of them 
were duplicates. On November 12, about 29 percent of the content was unique (22.54 
percent tweets and 6.37 percent replies) and 71.08 percent of them were retweets, 26.72 
percent of which were unique retweets and 43.36 percent were duplicates. Hence, from 
all of the content on November 12 network, 58.41 percent were unique and 44.36 
percent were duplicates.  
In sum, more than 58 percent of the content was unique, and more than 41 
percent of it was duplicate. This indicates that much of the discourse was shared, 
retweeted and duplicated without adding any additional content (Himelboim et al., 
2017). Since the goal of this study was to analyze the content of the discourse, the 
repeated or duplicated content in the network was excluded from the sample – it was 
not original content or discourse. The focus was on the original content, which was 
unique and not duplicated. As result, in order to code every tweet (unit of analysis) 
once, only the unique retweets were included in the sample.  
After identifying the network clusters, a general graph metrics of clusters were 
calculated on NodeXL and then the clusters were ordered in descending order based on 
the number of Twitter users in each one of them (Himelboim at al., 2013). NodeXL’s 
algorithm allows the researchers to identify the largest clusters in the entire social 
network (Hansen et al., 2010). Thus, a sample of the 10 largest clusters from each four-
day sample was chosen for analysis. These 10 clusters represented the largest and most 
active groups in the network with the most nodes and edges, which means they were 
100 
most representative of the primary Twitter discourse for the networks sampled 
(Himelboim at al., 2013).  
The 10 largest clusters made almost 3 percent of the total data and more than 6.7 
percent of the unique content in the four-group data. The 40 clusters that contain 1,132 
tweets, replies, and unique retweets. As shown in Table 4, there were a total of 269 
tweets, replies, and unique retweets in the ten largest clusters on November 7, 377 on 
November 8, 270 on November 9, and 198 on November 12. From the total of 1,132 
tweets, replies, and unique retweets, 18 of them were not in English, which were 
excluded from the sample and the sample size decreased to 1,114 cases (See Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4: Total Tweets, Retweets and Unique Tweets Across Ten Largest Clusters 
Clusters Tweets Replies Retweets 
Total Tweets 

































































































Total 163 153 5,169 5,485 797 4,372 1,114 
Percentage 2.97% 2.79% 94.24% 100.00% 14.53% 79.71% 20.29% 
 
For more details of the original content within each cluster in the 10 largest clusters of 
each network, see Appendix A. 
In order to answer RQ2a-d about the in-group characteristics of the 10 largest 
clusters of each of the four networks, two sets of analyses were conducted. First, a 3-
step method was used to identify in-group and out-group in each cluster by looking at 
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(1) the most common words, (2) the most common word pairs, and (3) the most 
retweeted messages.  
First, the most frequent words among the tweets in each cluster were selected 
from the list of 10 words and word pairs calculated on NodeXL. Second, each cluster’s 
main themes were identified based on the 10 words and word pairs, exclusing words 
that did not explain any characteristics of the cluster such as RT, election, news, etc. 
The third stage included looking at the top retweets in each cluster and finding the 
patterns that matched the themes and choosing the most appropriate category for the 
cluster. For instance, in cluster nine of the network from November 8, the top 10 most 
frequent words were Wikileaks, election, statement, Clinton, Hillary, Julian, campaign, 
Assange's, and Assange, which gave information about the names and broad topics 
discussed in the group such as Clinton, Julian Assange, and Wikileaks. Second, the top 
10 most frequent words in pairs were: Rt Wikileaks, Clinton campaign, Julian 
Assange's, Assange's statement, Wikileaks Wikileaks, Wikileaks editor, editor Julian, 
statement today, today election, and Wikileaks Assange, which indicate the discussion 
in the group was about Clinton and the editor of Wikileaks, Julian Assange. Third, the 
top retweets in this cluster were about the release of Clinton’s campaign documents by 
Wikileaks. From this process, the nature of the discourse – that Wikileaks was 
connected to the Clinton campaign and editor Julian Assange had issued a statement 
about material the website posted – could be identified. But these procedures could not 
clear whether the retweets were only on Assange’s statement about Clinton or they 
contained negative frames. For more details about this step, see Appendix B.  
102 
This process was helpful, but it did not produce a definitive picture of the 
network’s in-group and out-group characteristics. In other words, the words alone 
could not help in identifying the in-group, because there were a lot of overlaps 
between the tweets from Trump’s and Clinton’s supporters and nonpartisans that the 
repeated words, word pairs and retweets could not help in identifying as supportive a 
specific candidate or political ideology. The words and retweets were a mixture of 
messages from different groups including news media. Thus, another step was added. 
Because the first step for identifying the in-group cluster characteristics was not 
definitive, a second method was used to identify the in-group/out-group in each 
network. The second set of analysis for clusters’ in-group characteristics included 
coding of tweets (N = 1,114) for positive and negative frames toward the candidates. 
Framing the tweets produced three categories of Clinton, Trump, and Neither. Each 
tweet was coded for frames toward the candidate into three categories –positive, 
negative, and neither.  
Positive frames included words such as support, praise, love, happy for victory, 
respect, hopeful, excited, proud, prayer for favorite candidate, partying for election, 
congratulating others for their victory (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Andreoni, 1995; Bae & 
Lee, 2012; Russell & Carroll, 1999; Watson et al., 1988; Wojcieszak, 2011; Wolsko et 
al., 2000). Negative frames included words and phrases such as hostile, hate, shut up, 
bigot, guilty, not happy, criticize, upset, not hopeful, afraid, jittery, ashamed, bored, 
ridiculous, sick, crazy, disappointed, election odds, cannot enjoy life, against the 
opposing party, upshot, victory, distressed, and nervous (Adamic & Glance, 2005; 
Andreoni, 1995; Bae & Lee, 2012; Russell & Carroll, 1999; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
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1988; Wojcieszak, 2011). Neither frames included words and phrases that were neither 
positive nor negative such as casting vote, watching the election results, reporting facts 
about election, etc. 
After coding for positive, negative, and neither frames, the in-group for each 
cluster was identified using the following steps. First, the positive tweets for candidate 
A and the negative tweets for candidate B were summed. Second, the positive tweets for 
candidate B and the negative tweets for candidate A were summed up. Third, the sums 
of (posCandA + negCandB) and (posCandB + negCandA) were compared, and the 
candidate with the largest sum was identified as the in-group. For example, Cluster 1 in 
November 8 network was identified as a Clinton in-group, because in this cluster, the 
sum of Clinton’s positive tweets and Trump’s negative tweets was 38 while the sum of 
Trump’s positive tweets and Clinton’s negative tweets was 31. If neither of the 
candidates had a total of 5 tweets (e.g., posCandA + negCandB < 5), then the cluster 
was coded as neither (no clear in- or out-group). 
Content analysis. The third part of this study was content analysis of tweets. In 
order to find answers for RQ3a-d about tolerance and intolerance in political discourse 
on the U.S. 2016 presidential election, a content analysis of the unique content from the 
largest 10 clusters over a four-day period surrounding the election (40 total clusters) 
was conducted. Framing is a methodological framework that is widely used for content 
analysis (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Himelboim & Gleave, 2009; Himelboim at al., 2013; 
Lewis, Zamith, & Hermida, 2013). Frames are words, adjectives, phrases, concepts, and 
symbols that are used to describe attributes of issues (Coleman & Banning, 2006; 
Entman, 1991, 1993). First, frames “prescribe” an issue, then they “define the 
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problems” based on “common cultural values” and then make “moral judgments” about 
the problems and suggest “remedies” for them (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Framing is key in 
“making new beliefs available about an issue, making certain available beliefs 
accessible,” or making beliefs applicable or “strong” in people’s evaluations” (Chong 
and Druckman, 2007, p. 111). 
Operationalization of tolerance and intolerance. This study sought to explore 
how tolerance and intolerance in political discourse on Twitter are associated with 
Twitter network structure. Tolerance and intolerance on Twitter were examined by 
content analyzing 1,114 tweets from a total of 40 largest clusters from four different 
networks on November 7, 8, 9, and 12.  
Before discussing measures and variables, it is noteworthy to briefly talk about 
how the codebook was developed. This study was the content analysis of tolerance and 
intolerance. Previous studies of tolerance have been survey analyses with different 
measures and variables. As a result, despite drawing a lot of ideas about how tolerance 
has been defined from the existing literature, these ideas were not definitive for 
operationalizing the frames to measure the tolerance and intolerance variables. 
Therefore, using the tolerance literature, the researcher identified definitions for 
tolerance and intolerance. Some other concepts were derived from legal cases and civic 
discourse such as democracy, freedom, and so forth. Reading the literature and relevant 
sources, a list of terms, words, and phrases was identified on tolerance and intolerance. 
Then, samples of tweets were used to identify how to apply the terms from the literature 
to the actual tweets. Doing so, several revisions were made in the codebook. The 
process of developing the codebook also included recoding and refining the codebook, 
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which took approximately thirty hours over one month. The researcher and her 
dissertation advisor worked closely in developing the codebook and pre-coding 
hundreds of tweets from other times of the days from the days in the samples. First, they 
were coding the tweets together and discussing their thoughts about coding in relation 
codebook and revising it. Second, they coded sets of 30 to 60 tweets separately three 
times and compared their coding for reliability until they reached 90.3 percent 
agreements. Then, the researcher coded all of the tweets (N = 1,114) based on the 
following operationalization.  
Tolerance was defined based on the idea of being willing to accept the ideas, 
expressions and actions (non-voilent) of people who are unlike one’s self or whose 
views differ from one’s own (Locke, 1690/1963; Mill, 1861/1999; Sullivan et al., 
1979). Thus, tolerance refers to the acceptance of diversity of views, which is beyond 
the acceptance of in-group views (Locke, 1690/1963; Mill, 1861/1999). 
Tolerance was identified in relation to acceptance of broad concepts such as 
democracy, social justice, equality, diversity, etc. (Locke, 1690/1963; Mill, 1861/1999; 
Sullivan et al., 1979), which are explained as following. 
 Acceptance of all people regardless of their demographics (Adamic & 
Glance, 2005; Andreoni, 1995; Bae & Lee, 2012; Russell & Carroll, 1999; 
Watson et al., 1988; Wojcieszak, 2011; Wolsko et al., 2000). 
 Acceptance of America as a whole (Locke, 1690/1963; Mill, 1861/1999). 
Example, “Let’s vote to better serve our civic duty.”  
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 Acceptance of those who disagree or reject the communicator’s views 
Locke, 1690/1963; Sullivan et al., 1979). Example, “I am a Democrat voting 
for Trump.”   
 A tweets was not coded tolerant when it contained frames for acceptance 
of in-group or group of which one is expected to agree with. Example: 
Trump cluster – “I support Trump.”  
 If attempt at promotion or persuasion toward in-group (campaign slogans) 
was expressed as a broad appeal, then it was coded as neither. Examples: 
“Let’s all support Trump to save the 2nd Amendment, Make America Great 
Again (MAGA), Strong together.” In the above examples, “Make American 
Great Again” or “MAGA” is Trump’s campaign slogan and “Strong 
together” is Clinton’s campaign slogan. Even though these phrases seem 
very tolerant on the surface, they stand for promoting and persuading of 
people to support and vote a specific political ideology. Therefore, words 
and phrases like in the above examples were not coded as tolerant. 
Intolerance was identified in relation to any group, person, or set of ideas based 
on the following themes. The reason that coding for intolerant frames included any 
group and tolerant frames only include the out-group was that people often tend to show 
intolerance toward anyone that they disagree with. Even though people often express 
intolerance toward out-group, sometimes they show signs of prejudice and rejection 
toward their in-group individuals or ideas as well. Whereas, tolerance refers to 
acceptance of people, ideologies, and values regardless of the notions of in-group and 
out-group.  
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 Creating the sense of us” vs. “them” competition (Hardisty, Johnson, & 
Weber, 2009; Schubert & Otten, 2002; Shah, Brazy & Higgins, 2004; 
Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005; Tropp & Wright, 2001). Examples, 
“this is an election of Good vs. Evil,” or “I am sure you will choose hope 
over fear.” 
 Name calling (Smith, N.A; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942; Snyder v. 
Phelps, 2011; Teeter & Loving, 2008; Texas v. Johnson, 1989): Calling 
someone Hitler, Crooked Hillary, stupid, Drump, ghost, corrupt, hipster, 
criminal, liar, bereaved, ass hole, afraid, evil, zodiac killer, deplorable, 
immoral, whine, Nazi misogynist president, a bunch of fat-bags; sore losers, 
and “misled pigs”. 
 Rejecting: Denying a person, group, ideology, etc. (Locke, 1690/1963; 
Sullivan et al., 1979). Examples: “Let’s drain the swamp,” “not my 
president,” “never Hillary,” “I don’t want to hear your opinion,” “vote NO in 
gun control,” forcing anti-Trump celebrities out the country, “I won’t accept 
this election,” take someone down, and expressing distrust on someone. 
 Punishing: Go to jail, imprison, (Smith, N.A; Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 1942; Snyder v. Phelps, 2011; Teeter & Loving, 2008; Texas v. 
Johnson, 1989). Examples, impeach, assassinate, block, “Trump was 
dropped out of school.” 
 Attacking: Threatening, warning, display of symbols that arouse anger, and 
use of fighting words (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011; Smith, N.A; Teeter & 
Loving, 2008; Texas v. Johnson, 1989). 
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 Accusing someone of Corruption: Rigging, deceiving, lying, suspicion, 
attempting to fix/manipulate (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011; Smith, N.A; Teeter & 
Loving, 2008; Texas v. Johnson, 1989). Examples, blowing the election, 
Dems posing as Republicans, cheating, stealing, slight of hand, gutting the 
voting rights 
 Cursing/swearing (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011; Smith, N.A; Teeter & Loving, 
2008; Texas v. Johnson, 1989): “F*** Donald Trump,” shame on the 
candidate/party, “the bitch nigga Trump.” 
 Discriminating: Expressing prejudice, disgust and hate on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, religion, political ideology (Adamic & 
Glance, 2005; Bae & Lee, 2012; Coward, 1986; Russell & Carroll, 1999; 
Wojcieszak, 2011; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000; Yang & Self, 
2015). Examples, “sick of Dems,” or people of this group are stupid.”  
 Humiliating (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011; Smith, N.A; Teeter & Loving, 2008; 
Texas v. Johnson, 1989): “Democrats, people scoff at you,” “Dems sat on 
their butts and lost,” and “Trump will turn into pumpkin.”  
 Using hashtags: Hashtags that contain intolerant words. Examples: 
#nastywoman, #neverhillary, and #Drump 
 Using negative Emojis: Angr face, thumbs down or dislike, middle finger, 
crying face 
 If protests were clearly directed toward a specific person or group, the 
tweet was coded as intolerant (e.g., Hundreds of people took part in a 
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protests/riots to express anger against Trump, Lady Gaga protests against 
Trump in front of Trump Tower). 
 If protests were reported with no clear subject and object, the tweet was 
coded as neither (e.g., Hundreds of protestors took streets after election).  
If the tweets did not include expressions of tolerance and intolerance, they were coded 
as neither.  
The coding process included reading the entire tweet including mentions 
(@words) and hashtags (#words), identifying the subject and the object of the tweet, 
and traits associated with the object. If the subject had no direct/indirect objects (any 
person or group), then the traits associated with the subject were coded. If the tweet had 
more than one sentence (complete or clause), then a) it was coded for the first 
appearance of tolerance or intolerance, and b) if no tolerance or intolerance in the first 
clause, the second clause was considered, etc. If tweets had questions in them, they 
were coded as follows: a) If the whole tweet was a question, it was coded as neither 
tolerant nor intolerant. Except if subject of the tweet was called names or accused of 
prejudice, corruption, or deceiving. For example, “All that drama before the election! ? 
?Racist Trump close?” If the whole tweet ended with a question, it was coded as 
neither. But if there was a question with an answer in the tweet, it was coded for the 
answer. For example, “‘Do you know who rigged the election? Nigga Trump, not 
Hillary” If the tweets could not be understood, they were coded as neither. Example: 
“While ur following @wikileaks & election duality 24/7 -7th gen prophecy happenin-
Elders smoked from Crazy horse,Geroni?” 
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Inter-Coder Reliability. The researcher coded all the of the tweets (N = 1,114) 
from the 40 largest clusters based on the number of users in each network and was the 
primary coder of the content. To ensure a level of consistency in coding and that another 
researcher would apply the same standards and definitions of the codebook as the primary 
researcher, an inter-coder reliability test was conducted (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). 
Inter-coder reliability measures "the extent to which the different judges tend to assign 
exactly the same rating to each object" (Tinsley & Weiss, 2000, p. 98). According to Lacy 
and Riffe (1996), at least 10 percent of the research sample should be re-coded for the 
reliability test. Therefore, a second coder was trained to recode a random sample of at 10 
percent of data (n = 112) of the entire tweets (Himelboim at al., 2013). In order to test the 
inter-coder reliability, Cohen’s Kappa test was conducted. Cohen’s Kappa test measures 
the agreement between two coders of non-parametric variables while accounting for the 
likelihood the coders agree by chance; in this way, it is a robust test of multiple coder 
reliability (Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 2005). Cohen’s Kappa coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, and 
is acceptable at .75 or higher (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). The Cohen’s Kappa 
coefficient for the tolerance/intolerance variable was .877, which is good. 
In order to answer RQ4 about the association between tolerance and intolerance 
in the Twitter discourse and the network structure, scores from four measure of network 
centrality (in-degree, out-degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality) were analyzed 
in relation to framings of tolerance, intolerance, and neither. Before comparing network 
content with network structure, the network data was normalized, because network data 
are distributed based on power law, which is like a J-curve rather than a normal curve 
(Adamic & Huberman, 2000; Barabási & Albert, 1999). Transforming a non-normal 
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distribution into a normal distribution on SPSS is about making it useful for comparison 
with data that are normally distributed (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Osterlind, 2006). 
According to Tabachnick et al., transformation of data is about making the mean nearly 
equal to the median, because in skewed distributions, the median is often “a more 
appropriate measure of central tendency” than the mean (p. 86). There are three 
different ways of normalizing skewed data: Square root transformation, log 
transformation, and inverse transformation. Square root transformation is used when the 
distribution differs moderately from normal. If the distribution substantially differs from 
normal, a log transformation should be used. If the transformation differs severely from 
normal (J curve), an inverse transformation should be tried.  
All three transformations were conducted for all four centrality measures (in-
degree, out-degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality) to find out which one can 
produce skewness and kurtosis values near zero. Based on Tabachnick et al. (2001), the 
transformed data in which the median and mean values are very close and have the 
smallest skewness and kurtosis values should be chosen. Thus, for in-degree centrality, 
inverse transformation produced the smallest skewness (-.420) and Kurtosis (-1.520) 
with a mean of 6.6608 and median of 1.0. For out-degree centrality, inverse 
transformation produced the most normalized distribution – .390 skewness and -1.548 
kurtosis, and mean of .7363 and median of 1.0. Log transformation produced the most 
normalized distribution for betweenness centrality with -1.488 skewness, 7.622 
kurtosis, a mean of 4.0432 and a median of 3.9036.  
After transforming the data, two-way ANOVA analyses were run to explore the 
significance of relationships between tolerance and candidate in-group cluster and 
112 
network centrality measures: In-degree, out-degree, betweenness, and closeness. Two-
way ANOVA compares the mean differences between groups that are split on two 
independent variables (Tabachnick et al., 2001). A two-way ANOVA analysis also 
helps in explaining whether there is an interaction between the two independent 
variables on the dependent variable (Tabachnick et al., 2001). In this analysis, tolerance 
and cluster were the independent variables and in-degree centrality, out-degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality were the dependent 
variables. Each of these four centrality measures reveal a node’s position within the 
network structure, which can show the relative importance of nodes within the network. 
Hence, comparing tolerance and intolerance of a Twitter user with his/her centrality 
score (position in the network) can help in examining the relationship between Twitter 
content and network structure. A two-way ANOVA test for tolerance and cluster as IVs 
and each of the centrality measures as DVs will examine whether there are significant 
differences among the group means of the four network centrality measures based on 
tolerance and cluster. 
Summary 
 This chapter was on the methods and procedures of the analyses conducted in 
this dissertation research. The chapter was mainly divided into three parts. The first part 
of the chapter focused on how the social network analysis was done in this research, 
which included details on data collection, sampling, and analyzing the social network 
data. The second part of the chapter was about clusters and identifying the in-group 
characteristics of the 10 largest clusters in each of the four networks in the sample, 
which included sampling and coding for positive, negative, and neither frames in 
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tweets. The third part of the study was on content analysis of tweets for tolerance and 
intolerance, which consisted operationalization of tolerance and intolerance and 
examining the relationship of tolerance and cluster with four measure of network 



















Chapter 7: Results 
This study was a combination of social network analysis and content analysis 
of political tolerance and intolerance in political discourse on Twitter during the U.S. 
2016 presidential election. Using these two methods, this dissertation explored the 
relationship between social network structure and framing of tolerance and intolerance 
in political discourse on social media. The digital media have empowered citizens to 
not only make active decisions about their media use, but also to form political 
discussion groups independent of traditional media and communicate their thoughts 
and opinions with others. Despite the opportunities for cross-group communication, 
studies have shown that users tend to form homophilous communication networks, in 
which they interact with like-minded people in terms of political orientation 
(Himelboim et al., 2013; Liberman et al., 2014).  
The time period of the Twitter discourse included four days surrounding the 
election day (November 7, 8, 9, and 12) in order to explore whether there were 
differences among the networks before, during, and after the election. A total of 1,114 
tweets from 40 largest clusters from the four networks were analyzed to explore the 
relationship between social network structure and expression of tolerance and 
intolerance in people’s tweets. This chapter presents findings from social network 
analysis and content analysis answering four sets of research questions. The first part 
of the results chapter briefly summarizes the finding about the structures of the social 
networks over a four day-period surrounding the election – answering RQ1a-d. The 
second part of this chapter answers RQ2a-d about the in-group characteristics of the 
largest clusters in the networks during this period and the nature of the discourse in 
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these clusters. In part three of the chapter, RQ3a-2 explored the relationships between 
tolerant and intolerant content frames in the tweets with the in-group candidate 
characteristics of the largest clusters. The last part of this chapter answers RQ4 on the 
association between tolerance, in-group cluster characteristics and four measures of 
network centrality – in-degree, out-degree, betweenness, and close centrality.   
RQ1a-d explored the network structure of the election discourse on Twitter 
during the four-day period surrounding the election. The following graphs belong to 
the four networks from the four days surrounding the election, which show the 
network strcutures visually.  
Figure 7.1: Election Network on Nov. 7       Figure 7.2: Election Network on Nov. 8 
          
  
Figure 7.3: Election Network on Nov. 9         Figure 7.4: Election Network on Nov. 12 
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RQ1a asked about how was the Twitter network structured on November 7, 
the day before the U.S. 2016 presidential election. There were a total of 7,959 nodes or 
vertices, 7,054 edges in the election network on November 7. This means there were 
7,959 Twitter users (i.e., nodes) who generated 7,054 ties (6,803 unique and 251 
duplicate ties) or Twitter interactions in the form of tweets, retweets, mentions, and 
replies. A unique edge or tie is created with only one tweet, retweet, mention, or reply 
between two users, but duplicate edges (number of repeated vertex pairs) are 
established when there is more than one tweet, retweet, mention or reply between 
users (Hansen et al., 2010). There were 2,733 connected components in the November 
7 network. A connected component is a set of nodes or sub-networks that are 
connected to each other but are disconnected from the rest of the network (Hanneman 
& Riddle, 2005; Hansen et al., 201). In other words, a component refers to “the 
portion of the network that remains intact after removing isolates” (Lee, Kim, & 
Piercy, 2016, p. 10). A component can contain several clusters (Hanneman & Riddle, 
2005; Hansen et al., 201). There were 1,262 isolates or single-vertex connected 
components that were not connected to any other vertices in the entire network. 
Moreover, the number of connected components in this Twitter network was twice as 
the number of isolates, indicating that about two-thirds of the users were connected to 
at least one other user in the network (see Figure 7.1). As Figure 1 illustrates, the 
biggest component is in the left side of this network with 2,005 nodes and 2,313 
edges, which looks denser and more connected than the rest of the network. The 
largest connected component contained more than a quarter of the whole network.  
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As shown in Figure 7.1, the November 7 network was not centralized. 
Centralization measures the extent to which a social network structure is hierarchical 
or non-hierarchical (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). In a hierarchical network, one or a 
few users are extremely more popular than others with the most number of 
connections (Freeman, 1979; Himelboim at al., 2017). In contrast, in a non-
hierarchical network, users’ connections are distributed more or less evenly across the 
network (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Centralization score ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 
being a completely flat and decentralized network and 1 being the most hierarchical 
and centralized network (Freeman, 1979; Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 2009).  
In-degree centralization of the November 7 network was 0.016, meaning the 
most popular users received 1.6 percent of the overall in-coming connections in the 
network. This in-degree centralization indicates a low level of hierarchy in the 
network. Out-degree centralization was also low (0.001), even lower than the in-
degree centralization. An out-degree centralization of 0.001 indicate that the most 
central users initiated 0.1 percent of communication on the total communication 
connections in form of mentioning, retweeting, and replying. Network density was 
0.00008, which showed a low level of interconnectivity among nodes. Considering 
that network density shows ranges from 0 to 1 (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; 
Wasserman & Faust, 2009), a density score of 0.00008 means that 8 out of a 1,000 
users were interconnected in this network.  
The modularity score in this network was 0.883. Network modularity score 
ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating no interconnectivity among nodes within clusters 
and 1 indicating the highest level of interconnectivity among nodes within clusters 
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(Himelboim at al., 2017). A modularity score of 0.883 means that 88.3 percent of the 
users were connected to those within their own clusters, not with nodes from other 
clusters. A high level of modularity and low level of density, together, indicate that 
nodes were not interconnected in the network, they were disconnected across clusters, 
but connected within their own clusters. 
Maximum geodesic distance (e.g., diameter) in the network was 24. Geodesic 
distance is the shortest path between two users (Kadushin, 2012). The maximum 
geodesic distance is the farthest distance between two users in the network 
(Wasserman & Faust, 2009). In this network, the average geodesic distance was 9.3, 
which means that on average, there were more than 9 paths between two nodes in this 
network. The reciprocity score in this network is 0.001, meaning that Twitter users 
responded to only 0.1 percent of the total number of tweets in the network. Network 
reciprocity scores range between 0 and 1(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005), and a 
reciprocity of .001 indicates that one of 1,000 tweets drew a response, or interaction. 
This showed a low level of interaction in the network. 
  RQ1b asked about the structure of Twitter network on the day of the U.S. 2016 
presidential election. On November 8 network, there were 13,826 nodes and 12,554 
edges (11,837 unique and 717 duplicate edges). This means that 13,826 Twitter users 
on the November 8 election network generated 12,554 ties or interactions (e.g., tweets, 
retweets, mentions, and replies). There were 4,956 connected components or 
subnetworks and 2,413 isolates in the November 8 network. This means that the 
network had twice as many connected components as isolates. Figure 7.2 shows that 
November 8 network was very connected, the largest component located at the center 
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of the network has 3,678 nodes and 4,376 edges – making a quarter of the whole 
network. As a result, the network was shaped central and compact and the nodes look 
interconnected.    
Figure 7.2 shows that the November 8 network looks centralized, but the 
centralization scores were slightly higher than zero in the network. In-degree 
centralization of the network was 0.059, which suggests that the most popular users in 
this network received only 5.9 percent of the total in-coming connections (retweets, 
mentions, and replies). Likewise, out-degree centralization was 0.001, which was 0.1 
percent of hierarchy in the network based on out-going ties. In other words, the most 
central users’ retweets, mentions and replies accounted for 1 out of 1,000 connections 
in the network. 
The density of the network was 0.00004, which revealed 0.004 percent 
interconnectivity in the entire network. This suggests that just 4 of 1,000 users in the 
network were inter-linked with each other. Modularity score was 0.833 that 
demonstrates a high level of interconnectivity within clusters. The low density and 
high modularity scores show the Twitter users were loosely connected in the 
November 8 network, rarely interacted beyond their clusters, but they were 
interconnected within their own clusters. The maximum geodesic in the network was 
22 and the average geodesic distance was 6.6, indicating that on average, there were 
more than 6 paths between two nodes in this network and the longest distance was 22 
paths between two nodes. The reciprocity score in this network was 0.003, meaning 3 
out of 1,000 tweets, or .3 percent, were replied to, revealing a low level of interactivity 
in the network. 
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RQ1c asked how was the Twitter network structured the day after the U.S. 2016 
presidential election. On November 9, the network had 10,402 nodes, 9,264 edges 
(8,938 unique and 326 duplicate edges). There were 3,396 connected components and 
1,536 isolates in the network, which means that the network had more than twice as 
many nodes as the number of isolates. As Figure 7.3 shows, the biggest component in 
this network is located in the lower left side of the network with 2,857 nodes and 
3,289 edges. 
The in-degree centralization of the network was 0.018, which means 2 percent 
hierarchy in the network structure based on in-coming ties. In other words, the most 
central nodes in this network received 1.8 percent of the total in-coming ties in the 
network –retweets, mentions, and replies. This means that out-degree centralization 
score was 0.001, which suggests that only 0.1 percent of the popular nodes retweeted, 
mentioned, and replied to other people’s tweets. This is 1 reply for every 1,000 tweets. 
Graph density of the network was 0.00006, which demonstrates that users were 
only 0.006 percent interconnected with each other across this network. This means 
that 6 out of 1,000 users were inter-linked in this network. The modularity score in 
November 9 network was 0.874, which demonstrates high interconnectedness among 
nodes within clusters. Comparing the low density and high modularity scores shows 
that the nodes were loosely interconnected across the network, but densely 
interconnected within clusters. Maximum geodesic distance in the network was 20 –
meaning – the longest distance between two nodes was 20 steps or users. The average 
geodesic distance was 8.3, which suggests that on average, 2 Twitter users were 8 
steps far from each other in this network. The reciprocity score in this network was 
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0.003, which suggests every 3 of 1,000 tweet generated replies (0.3 percent of the total 
content in the network).  
RQ1d asked how was the Twitter network structured 4 days after the U.S. 2016 
presidential election. In the election network on November 12, there were 6,462 nodes 
5,928 edges (5,664 unique and 264 duplicate edges). There were 1,937 connected 
components and 845 isolates in the November 12 network suggesting that the network 
nearly 2.5 as many connected nodes as isolates. Figure 7.4 demonstrates that the 
largest component is spread across the central areas on the network with 2,317 nodes 
and 2,669 edges, which includes nodes from more than four clusters. In-degree 
centralization of the network was 0.033, which indicates that the most central nodes 
received 3.3 percent of in-coming connections such as retweets, mentions, and replies 
– not hierarchical. At the same time, out-degree centralization was 0.001, which 
means that only 0.1 percent out-going ties were started by the most central nodes in 
the network. Network density was 0.0001, which demonstrates 0.01 percent of 
interconnectivity among nodes across the network. This also mean that 10 out of 1,000 
users in this network were interconnected with each other. Modularity score were 
0.871 that shows the clusters were disconnected from each other, but the nodes were 
interconnected within the clusters. Such a low density score and high modularity score 
indicate that the nodes were loosely interlinked in the network and clusters 
disconnected from each other, but cluster members were interrelated within 
themselves. The maximum geodesic distance (diameter) in the network was 24 and the 
average geodesic distance was 8.97, which suggests that on average, there were about 
9 paths between two nodes in this network and the longest distance between two nodes 
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was 24 steps. The reciprocity score in this network was 0.005, indicating that 5 out of 
1,000 tweets were replied to, which makes 0.5 percent of the total communication in 
the network. 
Compare and Contrast the Four Networks 
Before comparing and contrasting the four networks, it is noteworthy to 
mention that the comparisons between network structures were based on descriptive 
differences and similarities among the networks (See Table 7.1).  
As Table 7.1 shows, there were similarities between the four networks in the 
four days around the election, including the election day. In all four networks in-
degree centralization was low and non-hierarchical and out-degree centralization was 
lower than in-degree centralization. Also, density scores were low in all four networks 
while the modularity scores were high. Maximum and average geodesic distance 
scores were similar across the network. Reciprocity was also low in all four networks.  
Despite the similarities between the four networks, there were patterns in the 
data across the four days in terms of networks size, connectedness, centralization, 
density, geodesic distance, and density. These patterns showed how the networks 
changed over the four days surrounding the election.  
The network on November 8 was the biggest network in terms of number of 
nodes (13,826) and edges (12,554) followed by November 9 (10,402 nodes and 9,264 
edges), November 7 (7,957 nodes and 7,054 edges), and November 12 (6,462 nodes 
and 5,928 edges). Accordingly, the differences in the network size impacted the sizes 
of components, isolates, and levels of density in the four networks. Like the network 
size, number of connected components was bigger on November 8 and 9 compared to 
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November 7 and 12. Similarly, the number of isolate nodes was larger in November 8 
and 12 network than November 7 and 9 networks (See Table 7.1). 
The density scores were low in all four networks, which indicates that nodes in 
all four networks were loosely interconnected. November 12 network had slightly 
higher density score (0.0001) among the four networks followed by November 7 
(0.00008), November 9 (0.00006) and November 8 (0.00004) networks. There were 
differences in density scores because nodes in bigger networks are often loosely 
connected to each other than they in smaller networks – as a network gets smaller, it 
becomes denser (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). This being said, because November 8 
network is the biggest among the four networks and it has lower density score than 
November 12, 7, and 9 networks. 
The differences in the density scores among the four networks also mean that 
there were more interactions among Twitter users in November 12 network compared 
to other three networks; November 8 network – election day – was the least 
interconnected network among the four. This indicates that on November 12 and other 
days surrounding the election, people were more interconnected compared to the day 
of election. Even though the network size on November 8 was bigger than the other 
three days, the users were less interconnected with each other in this network 
compared to other three networks (low density).  
Although centralization scores were low in all of the four networks, the network 
on November 8 had the highest centralization score (0.059) followed by November 12 
(0.033), November 9 (0.018), and November 7 (0.016). Looking at Figure 7.2, the 
election network on November 8 looks more central compared to the other three 
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networks. This means that the network on November 8 was more hierarchical – more 
structured around a few key users – than the other three networks. These centrals users 
were the candidates (Trump and Clinton), news media (CNN, The Washington Post, 
and The New York Times), high profile politicians (Bernie Sanders and Mike Pence), 
candidate’s family members (e.g., Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump), celebrities (Bill 
Mitchel and Lady Gaga), and WikiLeaks.  











































































































































































































































7,957 7,054 6,803 251 2,733 1,262 2,005 2,313 0.016 0.001 0.00008 0.883 24 9.33 0.001 
Nov. 
8 
13,826 12,554 11,837 717 4,956 2,413 3,678 4,376 0.059 0.001 0.00004 0.833 22 6.67 0.003 
Nov. 
9 
10,402 9,264 8,938 326 3,396 1,536 2,857 3,289 0.018 0.001 0.00006 0.874 20 8.36 0.003 
Nov. 
12 
6,462 5,928 5,664 264 1,937 845 2,317 2,669 0.033 0.001 0.0001 0.871 24 8.97 0.005 
 
The modularity scores were high in all four networks starting from November 
7 (0.883) followed by November 9 (0.874), November 12 (0.871), and November 8 
0.833). The high modularity scores indicate the existence of highly disconnected 
clusters in all four networks. This can also mean that clusters on different topics were 
very disconnected from each other even if they supported the same candidate. The 
election network on November 8 had the lowest modularity score among the four 
networks, which means there were more cross-group interactions among clusters in 
this network compared to other three networks.  
There were some patterns in the geodesic distance and reciprocity across the 
four network. The average geodesic distance on November 7 was high, it got smaller on 
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November 8, increased on November 9, and again decreased on November 12. The 
average geodesic distance in the November 8 network was the smallest (6.67) among 
the four networks. November 8 election network reveals that users were closer together 
on the election day than on other three days. This means that on average there were of 
six nodes (or users) between the two users in November 8 network. This is what social 
network scholars have called six degrees of separation (Travers & Milgram, 1967; 
Watts, 2004). Milgram (1967) was the first researcher who conducted a study called 
“The Small World Problem,” which found that in any given country, it only takes six 
steps of acquaintances for a resident to know another resident. This also suggest that 
people live in clusters, which facilitate the linkage among them and makes it easy to 
connect them to each other even without their awareness (Barabasi, 2002). Kwak et al. 
(2010) found that the average distance between two users on Twitter is 4 paths. The 
finding of this study is different from Kwak and colleagues in that the average geodesic 
distances in the four networks range between 6 to 9 steps.  
Overall, reciprocity was very low in all of the four networks, but November 7 
network had the lowest reciprocity (0.001), followed by November 8 (0.003), 9 (0.003), 
and 12 (0.005) networks. November 7 revealed the lowest level of reciprocity, 
suggesting that on the day before the election people in the network were either 
following election news or expressing their own views, as opposed to responding or 
interacting with others. The networks on November 8 and 9 had the same levels of 
reciprocity, which suggest that people were replying to others’ tweets on the election 
day and the day after in similar manner. However, the higher reciprocity on November 
12 indicates that people were more interactive in their Twitter communication after the 
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election compared to time before the election. Reciprocity might be low due to the 
structure of the platform, because Twitter is a medium of the moment and the Twitter 
networks are conversational. It might also be to due the time frame of the data 
collection (1-5 mintues).  
RQ2a-d asked about the candidate in-group characteristics of each of the 10 
largest clusters for the four days sampled. To do this, two sets of analyses were used. 
First, a 3-step method was used to identify candidate in-group in each cluster by 
looking at (1) the most common words, (2) the most common word pairs, and (3) the 
most retweeted messages in the cluster. The 3-step process could help in identifying 
the candidates and topics discussed in the clusters, but it was not able to identify how 
these topics were framed and which candidates were primarily supported or not in the 
tweets. The repeated words, word pairs and retweets overlapped in most clusters, 
which made it confusing to decide which candidate or political ideology was dominant 
in a specific cluster (See Appendix B).  
Because the first set of analyses was not useful in identifying the in-group and 
out-group of clusters, the second analysis of clusters included coding of all tweets (n = 
1,114) for positive, negative and neither frames toward each candidate and neither of 
the candidates. Positive tweets included frames in support for the candidate, the 
political party, or campaign. Negative tweets included frames against the candidate, 
the political party, or issues related to the political ideology. Neither tweets included 
those in which the subject or topic of the tweets did not include either candidate or the 
frame of the tweets did not reflect positively or negatively toward either candidate.  
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After coding for positive, negative, and neither frames, the in-group for each 
cluster was identified by summing up the positive tweets of Clinton with negative 
tweets of Trump and positive tweets of Trump with negative tweets of Clinton. If the 
sum of Clinton’s positive tweets and Trump’s negative tweets was more than the sum 
of Trump’s positive tweets with Clinton’s negative tweets, Clinton was identified as 
the in-group for the cluster. If the sum of Trump’s positive tweets with Clinton’s 
negative tweets was more than Clinton’s positive tweets and Trump’s negative tweets, 
the cluster was identified as Trump in-group. If the sum of neither candidate’s positive 
tweets with the opposing candidate’s negative tweets was more than 5, the clusters 
was identified as neither. The following section briefly explains the in-group 
characteristics of each of the 10 largest clusters in the four networks on November 7, 
8, 9, and 12. 
RQ2a asked about the in-group characteristics of dominant clusters within the 
network the day before the U.S. 2016 presidential election. There were 269 original 
tweets in the 10 largest clusters in November 7 network. After analyzing the tweets for 
positive, negative, and neither frames and comparing the sums of positive tweets of 
one candidate with the negative tweets of the other candidate, 3 clusters were 
identified as Clinton in-group, 3 as Trump in-group, and 4 as neither. Figure 7.5 
illustrates the 10 clusters based on their in-group characteristics, in which blue stands 






Figure 7.5: The 10 Largest Clusters from Nov. 7 Network Colored based on 
Political Ideology  
 
In cluster 1 (the largest cluster) in the November 7 network there were 77 
original tweets. This cluster was identified as Clinton in-group, because the sum of 
Clinton’s positive tweets and Trump’s negative tweets (Clinton positive + Trump 
negative) was 37 tweets, which was higher than the sum of positive tweets about 
Trump and the negative tweets about (Clinton Trump positive + Clinton negative), 21 
tweets. As Table 7.2 shows, a total of 19 tweets were neither positive nor negative 
toward the two candidates. 
                  Table 7.2: Cluster1: Clinton 
 Positive Negative Neither Total 
Trump 11 14 1 26 
Clinton 23 10 2 35 
Neither 2 3 11 16 
Total 36 27 14 77 
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The results of the next nine largest clusters in November 7 network are summarized in 
the following bullet points. The number of original tweets in each cluster is noted 
parenthetically: 
 Cluster 2: Clinton in-group (n = 66); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 21; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 10; neither = 35 
 Cluster 3: Clinton in-group (n = 33); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 6; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 2; neither = 25 
 Cluster 4: Neither in-group (n = 8); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 1; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 0; neither = 7 
 Cluster 5: Trump in-group (n = 15); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 2; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 8; neither = 5 
 Cluster 6: Neither in-group (n = 5); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 1; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 0; neither = 4 
 Cluster 7: Trump in-group (n = 36); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 6; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 14; neither = 16 
 Cluster 8: Neither in-group (n = 7); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 1; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 0; neither = 6 
 Cluster 9: Trump in-group (n = 21); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 0; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 11; neither = 10 
 Cluster 10: Neither in-group (n = 1); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 0; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 0; neither = 1 
As shown on Table #, from the 10 largest clusters about election on November 7, 
the day before the election, three Clinton in-group, three Trump in-group, and four 
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neither in-group clusters emerged. For the three Clinton in-group clusters, there were 64 
tweets that identified her as the in-group (the sum of Clinton positive + Trump negative 
in the three clusters). There were also 33 tweets that were not positive toward Clinton 
(sum of Trump positive and Clinton negative in these clusters). There were 79 tweets in 
these Clinton in-group clusters that identified neither candidate as the in-group. 








Clinton negative Neither Total 
Clinton 37 21 19 77 
 21 10 35 66 
 6 2 25 33 
  64 33 79 176 
Trump 2 8 5 15 
 6 14 16 36 
 0 11 10 21 
  8 33 31 72 
Neither 1 0 7 8 
 1 0 4 5 
 1 0 6 7 
 0 0 1 1 
 3 0 18 21 
Total 75 66 128 269 
 
As shown on Table 7.4, in the three Trump in-group clusters, there were 33 tweets 
that identified Trump as in-group (sum of Trump positive and Clinton negative in these 
clusters) and 8 tweets were not positive toward him (the sum of Clinton positive + 
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Trump negative in the three clusters). There were 31 tweets in these clusters that were 
about neither of the candidates. In the three neither clusters, the sum of Clinton’s 
positive and Trump’s negative tweets was 3 and sum of Trump’s positive and Clinton’s 
negative tweets was zero. In these clusters, 18 tweets identified neither of the candidates 
as in-group.  
RQ2b asked about in-group characteristics of the dominant clusters within the 
Twitter network on the day of the U.S. 2016 presidential election. There were 377 
original tweets in the 10 largest clusters of November 8 network. The framing analysis 
for positive, negative, and neither frames revealed three clusters as Clinton in-group, 5 
as Trump in-group, and 2 as neither. Figure 7.6 shows the in-group characteristics of 
clusters in different colors, in which blue stands for Clinton in-group clusters, red for 
Trump in-group clusters, and black for neither clusters. 
Figure 7.6: The 10 Largest Clusters Colored in November 8 Network 
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The results of the 10 largest clusters’ in-group characteristics are presented in the 
below bullet points, in which the total number of original tweets are written in 
parentheses.  
 Cluster 1: Clinton in-group (n = 99); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 38; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 31; neither = 30 
 Cluster 2: Neither in-group (n = 17); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 3; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 2; neither = 12 
 Cluster 3: Clinton in-group (n = 45); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 14; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 3; neither = 28 
 Cluster 4: Trump in-group (n = 25); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 1; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 18; neither = 6 
 Cluster 5: Trump in-group (n = 34); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 3; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 10; neither = 21 
 Cluster 6: Trump in-group (n = 32); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 2; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 14; neither = 16 
 Cluster 7: Trump in-group (n = 28); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 1; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 13; neither = 14 
 Cluster 8: Neither in-group (n = 34); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 2; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 1; neither = 31 
 Cluster 9: Trump in-group (n = 30); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 4; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 12; neither = 14 
 Cluster 10: Clinton in-group (n = 33); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 11; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 1; neither = 21) 
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From the 10 largest clusters about election on November 8, the election day, three 
clusters were identified as Clinton in-group, five clusters as Trump in-group, and two 
clusters as neither. In the three Clinton in-group clusters, 63 tweets were recognized as 
Clinton in-group (the sum of Clinton positive + Trump negative in the three clusters). In 
these three clusters, 33 tweets were not positive toward Clinton (sum of Trump positive 
and Clinton negative in these clusters). There were 79 tweets that identified neither 
candidate as the in-group in these Clinton in-group clusters. 
Table 7.4: In-group Characteristics in the 10 Largest Clusters of November 8 
Network 
 
Clinton positive  
+ 





negative Neither Total 
Clinton 38 31 30 99 
 14 3 28 45 
 11 1 21 33 
 63 35 79 177 
Trump 1 18 6 25 
 3 10 21 34 
 2 14 16 32 
 1 13 14 28 
 4 12 14 30 
 11 67 71 149 
Neither 3 2 12 17 
 2 1 31 34 
 5 3 43 51 
Total 79 105 193 377 
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As shown on Table 7.5, in the five Trump in-group clusters, 67 tweets identified 
Trump as in-group (sum of Trump positive and Clinton negative in these clusters) and 
11 tweets were not positive toward him (the sum of Clinton positive + Trump negative 
in the three clusters). In these five clusters, 71 tweets recognized neither of the 
candidates as in-group. In the two neither clusters, the sum of Clinton positive and 
Trump negative were 5 tweets and sum of Trump positive and Clinton negative was 3. 
In these clusters, 43 tweets identified neither of the candidates as in-group.  
RQ2c asked about in-group characteristics of the dominant clusters within the 
network the day after the U.S. 2016 presidential election. In the 10 largest clusters in 
November 9 network, there were 270 original tweets. The analysis of positive, negative, 
and neither frames in these tweets revealed that there were 3 in-group clusters for 
Clinton, 3 for Trump, and 4 for neither. The clusters’ in-group characteristics are shown 
in figure 7.7 in three colors – blue for Clinton in-group clusters, red for Trump in-group 
clusters, and black for neither clusters.  
Figure 7.7: The 10 Largest Clusters Colored in November 9 Network 
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The findings for in-group characteristics of clusters are summarized in bullet points 
below, and the total number of original tweets in each cluster are written in parentheses. 
 Cluster 1: Clinton in-group (n = 67); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 22; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 19; neither = 26 
 Cluster 2: Trump in-group (n = 84); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 25; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 38; neither = 21 
 Cluster 3: Neither in-group (n = 3); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 3; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 0; neither = 0 
 Cluster 4: Clinton in-group (n = 34); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 21; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 5; neither = 8 
 Cluster 5: Neither in-group (n = 4); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 3; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 0; neither = 1 
 Cluster 6: Clinton in-group (n = 49); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 21; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 14; neither = 14 
 Cluster 7: Trump in-group (n = 10); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 1; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 8; neither = 1 
 Cluster 8: Trump in-group (n = 12); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 3; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 8; neither = 1 
 Cluster 9: Neither in-group (n = 5); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 3; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 0; neither = 2 
    Cluster 10: Neither in-group (n = 2); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 1; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 1; neither = 0 
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Table shows that of the 10 largest clusters about election on November 9 network, 
the day after election, three clusters recognized Clinton as in-group, three clusters 
Trump as in-group, and four clusters neither of them as in-group. In the three Clinton 
in-group clusters, 64 tweets identified Clinton as the in-group (the sum of Clinton 
positive + Trump negative in the three clusters). In these Clinton clusters, 38 tweets 
were not positive toward her (sum of Trump positive and Clinton negative in these 
clusters). There were 48 tweets that recognized neither candidate as the in-group. 










Clinton negative Neither Total 
Clinton 22 19 26 67 
 21 5 8 34 
 21 14 14 49 
  64 38 48 150 
Trump 25 38 21 84 
 1 8 1 10 
 3 8 2 12 
  29 54 24 106 
Neither 3 0 0 3 
 3 0 1 4 
 3 0 2 5 
 1 1 0 2 
 10 1 3 14 
Total 103 93 75 270 
 
In the three Trump in-group clusters, 54 tweets were identified as Trump in-group 
(sum of Trump positive and Clinton negative in these clusters) and 25 tweets were not 
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positive toward him (the sum of Clinton positive + Trump negative in the three 
clusters). In these Trump clusters, 27 tweets identified neither of the candidates as in-
group.  The four neither clusters had a total of 14 tweets, 10 of which were positive 
toward Clinton (Clinton positive + Trump negative), one was positive toward Trump 
(Trump positive + Clinton negative), and 3 of them identified neither of the candidates 
as in-group.  
RQ2d asked about in-group characteristics of the dominant clusters within the 
Twitter network four days after the U.S. 2016 presidential election. There were 198 
original tweets in the 10 largest clusters on the November 12 network. Analyzing these 
tweets for positive, negative, and neither framed revealed 7 clusters as Clinton in-group, 
2 as Trump in-group, and 1 as neither. Again, in Figure 7.8, the ten clusters are shown 
in three different colors according to their in-group characteristics – blue for Clinton in-
group, red for Trump in-group, and black for neither clusters. 
Figure 7.8: The 10 Largest Clusters Colored in November 12 Network 
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The findings of the analysis for positive, negative, and neither frames in the 10 largest 
clusters on November 12 are briefly reported in the below bullet point, in which the 
total number of original tweets in each cluster is stated in parentheses.  
 Cluster 1: Clinton in-group (n = 9); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 7; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 0; neither = 2 
 Cluster 2: Trump in-group (n = 9); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 0; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 7; neither = 2 
 Cluster 3: Clinton in-group (n = 18); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 6; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 4; neither = 8 
 Cluster 6: Trump in-group (n = 42); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 13; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 25; neither = 4 
 Cluster 5: Clinton in-group (n = 25); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 12; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 8; neither = 5 
  Cluster 6: Clinton in-group (n = 10); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 5; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 2; neither = 3 
 Cluster 7: Clinton in-group (n = 34); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 9; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 7; neither = 18 
 Cluster 8: Clinton in-group (n = 25); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 12; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 8; neither = 4 
 Cluster 9: Neither in-group (n = 17); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 6; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 6; neither = 5 
 Cluster 10: Clinton in-group (n = 9); Clinton positive + Trump negative = 6; 
Trump positive + Clinton negative = 1; neither = 2 
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As shown on Table7.6, from the 10 largest clusters about election on November 
12, our days after the election day, six clusters were identified as Clinton in-group, 
two clusters as Trump in-group, and two clusters as neither of the candidate’s in-
group. In the six Clinton in-group clusters, 52 tweets identified her as the in-group (the 
sum of Clinton positive + Trump negative in the three clusters). In these six clusters, 
there were 26 tweets that were not positive toward Clinton (sum of Trump positive 
and Clinton negative in these clusters). Also, 43 tweets identified neither of the 
candidates as their in-group.  










 +  
Clinton 
negative Neither Total 
Clinton 7 0 2 9 
 6 4 8 18 
 11 6 8 25 
 5 2 3 10 
 9 7 18 34 
 12 8 5 25 
 6 1 2 9 
  56 28 46 130 
Trump 0 7 2 9 
 13 25 4 42 
  13 32 6 51 
Neither 6 6 5 17 




In the three Trump in-group clusters, in 33 tweets Trump was identified as in-
group (sum of Trump positive and Clinton negative in these clusters) and 13 tweets 
were not positive toward him (the sum of Clinton positive + Trump negative in the 
three clusters). In these three Trump clusters, 5 tweets identified neither of the 
candidates as in-group. The two neither clusters had 27 tweets in total, 11 of which 
were positive toward Clinton (Clinton positive + Trump negative), 8 were positive 
toward Trump (Trump positive + Clinton negative), and 8 tweets had neither of the 
candidates as their in-group. 
In sum, 17 clusters were recognized as Clinton’s in-group clusters, 12 as 
Trump’s in-group clusters and 11 as neither. From the total sample (n = 1,114), 29.8 
percent of the tweets were positive about Clinton and Negative about Trump, 29.62 
percent were positive about Trump and negative about Clinton, and 40.66 percent of 
them were neither positive nor negative toward the candidates. 
Accordingly, from the 633 tweets in Clinton’s clusters, 39.02 percent of them 
identified Clinton as in-group (Clinton positive + Trump negative), 21.16 percent 
identified Trump as in-group (Trump positive + Clinton negative), and 39.81 percent 
identified neither of the candidates as in-group. From the 378 tweets in Trump 
clusters, 49.20 percent of them recognized Trump as in-group (Trump positive + 
Clinton negative), 16.13 identified Clinton as in-group (Clinton positive + Trump 
negative) about Trump, and 34.92 percent identified neither of the candidates as in-
group. Of the 103 tweets in the neither in-group clusters, 23.3 percent identified 
Clinton as in-group, 9.7 percent Trump as in-group, and 66.99 percent neither of the 
candidates as in-group. 
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As Table 7.7 shows, the Clinton clusters had softer support for Clinton, because 
there were more Trump positive + Clinton negative tweets in the Clinton clusters (134 
tweets) than there were Trump negative + Clinton positive in the Trump clusters (61). 
Furthermore, there were more neither tweets in Clinton clusters (252) than in Trump 
clusters (132), which can indicate that there were non-partisan conversations in 
Clinton clusters compared to Trump clusters. In the neither clusters, there were more 
positive tweets for Clinton than Trump, because the Clinton positive + Trump 
negative tweets (24 tweets) were more than Trump positive + Clinton negative tweets. 











Clinton positive 247 61 24 332 
+ 39.02% 16.13% 23.30% 29.80% 
Trump negative     
 
Trump positive 134 186 10 330 
+ 21.16% 49.20% 9.70% 29.62% 
Clinton negative     
 
Neither 252 131 69 452 
 
39.81% 34.92% 66.99% 40.66% 
Total 633 378 103 1114 
 
 
RQ3a-d were about the framing of tolerance and intolerance among the 10 
largest clusters in each of the four networks. Each tweet in the sample (n = 1,114) was 
coded for tolerance, intolerance or neither. These research questions were answered by 
chi-square tests on the frequency of frames of tolerance, intolerance, and neither among 
Clinton, Trump, and neither clusters. Chi-square test calculates the significance of 
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relationships between two or more non-parametric variables (Wimmer & Dominick, 
2011). First, the differences were explored for each day by running a chi square test, 
and then for all four days together.   
RQ3a asked how the content was framed in terms of tolerance and intolerance 
in the 10 largest clusters the day before the U.S. 2016 presidential election. The results 
found no statistically significant differences in the expression of tolerance and 
intolerance between the candidates’ in-group clusters on November 7 (χ2 = 4.412, df = 
4, p = .353). Table 7.8 shows similar break down in the expression of tolerance and 
intolerance for both Clinton and Trump clusters.  
Table 7.8: Frames of Tolerance and Intolerance by Candidate’s In-group Cluster   
on Nov.7 
                           Cluster 


















































        χ2 = 4.412 
        df= 4 
        p = .353 
        
Note: Percentages are by columns (e.g., the 8 Clinton cluster tweets exhibiting     
tolerance are 4.5 percent of the 176 Clinton cluster tweets). 
 
There was little difference in the expression of tolerance between Clinton (4.5 
percent) and Trump (5.6 percent). Clinton’s clusters had more intolerant tweets (39.2 
percent) than Trump’s clusters (30.6 percent), but the difference was not significant. 
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Trump cluster tweets had a higher percentage of tweets that expressed neither tolerance 
or intolerance (63.9 percent) than Clinton cluster tweets (56.3 percent). A key finding 
was that in both sets of clusters, about 60 percent of the tweets were neither tolerant nor 
intolerant. This means that for both candidate in-group clusters, a majority of the tweets 
did not include frames for tolerance or intolerance toward either candidate. 
RQ3b asked how the content was framed in terms of tolerance and intolerance 
in the 10 largest clusters on the day of the U.S. 2016 presidential election. There were 
no significant differences in the framing of tolerance and intolerance between the two 
sets of clusters (χ2 = 6.167, df = 4, p = .187) (See Table 7.9). 
Table 7.9: Frames of Tolerance and Intolerance by Candidate’s In-group Cluster 
on Nov. 8 
                          Cluster 

















































          χ2 = 6.167 
          df= 4 
          p = .187 
Note: Percentages are by columns (e.g., the 11 Clinton cluster tweets exhibiting 
tolerance are 6.2 percent of the 177 Clinton cluster tweets). 
 
Table 7.9 demonstrates similarities in the expression of tolerance and 
intolerance between Clinton and Trump clusters. Clinton clusters had slightly more 
tolerant (6.2 percent) and intolerant (31.1 percent) tweets than the tolerant (4.9 percent) 
and intolerant (30.1 percent) tweets in Trump clusters. The Trump clusters had slightly 
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more tweets (65 percent) that were neither tolerant nor intolerant than Clinton clusters 
(62.7 percent). Similar to the day before the election, in both sets of candidate in-group 
clusters, more than 60 percent of the tweets were neither tolerant nor intolerant. 
RQ3c asked how the content was framed in terms of tolerance and intolerance 
in the 10 largest clusters the day after the U.S. 2016 presidential election. There was no 
significant difference in the expression of tolerance and intolerance between the three 
sets of clusters (χ2 = 5.143, df = 4, p = .273) (See Table 7.11). Table 7.10 shows 
differences between cluster groups in their expression of tolerance and intolerance.  
Table 7.10: Frames of Tolerance and Intolerance by Candidate’s In-group 
Cluster on Nov. 9 
                          Cluster 

















































    χ2 = 5.143 
     df= 4 
     p = .273 
Note: Percentages are by columns (e.g., the 12 Clinton cluster tweets exhibiting 
tolerance are 8 percent of the 150 Clinton cluster tweets). 
 
Clinton clusters had more tolerant tweets (8 percent) than neither (7.1 percent) 
and Trump (3.8 percent) clusters. There were more intolerant tweets in neither (71. 4 
percent) clusters than Clinton (64 percent) and Trump clusters (57.5 percent). Trump 
Clusters had more tweets that were neither tolerant nor intolerant (38 percent) compared 
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to Clinton (28 percent) and neither (21.4 percent). On this day (the day after election), 
more than 60 percent of the tweets were intolerant. This suggests that, the day after the 
election, more than half of the tweets included intolerant frames toward the candidates. 
RQ3d asked how the content was framed in terms of tolerance and intolerance 
in the 10 largest clusters four days after the U.S. 2016 presidential election. There was 
no significant difference in the expression of tolerance and intolerance among the 
candidate in-group clusters (χ2 = 1.173, df = 4, p = .882) (See Table 7.11).  
Table 7.11: Frames of Tolerance and Intolerance by Candidate’s In-group 
Cluster on Nov. 12 
                          Cluster 

















































             χ2 = 1.173 
            df= 4 
            p = .882 
Note: Percentages are by columns (e.g., the 5 Clinton cluster tweets exhibiting 
tolerance are 3.8 percent of the 130 Clinton cluster tweets). 
 
Both Trump and neither clusters had the same level of tolerance (5.9 percent) 
while Clinton clusters had fewer tweets with expressions of tolerance (3.8 percent). 
Neither clusters had more intolerant tweets (58.8 percent) followed by Clinton clusters 
(51.5 percent) compared to Trump’s clusters (47.1 percent). Trump clusters had more 
tweets that were neither tolerant nor intolerant (47.1 percent) in comparison to Clinton 
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(44.6 percent) and neither clusters (21.4 percent). Four days after the election, more 
than 50 percent of the tweets were intolerant. This indicates that after the election, more 
than half of the content contained intolerant frames toward the candidates.  
Candidate In-Group Expressions of Tolerance and Intolerance Patterns for the 
Entire Sample 
To explore the extent to which the candidates’ in-group clusters reflect tolerance 
and intolerance in the discourse over the four-day election period, two analyses were 
conducted: 1) a chi-square test tested the aggregated data from all four days (n = 1,114), 
and 2) a descriptive analysis of the patterns that emerged from the four days. 
The chi-square test found no significant differences in the expression of 
tolerance and intolerance between Clinton and Trump clusters (χ2 = 6.398, df = 4, p = 
.171). Table 7.12 shows that even though the differences between categories are not 
significant, there are some interesting patterns in the discourse, which are discussed in 
the following section.  
Clinton in-group tweeters were slightly more tolerant and intolerant than Trump 
tweeters. Neither of the candidate’s tweeters were as tolerant as the neither in-group 
tweeters. As shown on Table 7.12, the Neither candidate clusters had the highest 
percentage of tolerant tweets (8.7 percent) compared to Clinton (5.7) and Trump (4.9) 
in-group clusters. This also demonstrates that people who were in favor of neither of the 
candidates (those who were not clearly partisan) tweeted with more tolerant frames than 
those who supported one of the candidates.  
In Clinton in-group clusters, 49 percent of the tweets were neither tolerant nor 
intolerant, more than 45 percent of the tweets were intolerant, and more than 5 percent 
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of them were tolerant. At the same time, more than 55 percent of tweets in Trump 
clusters were neither tolerant nor intolerant, more than 39 percent of them were 
intolerant and only 4.9 percent of them were tolerant. Comparing the tweets from 
Clinton and Trump clusters, nearly half of the Clinton in-group cluster tweets were 
intolerant over the four-day period (45.33 percent), which was slightly more than the 
four-day total for the Trump in-cluster (39.3 percent). The similarities in the expression 
of tolerance and intolerance between Clinton and Trump clusters indicate that both 
liberals and conservative were equally tolerant and intolerant toward each other. 
Moreover, Clinton clusters had slightly more intolerant tweets than Neither clusters 
(44.9 percent).  
Table 7.12: Frames of Tolerance and Intolerance by Candidate’s In-group 
Clusters in the four networks 
                          Cluster 

















































             χ2 = 6.398 
            df= 4 
            p = .171 
Note: Percentages are by columns (e.g., the 36 Clinton cluster tweets exhibiting 
tolerance are 5.7 percent of the 310 Clinton cluster tweets). 
 
Overall, there was little tolerance (just 5.6 percent of tweets showed tolerance in 
their tweets). Also, more than 50 percent of the total 1,114 tweets were neither tolerant 
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nor intolerant toward any of the candidates or parties. More than 43 percent included 
expression of intolerance. The fact that about half of the candidate in-cluster tweets 
revealed neither tolerance or intolerance (Clinton, 49 percent; Trump, 55.8 percent) 
showed that about half of the discourse from those who clearly supported one candidate 
over the other revealed no apparent partisanship that reflected tolerance or a lack of it. 
About half of the discourse from partisans was neither tolerant or intolerant.  
An important finding was that the discourse became less tolerant after the 
election. On the first two days, the majority of tweets were neither tolerant nor 
intolerant. However, both candidates’ tweeters became more intolerant after the 
election, but the intolerance exhibited in the Clinton clusters was a bit higher than in 
Trump clusters. Clinton cluster tweeters became intolerant the day after the election, 
and remain a majority intolerant four days after the election. Correspondingly, the 
percentage of neither tolerant or intolerant tweets on the days after the election 
decreased. In other words, in the first two days, the majority of the tweets for both 
candidate in-group clusters were not partisan. In the days after the election, the tweets 
become more partisan (intolerant). This was really the case on the day after the election 
and four days after the election that less than half of the tweets for both candidates’ in-
group clusters had no expression of tolerance or intolerance. 
RQ4 asked whether there were associations between tolerance and intolerance 
and measures of network centrality: in-degree and out-degree, betweenness, and 
closeness. Network centrality measures deal with the location of individual nodes or 
actors in the network (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). In-degree and out-degree centrality 
measures are about in-coming and out-going ties in a network (Freeman, 1979; 
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Kadushin, 2012). In a communication network, in-degree centrality is about popularity, 
which deals with the identification of the most active, important, and powerful actors 
based on the number of in-coming connections they receive in a network (Barnett & 
Sung, 2006; Freeman, 1979; Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). In contrast, 
out-degree centrality (in a communication network) deals with less popularity and 
under-dominance (Freeman, 1979; Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). People 
with highest out-degree centrality scores are the ones who nominate so many people as 
their friends but those people may not respond mutually (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). 
Betweenness centrality refers to the number of times a node or an actor acts as a bridge 
along the shortest path between two important but otherwise disconnected nodes 
(Krebs, 2016; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Nodes with high betweenness centrality have 
great influence on the information flow in a network and without such node, the ties 
between important actors will be cut off (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Krebs, 2016). 
Closeness or distance is the average length of the shortest path between a node and all 
other nodes in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Actors with higher closeness 
centrality are closer to all nodes compared to other actors, they can reach everyone in a 
network faster than others (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Lieberman, 2014).  
As shown in Table 7.14, like all social network data, the centrality scores were 
skewed and not normally distributed. The average in-degree centrality in among the 40 
clusters is .34 (SD = 5.127), which means on average, nodes received less than one in-
coming tie (being retweeted, replied to, or mentioned). The mode for in-degree 
centrality was zero, which means that the most frequent number of in-coming ties was 
zero. The median was in 0.00, which also means that the midpoint for the frequency of 
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in-coming ties was zero in the network even though in-degree centrality ranged from 
zero to 128. The mean score for out-degree ties was 1.76 (SD = 1.179) suggesting that 
on average, users were connecting with more than one other user (retweet, reply, 
mention). The mode for out-degree centrality was one, which means that the majority of 
nodes had connections to one other user in the network. The median was 1, which 
means that the midpoint for the frequency of out-going ties was one in the network even 
though in-degree centrality ranged from 1 to 10.   








Mean .34 1.76 28,247.922 .00005 
Median .00 1.00 .000 .00005 
Mode 0 1 .000 .000059 
Std. Deviation 5.127 1.179 128,885.241 .00006 
Skewness 21.393 2.736 9.047 19.646 
Std. Error of 
Skewness .073 .073 .073 .073 
Kurtosis 484.136 11.036 98.544 406.663 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis .146 .146 .146 .146 
Range 128 9 1,818,181.981 .0014 
Minimum 0 1 .000 .00002 
Maximum 128 10 1,818,181.981 .00141 
 
The mean score for betweenness centrality was 28,247.922 (SD = 128,885), 
which means on average a node connected two important nodes more than 28,247 
times. The mode score for betweenness centrality was zero (.000), which means that the 
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majority of nodes had zero betweenness centrality – indicating the majority of the users 
had no influence on others. The median score was also zero even though betweenness 
centrality ranged from .00 to 1,818,181.981. 
The mean for closeness centrality was .00005 (SD = .00006), which means that 
on average users were not close to everyone within the clusters. The mode score for 
closeness centrality was nearly zero (.000059), which means that the majority of users 
had nearly zero closeness centrality and could not quickly interact with all other actors 
in the network. The median score was .00005, which shows that the middle point for 
reachability among users was almost zero. 
To answer RQ4 about the association between tolerance and intolerance, the 
clusters and centrality measures (in-degree, out-degree, betweenness, and closeness 
centrality) a set of ANOVA analyses were conducted. ANOVA tests for differences 
among groups first by looking for main effects of each IV on the DV and then the 
effects of the interactions of the IVs on the DV (Tabachnick et al., 2001). The ANOVA 
tests in this study first looked for the main effect of each of the of the IVs (tolerance and 
cluster) on in-degree, out-degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality measures and 
then for the effects of the interaction of tolerance and cluster on these centrality 
measures. Tolerance and cluster were the IVs and in-degree, out-degree, betweenness, 
and closeness centrality measures were the DVs. Tolerance was measured in three 
categories of frames: tolerance, intolerance, neither. Cluster was measured by its 
candidate in-group affiliation, Clinton, Trump or neither. 
Before the ANOVA tests could be run the centrality data was transformed from 
a power to normal distribution, and reverse transformation was the best fit for in-degree, 
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out-degree and closeness centrality measures. Inverse transformation creates an 
inversed set of data that impacts how the data are interpreted. For instance, the mean 
values for closeness centrality in relation to tolerance (M = 22,456.4) intolerance (M = 
21,713.6), and neither (M = 21,310.1) were interpreted in the inversed manner. 
Accordingly, the examples above would be interpreted to mean those tweets that were 
neither tolerant nor intolerant had higher closeness centrality (reachability) than those 
with tolerant and intolerant tweets. Logarithmic transformation came out the best 
method for normalization of betweenness centrality. 
Tolerance and In-degree Centrality 
There were only 44 cases that had in-degree values more than 0. Therefore, 
these 44 cases were used in an ANOVA test for differences in tolerance and candidate 
in-group clusters. Because the number of cases in the dependent variable was very 
small, the results should be interpreted cautiously.  
An ANOVA test found no significant differences between tolerance and in-
degree centrality, F(2, 36) = .068, p = .935. Similarly, there were no significant 
differences between candidate in-group cluster in relation in-degree centrality, F(2, 36) 
= .457, p = .637. Also, there were no significant difference in the interaction of 
tolerance and cluster in to in-degree centrality, F(3, 43) = .519, p = .672.  
Tolerance and Out-degree Centrality 
 An ANOVA test found significant differences between tolerant and intolerant 
content in relation to out-degree centrality, F(2, 1,105) = 3.113, p = .045 (See Table 
7.14). The tweets with neither tolerant nor intolerant frames (M = .714) had higher out-
degree centrality than tweets with intolerant (M = .777) and tolerant frames (M = .802). 
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This means that the users with tweets that were neither tolerant nor intolerant were 
significantly retweeting, mentioning and replying to others more than the users with 
intolerant and tolerant tweets. There were no significant differences between tolerant 
and intolerant tweets and out-degree centrality.  
Table 7.14: Tolerance and Interaction of it with Cluster in Relation to Out-degree   
Centrality 
Main Effects 
   Intolerance Neither Tolerance    





























.703 .792 .834 .751 .706 .685 .724 .792 .889 
   Note: *p < .05  
The values are inverse-coded and the different letters indicate significant differences 
alphabetically (e.g., “a” is larger than “b”). 
 
There were no significant differences between candidate in-group clusters in 
relation to out-degree centrality, F(2, 1,105) = 1.536, p = .216. However, the interaction 
between tolerance and candidate in-group clusters was significantly associated with out-
degree centrality, F(4, 1,113) = 4.141, p = .002. This means that there were significant 
differences between nodes with tolerant, intolerant, and neither tweets in Clinton, 
Trump, and neither clusters in relation to out-degree centrality. Clinton in-group 
clusters retweeted, replied or mentioned in both tolerant and intolerant tweets had 
higher out-degree centrality than Trump cluster nodes that retweeted, replied, or 
mentioned tolerant and intolerant tweets. People in Trump in-group clusters with neither 
tolerant nor intolerant tweets had higher out-degree centrality than those with tolerant 
and intolerant. Likewise, people in the clusters that did not identified as the candidate 
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in-group who retweeted, replied or mentioned in tweets had higher out-degree centrality 
than those with tolerant and intolerant tweets.  
Tolerance and Betweenness Centrality 
Tolerant and intolerant content had no significant differences on the basis of 
betweenness centrality, F(2, 499) = .83, p = .920. Likewise, there were no significant 
differences between Clinton, Trump, and Neither clusters in relation to betweeness 
centrality, F(2, 499) = .560, p = .571. The interaction between tolerance and cluster was 
not significantly associated with Twitter users’ out-degree centrality F(4, 507) = 1.121, 
p = .346.  
Tolerance and Closeness Centrality 
Tolerant and intolerant tweets were not significantly different in relation to 
closeness centrality, F(2, 1,105) = .990, p = 372. But candidate in-group cluster was 
significantly associated with closeness centrality, F(2, 1,105) = 23.269, p = .000. 
Twitter users in Clinton clusters had significantly higher closeness centrality (M = 
19,537.2) than those in Trump (M = 22,612.8) and neither (M = 23,330.0). This 
indicates that people in Clinton clusters were more reachable to each other within the 
clusters rather than outside the cluster compared to people in Trump clusters (See Table 
7.15). At the same time, people in neither clusters were not so close to their in-group 
people. The difference between Trump and neither cluster was not significant (p = 
.423). The interaction between tolerance and cluster was not significantly associated 





Table 7.15: Framing of Tolerance and Intolerance in Relation to Closeness 
Centrality 
 Main Effects  
 Clinton Neither Trump   
Cluster 19,537.2a* 23,330.0b 22,612.8b   
    Note: *p < .05  
The values are inverse-coded and the different letters indicate significant differences 
alphabetically (e.g., “a” is larger than “b”). 
 
In sum, RQ4 found significant differences between tolerant and intolerant tweets 
in relation to out-degree. The study also found significant association between the 
interaction of tolerance and candidate in-group cluster in relation to out-degree 
centrality. Moreover, there were significant differences between candidate in-group 
clusters in relation to closeness centrality. However, in-degree, betweenness, and 
closeness centrality measures had no significant associations with tolerance.  
Results Summary 
 The results to RQ1a-d found that the network structures did not differ from 
November 7 to November 12. There were similarities between the four networks in 
terms of size, centralization, modularity, geodesic, distance, reciprocity. RQ2a-b found 
that the proportion of Clinton and Trump in-group clusters were almost the same even 
though Clinton had more in-group clusters than Trump. More than 40 percent of the 
tweets identified neither of the candidates as in-group. RQ3a-d found no significant 
differences in the framing of tolerance and intolerance across clusters. RQ4 found 
significant differences between tolerant and intolerant tweets in relation to out-degree 
centrality. There were significant differences in users’ out-degree centrality based on 
the interaction of tolerance and intolerance in their tweets and in-group cluster. Also, 
156 
there were significant differences between candidate in-group clusters in relation to 
closeness centrality –people in Clinton in-group clusters had significantly higher 
closeness centrality than people in neither and Trump in-group clusters. But there were 





















Chapter 8: Discussion 
This dissertation seeks to understand the relationship between online social 
network structures and tolerance and intolerance in political discourse on Twitter during 
the U.S. 2016 presidential election. Online social networks, in particular social media, 
have enabled the public to not only directly take part in political discussions, but also to 
form political virtual communities and discussion groups (Ankerson, 2015; Kietzmann, 
Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011; Schwartz, 2015; van Dijck & Poell, 2015). 
The virtual space is a new marketplace of ideas where people from all kinds 
backgrounds and distances can take part in discussions and information exchange, 
which is very fast, easy, accessible, and cheap (Papacharissi, 2002; Schmuhl & Picard, 
2005). The revolution in digital communication technologies have resulted in the 
abundance of information sources accessible at anyplace, anytime, and in any format, 
which have empowered citizens to choose any media platforms and sources that gratify 
them (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Castells, 2015; Gade & Lowrey, 2011). Studies 
have found that people often use digital media to communicate with individuals and 
groups who have similar backgrounds and ideologies as their own (Himelboim et al., 
2013; Kadushin, 2012; Lieberman, 2014; McPherson et al., 2001; Valenzuela et al., 
2009). Studies of political discourse on Twitter have shown that political discussions 
are often polarized and that there is little interaction among clusters from opposing 
ideological groups (Himelboim et al., 2013; Lieberman, 2014). If one believes that 
freedom of speech is essential to democracy, then one must accept that people will use 
their freedom in ways that others will not like or agree (Mill, 1861/1999; Sullivan et al., 
1993). Thus, tolerance of views unlike one’s own is embedded in freedom of expression 
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(Locke, 1713/1988; Sullivan et al., 1993). An ideal place for practice of tolerance can 
be a public sphere where everybody’s exchange of thoughts and opinions are welcomed 
(Habermas, 1994). Social media are widely used as a space for free exchange of ideas 
and opinions, in particular political, where tolerance and intolerance are both present. 
The existence of intolerance in public discourse on social media brings into question the 
ideas that the Internet is flat and democratic in nature and that it is an ideal place for 
practice of tolerance among people.   
In 2016, the U.S. presidential election was one of the biggest and most 
controversial political events in the world, in which Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton 
competed for the 45th U.S. president (Jackson, 2017). The election campaigns were full 
of controversial scandals and personal attacks between candidates (Killough, 2016; 
Niose, 2016). The candidates used social media, in particular Twitter, as tools to 
express partisan conversations and personal attacks, which were later shared and 
retweeted among the public (Killough, 2016; McCormick, 2016; Rubin, 2016). Both 
candidates had controversial backgrounds including scandals and accusations. For 
instance, Clinton was accused of betraying the American public by using personal email 
while dealing with Libya crisis over the death of the American ambassador there 
(Bradner,2016; Fahrenthold, 2016). Trump was accused of several sexual assault 
incidents, which was exacerbated with the release of a tape of him with misogynistic 
words from Access Hollywood in 2005 (Fahrenthold, 2016; Graham, 2016). Despite the 
controversial issues, scandals, and personal attacks for the candidates, Trump won the 
election from Clinton by winning more than 30 states including nine swing states 
(Bradner, 2016; Berenson, 2016). The election results were unlike what polls predicted 
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–Clinton’s victory – and she only won the popular vote (Berenson, 2016; Bradner, 
2016; Tumulty. Rucker, & Gearan, 2016). Soon after the election, there were surges of 
protests in reaction to the election results and the conversations on the election and the 
candidates continued on Twitter and other online media (Ali & Hassan, 2016; Gibbs, 
2016).  
To explore how public discourse was created and how people used social media 
to engage in this discourse, this study analyzed Twitter network structure in relation to 
the Twitter content or tweets during the U.S. 2016 presidential election. Thus, this study 
was a combination of social network analysis and content analysis of four days 
surrounding the election, including election day. The sample included networks of 
political discourse on Twitter before, during, and after the election, November 7, 8, 9, 
and 12. NodeXL software program was used for data collection and social network 
analysis, which included the analysis of network structure (both general graph metrics 
of the network and node-specific metrics) as well as identification of clusters within the 
network.  A sample of 1,114 original tweets from 10 largest clusters of each network (n 
= 40 clusters) were content analyzed: 1) for positive and negative frames toward 
candidates (for identification of in-group cluster), and 2) for frames of tolerance and 
intolerance. Then, the tolerant and intolerant and in-group clusters were examined in 
four sets of two-way ANOVA analyses in relation to four node-specific measures of 
network –in-degree, out-degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality. 
This chapter discusses the findings of this study in relation to the existing 
literature. First, the findings on the four networks’ structures are discussed based on the 
findings of previous studies. The second part of this chapter focuses on cluster 
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characteristics. The third section of this chapter talks about frames of tolerance and 
intolerance in the tweets. Part four of the chapter discusses the findings on the 
association between network structure and tolerance and intolerance. Part five talks 
about the shortcomings of this study and suggestions for future research, and the chapter 
ends with a briefs conclusion on the overall dissertation.  
Network Structure 
The graphs for the four networks look very different from each other, but their 
descriptive structural scores are not so different. In other words, the scores for 
centralization, density, modularity, and reciprocity are similar even though the 
networks’ graphs look different across the four days. The networks were similar in that 
they had low centralization and high modularity. Still, there were patterns of small 
differences and similarities in the scores for network structural measures. All of the four 
network structures had low centralization scores (ranging from .016 to .059). 
Considering that network centralization ranges between 0 and 1, the centralization 
scores in the four networks were slightly more than zero. A low centralization means 
that network is flat and non-hierarchical, not dominated by a few central nodes 
(Freeman, 1979; Himelboim at al., 2017; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). The low 
centralization scores in the four networks in this study suggest that these networks were 
not centralized; instead, they were decentralized, flat, and split into groups. This finding 
fits with the argument that online network structure is flat and decentralized, and that 
people communicate in fragmented groups in this environment (Bennett, 2012; Gade & 
Lowrey, 2011; Tewksbury, 2005; Turner, 2005).  
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The day before election, users were more split (lowest centralization score and 
highest geodesic distance) and strongly engaged in in-group conversations (highest 
modularity score), but disconnected from out-groups. On the election day, people were 
closer to each other (highest centralization and lowest geodesic distance), more 
connected to a few central actors such as candidates, news media, and high profile 
politicians (centralized), and more connected across groups. The clusters were more 
interconnected in this network (higher density), which led to a lower modularity score. 
The day after the election, people were fragmented across the network (lower 
centralization and higher geodesic distance), more connected at the group level (high 
modularity) and disconnected from other groups. Four days after the election, people 
were more densely connected in the network, more centralized/hierarchical than 
November 9, more interactive, but less interconnected at the group level. 
 The differences in the networks’ structures across the four days might be due to 
the relative sensitivity of the American public toward the election (Ali & Hassan, 2016; 
Gibbs, 2016). In other words, the Twitter network from November 7, the day before 
election, was divided with high modularity, and the discussions varied across clusters 
on the basis of political ideology, news coverage, polls, personal predictions about the 
elections, and campaigning for a certain candidate. The network from November 8, the 
day of election, was more centralized compared to other networks with lower 
modularity, in which the clusters overlap on each other and the discussions were 
generally about voting and encouraging people to take part in the election. In the 
election day network, some of the fragmentation apparent from the day before was less 
apparent, as people across in-group clusters focused more on the election and traditional 
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democratic processes of voting. The election day network was more highly centralized 
and lower modularity compared to others, which indicate that the users were looking for 
a smaller number of twitter sources (the media and candidates) for news and 
information more on this day. This was unlike the finding of previous studies that 
polarization reaches its peak in mediated political discourse on the day of election 
(Adamic & Glance, 2005; Himelboim et al., 2013; Himelboim et al., 2017). In other 
words, there was not much echo chamber (Lieberman, 2014; Smith et al., 2014). 
Instead, there were ech chambers –several groups of people talking about different 
topics.  
The network after the election day, November 9, looked more divided than the 
election day. The centralization score for this network was lower than November 8 
network, which suggests this network was less hierarchical than the network on election 
day. However, this network was denser with higher modularity score than the election 
day network, which indicates that the people were more interconnected across the 
network as well as within their own in-groups the day after election compared to the 
day before the election. This also means that after the election day, people went back to 
their clusters and the networks became less hierarchical and more partisan. November 9 
was the day after the election in which people were divided over the election results and 
social media were inundated with reactions of the public toward or against the election 
(Ali & Hassan, 2016; Berenson, 2016; Bradner, 2016a; Gibbs, 2016; Tumulty et al., 
2016).  
Even though the November 12 network looked more divided and flat compared 
to the November 9 network, it had a higher centralization score, which means the 
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network was more hierarchical and less flat than the day after election. The reason for 
more hierarchy in this network is that there were many protests across the country on 
this day, and some groups even called for national day of protests. Therefore, people 
were looking at a few sources (probably news media) to orient themselves to what was 
going on. This network had the highest levels of density and reciprocity among the four 
networks, which stand for higher interconnectivity and interaction among nodes across 
the network. Also, this network was fragmented (high modularity) because people were 
interacting more about the protests with others like them to hear what their in-groups 
were saying.  
The reciprocity scores were very low across the clusters indicating that there 
was little interactivity among users in all four networks. This also means that even 
though social media provide the opportunity for people to be very interactive in the 
communication process (Castells 2003; Shaffee & Metzger, 2001; Singer, 2011), they 
seldom reply to other people’s posts. Despite the fact that Twitter is an easy medium for 
interactivity, because people can respond to others in 140 characters or less (Arceneaux 
& Weiss, 2010; Duggan et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2014), the percentage of replying in 
all four Twitter networks ranged from 0.001 to 0.005. The means that the highest 
number of replies in the four network was not more than 5 out of 1,000 tweets. 
Power law distribution. In all of the four networks, high profile politicians, 
mainstream media, and some organizations and popular supporters of candidates 
(including their children) had the highest in-degree ties. As shown in Figures 8.1 - 8.4, 
in all of these four Twitter networks, people like Trump, Clinton, Bernie Sanders, news 
media such as The New York Times, ABC, CNN, FOXNEWs, Donald Trump Jr., 
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WikiLeaks, etc. were among the most popular nodes in the four networks. The people 
shown in the graphs were the 10 most important nodes who received the highest number 
of retweets, mentions, and replies, but all of them had zero out-degree scores. In other 
words, these popular nodes, did not retweet, mention, or reply to others.  
As predicted by the power law distribution, a small number of people receive the 
most connections and the majority receives a small number of connections – the rich get 
richer in terms of power and popularity in the network (Adamic et al., 2001; Barabasi, 
2002; Castells, 2009). The dominance of candidates, high profile politicians, and news 
media in the four networks confirmed the logic of power law distribution that central 
nodes received the most connections, because they were used as bridge between 
disconnected nodes and clusters (See Table 8.1).  
The graphs also show that some of the key nodes were not among the 
candidates, politicians or news organizations (e.g., Christopher Hayes, Red Retract, 
Nathan Zed, Good looking loser and GirlPost). These users were the citizens who 
became opinion leaders on social media by advocating for certain ideologies or people. 
The presence of these people provide examples of what the Internet and social media do 
– they allow non-institutional actors, even average citizens, the opportunity to express 

































Figure 8.3:  The 10 most Central Nodes in November 9 Network  

























Table 8. 1: Nodes with the Highest In-degree Centrality in four Networks 


































































































































Network Clusters  
Characteristics.  Of the 40 largest clusters, 16 of them were recognized as 
Clinton’s in-group, 13 as Trump’s in-group and 10 as neither of the candidates’ in-
group. While the number of in-group cluster for each candidate was similar on 
November 7 and 9, it differed on November 8 and 12. The day before election, there 
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were equal number of clusters for Clinton and Trump (3 clusters for each) and 4 clusters 
as neither candidate in-group. But on the election day, there were 5 clusters for Trump, 
3 for Clinton, and 2 as neither candidate in-group. The day after the election, there were 
equal number of clusters for Clinton and Trump (3 clusters for each) and 4 as neither 
candidate in-group, which was similar to the number of clusters for candidates on 
November 7. Four days after the election day, there were 7 clusters for Clinton, 2 for 
Trump, and one as neither candidate in-group.  
Even though the number of in-group candidate clusters over the four days for 
Clinton (16) was more than Trump (13), the sum of all positive and negative tweets for 
both candidates reveal that they had similar number of in-group tweets (Clinton = 332 
and Trump = 330). In other words, Clinton and Trump had similar percentage of 
positive and negative tweets (positive Clinton + negative Trump and positive Trump + 
negative Clinton) over the four days (more than 29 percent each). More than 40 percent 
of the total tweets were neither positive nor negative toward the candidates.  
In Clinton in-group clusters, more than 39 percent of the tweets were positive 
toward Clinton and negative toward Trump, and more than 21 percent of the tweets 
were positive toward Trump and negative toward Clinton. Conversely, in Trump in-
group clusters, more than 49 percent of tweets were positive toward Trump and 
negative Toward Clinton, and more than 16 percent of the tweets were positive about 
Clinton and negative about Trump. The high percentage of pro-Trump tweets in Clinton 
clusters indicate that she had softer support from her in-group clusters compared to 
Trump. In other words, only 16 percent of the tweets in Trump in-group clusters were 
pro Clinton. Also, the pro-Trump people were posting in the Clinton clusters. These 
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people know where the opponents: reside online and post on their networks using the 
using the tags and hashtags. 
Although the total number of positive and negative tweets for Clinton (332) and 
Trump (330) were nearly identical, there were patterns in the number of positive and 
negative tweets for candidates across the four days. On November 7, Clinton had more 
positive tweets (75) than Trump (66). On November 8, Trump had more positive tweets 
(105) than Clinton (79). On November 9, Clinton had more positive tweets (103) than 
Trump (93). On November 12, again, Clinton had more positive tweets (75) than Trump 
(66). These patterns suggest that there were more pro Trump and anti-Clinton tweets on 
the day of election than the other three days before and after election. Also, there were 
more pro-Clinton and anti-Trump tweets before and after the election.  
Fragmentation more than polarization among clusters. One of the key 
findings of this study is the existence of non-partisan clusters in the election network on 
social media. Previous studies ignored the clusters in the network structures that did not 
reflect polarization (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Himelboim et al., 2013; Himelboim et al., 
2017). However, this study had two main findings regarding online network clusters: 
First, the clusters were not simply polarized around the candidates, and second, those 
clusters not identified as candidate in-group clusters tended to be organized around 
topics, issues and themes that were related to the election but the content was not clearly 
supportive of one candidate over another. 
Many Trump people were posting on Clinton in-group clusters and vice versa. 
Most of the postings on the out-group clusters occurred when people expressed 
intolerance toward the opposing group and used tagging and mentioning to let the 
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opposing group see those tweets. For instance, in negative tweets in Clinton’s clusters 
against Trump, there were many tags and hashtags on Trump and Trump-related people 
and issues. At the same time, there were negative tweets about the candidates in their own 
in-group clusters. In particular, there were more negative tweets about Clinton in her own 
in-group clusters than the negative tweets about Trump in his own in-group clusters. This 
not only shows that the clusters were not simply polarized, but also there were clusters 
that did not identify as candidate in-group (neither clusters) and their content were 
organized around topics, issues and themes related to the election but were not clearly 
supportive of one candidate over another. In short, the findings show that the networks 
were not divided primarily around two candidates. But there was considerable election-
related discourse that was not pro-con toward one candidate. 
Dominance of duplicate content. More than 50 percent of the entire data was 
retweeted content and more than 25 percent was mentions. This means that only more 
than 22 percent of the data was unique (Tweets and replies) – written by the users 
themselves. This means there was little original content and many more people shared 
the content created by a few others than create original content of their own. Much of 
the discourse on Twitter consists of information that is shared, retweeted and duplicated 
without adding any additional content (Himelboim et al., 2017). The low percentage of 
replies in the network (3.58 percent) shows that people seldom reply to others’ tweets in 
comparison to retweeting, mentioning, and tweeting.  
The low percentage of original tweets in the networks demonstrates that people 
seldom write their tweets, and most of the time, they retweet other people’s or 
organization’s tweets. In other words, even though online media have enabled citizens 
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to create their own content (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Castells, 2015; Gade & 
Lowrey, 2011; Kietzmann et al., 2011), they often rely on duplicate content in their 
social media activities. They often share news and information from news media that 
they like or interest them. This is one of the reasons that traditional news media still 
remain important in the digital age, despite so many media choices (Albrecht, 2006, 
2007; Baum & Groeling, 2008; Gurevitch et al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 2013; Meraz, 
2009; Tumasjan et al., 2010). The news media are still agenda setters (signaling to 
citizens what is important), and social media users often redistribute news media stories 
through their social networks (Albrecht, 2006, 2007; Baum & Groeling, 2008; 
Gurevitch et al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 2009, Himelboim et al., 2013; Meraz, 2009; 
Tumasjan et al., 2010). Accordingly, the news media use social media, in particular 
Twitter, as platforms to share news stories with the public and receive more viewership 
(Lasorsa, Lewis, & Holton, 2012). 
 The creators of social media also play an important role in the structure of 
social media networks, because they have designed these platforms in ways that people 
can easily access and share duplicate information they see in their news feeds on their 
very close friends’ social media walls (Sunstein, 2017). Those tweets – the types of 
content that people pass through social media, and the people from whom that content 
comes – are recorded for each individual user by owners of social media platforms 
(Agichtein et al., 2008; Aggarwal & Zhai, 2012; Castells, 2003; Romero et al., 2011; 
Sunstein, 2017). The data are used to create algorithms that display information to 
social media users based on the level of circulation and number of viewership (Romero 
et al., 2011; Sunstein, 2017). Thus, these algorithms expose people to the kind of 
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information that are shared or circulated the most among the friends and friends of 
friends (Romero et al., 2011). In other words, people often see the information on their 
social media walls that is analogous with what they often click on and from friends and 
sources they often communicate with (Agichtein et al., 2008; Aggarwal & Zhai, 2012). 
This puts people in the bubbles of like-minded others and keeps them far from those 
different from them (Romero et al., 2011; Xiang & Gretzel, 2010).  
Equally intolerant clusters. Some scholars also argue that the online/virtual 
space can create the environment for expression of hate speech that facilitates 
discriminatory conversations among people (Arthur, 2011; Fisher, 2001). Accordingly, 
based on the findings of this study, the Internet creates the environment for expression 
of intolerance more than tolerance. Only 5.6 percent of the tweets were tolerant and 
more than 43 percent of the tweets were intolerant. Clinton and Trump in-group clusters 
were similar in their expression of tolerance and intolerance. But these differences were 
not statistically significant. These similarities indicate that both liberals and 
conservatives are equally tolerant and intolerant toward each other. This supports the 
findings of previous studies that liberals and conservatives show similar levels of biases 
toward each other (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Brandt et al., 2014; Himelboim et al., 
2013). 
Although more than half of the total tweets were neither tolerant nor intolerant, 
the percentage of intolerant tweets increased to 60 percent in the samples from days after 
the election. First, the clusters that were not aligned with either candidate (neither 
clusters) were about different issues related to election and promoting candidates rather 
than expression of acceptance of groups of people or attacks on opposing candidate or 
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party. Second, there were differences in the percentage of intolerant and neither content 
across the four days. On the day before election and the day of election, 60 percent of the 
tweets were neither tolerant nor intolerant and more than 30 percent of the tweets were 
intolerant. However, more than 60 percent of the tweets were intolerant the day after 
election and more than 50 percent four days after election. Second, one of the main 
reasons for the difference in the percentage of intolerant tweets between the first two days 
and the last two days is that on November 7 and 8, the majority of the conversations were 
about the election coverage and voting issues and predictions. However, the discourse 
dramatically changed after the election as a result of the reactions of people toward and 
against the outcome of the elections. For instance, there were so many protests across the 
country against and in support of the election of Trump as the 45th president (Ali & 
Hassan, 2016; Gibbs, 2016).  
Tolerance and In-Group Cluster and Network Centrality 
The frames of tolerance and candidate in-group cluster were examined in 
relation to four measures of network centrality: in-degree and out-degree, betweenness 
centrality, and closeness. These centrality measures deal with the locations of the nodes 
in a social network and their importance as receivers of ties, connectors, bridges and so 
forth (Freeman, 1979; Kadushin, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 2009).  
The findings show a significant association between tolerance and intolerance 
and out-degree centrality. The users with tweets that were neither tolerant nor intolerant 
had significantly higher out-degree centrality than those with tolerant and intolerant 
tweets. These users were significantly retweeting, mentioning and replying to others 
more than the users with tolerant and intolerant tweets. This also means that nodes with 
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tolerant and intolerant tweets were less likely to retweet, mention, and reply to others 
compared to those with tweets that were neither tolerant nor intolerant. But the 
difference between nodes with tolerant tweets and nodes with intolerant tweets in 
relation to their out-degree was not significant. Also, there were no significant 
differences between candidate in-group clusters in relation to out-degree centrality. The 
interaction between tolerance and candidate in-group clusters associated with out-
degree centrality was significant.  
The significant association between out-degree centrality and frames of 
tolerance and intolerance makes sense, because out-degree ties are established active 
decisions of the Twitter users. In other words, the users actively decide who to retweet, 
mention, and reply to. People with high out-degree centrality are not the powerful and 
popular people in the network such as candidates, news media, and celebrities who 
often have very high in-degree and betweenness centrality scores (incoming ties and 
bridges). Instead, people with high out-degree centrality scores are the common users 
who often spread the posts of popular/central nodes by reposting, retweeting and 
replying (Wasserman & Faust, 2009).  
The difference between candidate in-group clusters were statistically significant 
in relation to closeness centrality. People in Clinton clusters had significantly higher 
closeness centrality than people in Trump and neither clusters. This suggests that 
Clinton in-group tweeters were closer and more reachable to each other than to people 
outside their groups compared to Trump in-group and those from neither clusters. 
Previous studies have also found that the tendency for engagement in polarized 
communication processes can increase the chances for people’s involvement in 
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interactions with in-group people (Gurevitch et al., 2009; Himelboim et al., 2013; 
Lieberman, 2014; Meraz, 2009; Tumasjan et al., 2010). The findings of this study is 
somewhat mixed, especially, for Clinton.  
The study found no significant differences between tolerant and intolerant 
content and cluster in relation to in-degree centrality and betweenness centrality. In-
degree centrality is about the number of in-coming ties to a node, which is not in the 
control of the node itself (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). In other words, if Trump has the 
highest in-degree centrality in November 8 network, it does not mean that he chose to 
be retweeted, mentioned, and replied to by other Twitter users. Instead, people choose 
to retweets, mention, and reply to him. 
This study found no significant differences between the content frames 
(tolerance or intolerance) and betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality measures 
the extent to which a node becomes the connecting point (bridge) between two 
otherwise disconnected nodes (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). 
People use popular actors in their networks to communicate across different groups, not 
vice versa (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). In other words, 
betweenness centrality is related to in-degree centrality, in particular, mentions and 
retweets on Twitter, which is not controlled by the central node itself. Other people 
choose whom to mention and retweet on Twitter and the central nodes do not have any 
control of that.  
Overall, the main implications of this study is that Twitter networks can be used 
for fostering both tolerance and intolerance among people. But the key point is that 
those who iniate conversations (users with high out-going ties) play more important 
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roles in fostering tolerance and intolerance than those with central and powerful 
locations (users with high incoming ties) in the network. It is also noteworthy that user 
with content that is neither tolerant nor intolerant are more willing to retweet, mention, 
and reply to others compared to the users with tolerant and intolerant content.  
Shortcomings and Areas of Future Research 
Tolerance and intolerance are concepts that exist in almost all areas of social 
life. Democracies are thought to be the best place of existence of tolerance, which 
provides the environment for free exercise of rights, equality, and social justice among 
diverse groups of people (Locke, 1690/1963; Mill, 1861/1999; Sullivan et al., 1979). 
Intolerance, on the other hand, exists anywhere that tolerance norms are undervalued 
(Coward, 1986; Locke, 1690/1963; Mill, 1861/1999; Yang & Self, 2015). Despite the 
importance of tolerance in democracies, there were no established ways of measuring it 
in discourse. So, this study had to develop ways to operationalize it within the context 
of the political discourse. The measures could be refined in different contexts, and they 
would likely be operationally measured differently. Also, this study used framing in 
content analysis, and since this was the first study on framing of tolerance and 
intolerance, no thematic frames were found for expression of tolerance and intolerance. 
Future studies can focus on finding thematic frames for tolerance and intolerant in 
mediated content.  
 Another limitation of this study was the sampling of data, which was a 
combination of four snapshots from four days during and around the election time. 
There were hundreds of millions of tweets during the election week and 38,000 of 
tweets cannot represent the overall Twitter network during this time. In addition, the 
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limitation of NodeXL as the software program used for retrieval of the data from 
Twitter is another limitation of this study. The current version of NodeXL Pro retrieves 
20,000 tweets at a time (from the last 15 minutes maximum) depending on the speed of 
computer and Internet and cyber traffic (http://NodeXLcodeplex.com, 2017). None of 
the samples in the four networks had 20,000 tweets, because most of them collected 
tweets from the last 1-5 minutes. Because the sampling involved four snapshots of data 
during just a few minutes over the four-day period, the extent to which the study’s 
findings may represent the entire election discourse on Twitter is limited.   
This study mainly used NodeXL for data collection and social network analysis, 
which was limited to calculation of certain network structural measures, not all of them. 
For instance, the current version of NodeXL Pro cannot compare different networks to 
show the significance of difference among them. Future researchers can expand their 
use of social network analysis software beyond NodeXL and explore the significance of 
differences in network structures across different points of time. 
Future research can explore this problem in the following ways. First, this study 
was limited to a small sample size of four Twitter networks from four days surrounding 
the U.S. 2016 election, and only analyzed 1,114 tweets from a total of 16, 841 tweets 
from 40 largest clusters. Future research can further explore this problem by increasing 
the sample size and scope of the networks. Also, future research can examine this 
research problem using other social media networks such as Facebook. Furthermore, 
this idea can be examined in other problems in relation to online and offline social 
networks and other measures of network structure. Second, this dissertation was the first 
study examining tolerance and intolerance in content frames. Hence, almost all of the 
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measures for this content analysis were developed for the first time. Future research can 
build up on the measures developed in study and operationalize them in other ways. The 
types of questions that can extend this research would be: Is tolerance the same for all 
controversial issues? Should we pay more attention to the non-polarized groups? Should 
we explore for important non-institutional actors and consider their influence and how it 
develops and works? Should we consider more than two sides to discourse? 
Conclusion 
This dissertation explored tolerance and intolerance in political discourse on 
Twitter during 2016 the U.S. presidential election. The purpose of this research was to 
examine the discourse in relation to structure of online social networks, and the extent 
to which the structure of networks contributes to diverse and inclusive discourse. The 
study posed four sets of research questions about network structure and tolerance and 
intolerance and the relationship between the two. The findings showed that Twitter 
networks on the four days surrounding the election were non-centralized, flat, and 
fragmented –not polarized. There were a lot of cross-group communications in the 
candidate in-group clusters, in which the out-group people were talking positively about 
their own candidate or negatively about the in-group candidate. The tweets (content) 
exchanged within the candidate in-group cluster were more diverse than expected, 
especially for Clinton. In addition to positive tweets for Clinton in the Clinton in-group 
clusters, there were also more negative tweets toward her. Even though Trump in-group 
clusters also had negative tweets toward him, the number was smaller than those of 
Clinton’s. 
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There was more intolerance than tolerance on social media discourse. One of the 
key findings was that the those who express or publish intolerant views tend to be the 
ones whose content is passed through the network. Intolerant content was more 
retweeted, shared and mentioned than tolerant content. But more than 50 percent of the 
1,114 tweets were neither tolerant nor intolerant. Even though the day before and on the 
day of election, more than half of the Tweets were neither tolerant nor intolerant, the 
day after and four days after election more than half of the tweets were intolerant. The 
dramatic change in the days after the election was a result of the reactions, particularly, 
protests in support and against the outcome of the election (Ali & Hassan, 2016; Gibbs, 
2016). Clinton and Trump in-group clusters were equally intolerant toward each other. 
But there were no significant differences in the framing of tolerance and intolerance 
among Clinton and Trump in-group clusters. 
In sum, the main contribution of this study is that there are significant associations 
between online social network structure and tolerance and intolerance. Such a 
relationship is mainly established by non-central nodes who often choose to connect 
themselves with other nodes (in particular central/powerful or popular nodes) by tagging, 
sharing/reposing, and replying to them. Even though there was more intolerance than 
tolerance in political discourse on social media, Twitter users from different groups were 
equally tolerant and intolerant toward each other. Also, more than half of the 
conversations included neither tolerant nor intolerant frames, which contributed to 
diversity of thoughts in online discourse and reduced the possibilities for extreme 
polarizations among groups. The findings suggest that in the four days surrounding the 
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U.S. 2016 presidential election, people got more intolerant in their interactions on the 
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Appendix A: Tweets, Replies, and Retweets 
Table 1: Tweets, Replies, and Retweets in the 10 Largest Clusters on November 7  










(Tweets  + Replies + 
Unique RTs) 
1 18 9 117 144 50 66 77 
2 14 5 129 148 47 82 66 
3 5 3 147 155 25 122 33 
4 1 0 123 124 7 116 8 
5 1 1 104 105 12 92 14 
6 0 0 117 117 6 112 6 
7 0 3 88 91 33 55 36 
8 3 0 90 93 4 86 7 
9 4 1 79 84 16 63 21 
10 0 0 83 83 1 82 1 
Total 46 22 1,079 1,149 202 876 269 
Percentage 4.00% 1.91% 93.90% 100.00% 17.58% 76.51% 23.49% 
 
 
Table 2: Tweets, Replies, and Retweets in the 10 Largest Clusters on November 8  
Clusters Tweets Replies Retweets 
Total Tweets 







(Tweets + Replies + Unique 
RTs) 
1 22 19 821 862 58 763 99 
2 3 2 184 189 12 172 17 
3 9 7 151 167 29 122 45 
4 0 1 165 166 24 141 25 
5 0 4 118 122 30 88 34 
6 5 3 114 122 23 90 31 
7 1 1 91 93 26 65 28 
8 3 3 74 80 28 46 34 
9 2 2 79 83 26 53 30 
10 8 1 71 80 24 47 33 
Total 53 43 1,868 1,964 281 1,587 377 
Percentage 2.69% 2.18% 95.11% 100.00% 14.30% 80.86% 19.14% 
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Table 3: Tweets, Replies, and Retweets in the 10 Largest Clusters on November 9  
Clusters Tweets Replies Retweets 








(Tweets + Replies + Unique 
RTs) 
1 6 22 193 221 39 154 67 
2 18 13 107 138 53 54 84 
3 0 0 184 184 3 181 3 
4 2 3 145 150 29 116 34 
5 0 0 138 138 4 134 4 
6 4 11 88 103 34 54 49 
7 0 1 127 128 9 118 10 
8 1 0 113 114 11 102 12 
9 0 0 107 107 5 102 5 
10 0 0 94 94 2 92 2 
Total 31 50 1,296 1,377 189 1,107 270 
Percentage 2.25% 3.63% 94.12% 100.00% 13.73% 80.39% 19.61% 
 
Table 4: Tweets, Replies, and Retweets in the 10 Largest Clusters on November 12  
Clusters Tweets Replies Retweets 
Total Tweets 







(Tweets + Replies + Unique RTs) 
1 2 2 201 205 5 196 9 
2 0 2 176 178 7 169 9 
3 4 5 107 116 9 98 18 
4 7 13 53 73 22 31 42 
5 7 5 74 86 13 61 25 
6 2 0 77 79 8 69 10 
7 7 7 37 51 20 17 34 
8 4 1 62 67 20 42 25 
9 0 5 65 70 12 53 17 
10 0 0 75 75 9 66 9 
Total 33 40 927 1,000 125 802 198 
Percentage 3.30% 4.00% 92.70% 100.00% 12.50% 80.20% 19.80% 
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Appendix B: Clusters Characteristics  















Ohio (31 times) 
election,day (32 times) 
election,eve (27 times) 
rt,hillaryclinton (21 times) 
hillaryclinton,realdonaldtrum
p (20 times) 
rt,shannonrwatts (18 times) 
Ohio Dems breaking law (11 time) 
#NASTYWOMAN NOW BLOCKING #Deplorables (9 times) 
Latino voters will have powerful impact (8times) 
Who are you voting for (13 times) 
None of the five living First Ladies support Trump (6 times) 
2 Clinton 
Wins 
Clinton (61 times) 
President (58 times) 
Obama (40 times) 
Polls (35 times) 
Win (29 times) 
president,Obama (33 times) 
rt,fivethirtyeight (29 times) 
hillary,Clinton (28 times) 
latest,polls  (27 times) 
win,presidency (27 times) 
Clinton has 71% chance to win (23 times) 
Obama gave his final speech as president (19 times) 
Obama: "I am betting … you will reject fear and choose (9 times)  
It’s all up to you now. No matter who you’re voting for (7 times) 
This NASA astronaut voted from space (6 times) 
3 Polls_M
edia 
nytimes (124 times) 
know (96 times) 
polls (93 times) 
close (93 times) 
latimes (15 times) 
nytimes,time (93 times) 
time,polls (93 times) 
polls,close (93 times) 
close,election (93 times) 
election,night (93 times) 
What time will polls close on election night? (91 times) 
@nytimes @washingtonpost @latimes removing paywall (11 
times) 
Thank you, @nytimes, for making your news available (6 times) 
Nytimes: We're giving all readers unlimited access (5 times) 






chance (106 times) 
rapper (106 times) 
voting (106 times) 
voters (105 times) 
chance,rapper (106 times) 




young,voters (105 times) 
Rapper leads hundreds of young voters (102 times) 
Election night starter kit (8 times) 
The election results are in (6 times) 
Daddy, why did Donald Trump win the election? (3 times) 





2016 (87 times) 
Imvotingbecause (86 
times) 
Guide (85 times) 
Undecided (85 times) 
Votetrumppics (8 
times) 
guide,election (85 times) 
election,2016 (85 times) 





A Guide to Election 2016 For the ""Undecided"" Voter! (81 times) 
Opportunity to make America great again (4 times) 
AMISH COULD SAVE AMERICA WITH THEIR VOTES! (3 
times) 
Don't sit out this election – Protect your rights! #2A 🇺🇸 #MAGA (3 
times) 
#PodestaEmails33 #PodestaEmails34 Ok best campaign ad of 




election (124 times) 
remember (98 times) 
back (98 times) 
fun (98 times) 
candidate (98 times) 
remember,back (98 times) 
election,fun (98 times) 
fun,games (98 times) 
accused,candidate (98 times) 
candidate,being (98 times) 
When this election was all fun and games like (93 times) 
Don't let this election distract you (15 times) 
Only 1 more day till we have to hear about a ""rigged election"" (5 
times) 
My friend …worried about me … post election (2 times) 






Clinton (23 times) 
Comey (22 times) 
Day (21 times) 
Tomorrow (19 times) 
Obama (16 times) 
election,day (14 times) 
rt,seanhannity (12 times) 
election,night (10 times) 
state,dept (10 times) 
dept, 5 (10 times) 
State Dept wants 5 years to review emails, Comey did it in eight 
days (10 times) 
Chelsea Clinton used foundation money for her lavish 2010 
wedding (7 times) 
Trump needs all the prayers he can get! Retwee…" (6 times) 
We'll be updating our presidential odds LIVE over the course of 
Election (6 times) 






election (94 times) 
vote (92 times) 
day (90 times) 
sensanders  (89 times) 
national (88 times) 
election,day (90 times) 
sensanders,election (88 
times) 
national,holiday (88 times) 
everyone,time (88 times) 
opportunity,vote (88 times) 
Election Day should be a national holiday (87 times) 
No, you cannot vote in the US presidential election by text 
message (2 times) 
If u dont vote dont complain about the outcome (1 time) 
This person from Chicago should have been First Female US 
President (1 time) 
9 beating 
Clinton 
election (100 times) 
Trump  (37 times) 
2016 (35 times) 
Clinton (33 times) 
Searches (32 times) 
election,2016 (34 times) 
trump,beating (32 times) 
beating,Clinton (32 times) 
clinton,google (32 times) 
google,searches (32 times) 
We'll have teams everywhere tomorrow (49 times) 
Trump beating Clinton in Google searches (26 times) 
Hillary Clinton barely able to walk off plane caught on camera (24 
times) 
Hoping Amish voters will make election day a GOP barn raiser (21 
times) 
A Guide to Election 2016 For the ""Undecided"" Voter! (4 times) 
10 N 
Election 
election (85 times) 
twitter (83 times) 
day (83 times) 
girlposts,twitter (83 times) 
twitter,election (83 times) 
election,day (83 times) 
Twitter on Election Day (83 times) 
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Table 6: November 8: Most repeated words, word pairs and retweets 
Cluster Category Words Word Pairs Retweets 
1 Vote for 
Trump 
Election (957 times) 
Realdonaldtrump 
(803 times) 
Vote (568 times) 
Keep (453 times) 
Up (452 times) 
up,keep (451 times) 
vote,election (450 times) 
realdonaldtrump,up (449 
times) 
keep,getting (449 times) 
getting,out (449 times) 
Don't let up, keep getting out to vote - election is FAR FROM OVER! (386 times) 
I will be watching the election results from Trump Tower (197 times) 
If you stand for a stronger America, cast your vote for #TrumpPe…" (78 times) 
Remember our bravest men &amp; women who sacrificed everything (53 times) 






election (196 times) 
berniesanders (175 
times) 
day (107 times) 
national (107 times) 
holiday (107 times) 
today,election (163 
times) 







Election Day should be a national holiday (103 times) 
I hope everybody gets out to vote (55 times) 
Hillary Clinton news that could cost her the election (8 times) 
If Trump wins by a few votes, people are going to deal with reality (5 times) 




voting (113 times) 
Hillary (87 times) 
Election (73 times) 
Trump (54 times) 
Clinton (52 times) 
hillary,Clinton (44 times) 
married,37 (43 times) 
voting,Hillary (43 times) 
hillary,voting (43 times) 
voting,trump (43 times) 
He's voting for Hillary. She's voting for Trump (40 times) 
Hillary Clinton leaves home in Chappaqua (24 times) 
No matter who you’re voting for, see your vote counted (20 times) 
Women wearing pantsuits on #ElectionDay in support of Clinton (11 times) 
Please join me throughout the night for all the historic results (10 times) 
4 MAGA donaldjtrumpjr (152 
times) 
maga (94 times) 
vote (89 times) 
time (83 times) 
go (43 times) 
go,vote (41 times) 
donaldjtrumpjr,still (39 
times) 
time,send (39 times) 
dc,biggest (39 times) 
biggest,message (39 
times) 
If you voted to drain the swamp! #MAGA #ElectionDay #Election (32 times) 
Send DC the biggest message in the past 60 years (28 times) 
Sporting MAGA hat, she has only asked 300 times if she can vote (18 times) 
Judge pushed poll watcher (18 times) 





Election (144 times) 
trump (62 times) 
voters (62 times) 
evening (59 times) 
republicans(58 
times) 
evening,voters (59 times) 
saying,election (56 
times) 
election,come (56 times) 
voters,means (56 times) 
means,republicans (56 
times) 
Election will come down to evening voters. Republicans with actual jobs (44 
times) 
The Trump Democrats (19 times) 
I will be watching the election results from Trump Tower (8 times) 
Trump is winning (7 times) 
If you stand for a stronger America, cast your vote for #TrumpPe (2 times) 
6 Choosing 
Trump 
erictrump (63 times) 
eve (60 times) 
always (60 times) 
remember (60 
times) 
bravest (60 times) 
erictrump,eve (60 times) 
eve,election (60 times) 
let's,always (60 times) 
remember,bravest (60 
times) 
men, women (60 times) 
Remember our bravest men &amp; women who sacrificed (51 times) 
Red for the first time since 88 (30 times) 
I will be watching the election results from Trump Tower (3 times) 
Bernie voters and blacks voted for Trump (3 times) 






election (79 times) 
trump (41 times) 
vote (40 times) 
fraud (33 times) 
Hillary (21times) 
voter,fraud  (21 times) 
fraud,caught (11 times) 
video,voter (10 times) 
caught,camera (10 times) 
pennsylvania,election (10 
times) 
Exit poll favors Trump! #Trumplandslide #MAGA #HillaryForPrison2016 (9 
times) 
This is how they will steal the election! commit fraud! Calvary Pentecostal (8 
times) 
Don’t vote for someone who enriches herself (7 times) 
Why Don't We Ever See #Democrat Votes Switched To #Republican (7 times) 
It's Not #Democrat VS #GOP It's The #Globalist #UniParty Vs The People (6 
times) 




polls (38 times) 
know (26 times) 
look (22 times) 
live (22 times) 
exit (21 times) 
exit,polls (21 times) 
wsj,first (20 times) 
first,look (20 times) 
look,exit (20 times) 
polls,5 (20 times) 
We will get our first look at exit polls at 5 p.m. EST. (17 times) 
What time will polls close on election night? (14 times) 
When will we know we have a winner? (5 times) 
How the 50 million early voters may shape the election’s outcome (4 times) 






wikileaks (97 times) 
Clinton (35 times) 
Hillary (23 times) 
Campaign (22 
times) 









today,election (17 times) 
Election Judge ""pushed"" Pollwatcher out of the polling place (17 times) 
What are the reasons behind WikiLeaks exposures of the DNC and the Clinton 
(15 times) 
Julian Assange's statement today on the US election (16 times) 
George W Bush and his wife Laura have voted for Hillary Clinton (10 times) 







trump (22 times) 
results (19 times) 
electionday (19 
times) 







york,new (14 times) 
york,city (14 times) 
The Clinton motorcade leaves Chappaqua, New York (14 times) 
When do polls close across the US? #ElectionDay (9 times) 
A couple is split on #Election2016: Do you guys actually love each other? (9 
times) 
The most important election of our lifetime! Every vote makes a difference! (6 
times) 







Table 7: November 9: Most repeated words, word pairs and retweets 









Donald (68 times) 
trump's (58 times) 
win (53 times) 







several,cities (50 times) 
presidential,win (50 
times) 
Protesters take to the streets in several cities after Trump's win (38 
times) 
If enough upset-looking people block traffic the election is a do-ov… 
(31 times) 
As a woman and as a Latina, I feel very upset and oppressed (25 times) 
Election didn't shatter the glass ceiling, Senate's women of color 
quadrupled (23 times) 






president (20 times) 
berniesanders(19 
times) 




best,election (15 times) 
election,nite (15 times) 
reagan,80 (15 times) 
proud,realdonaldtrump 
(15 times) 
Best election nite I've had since Reagan '80. So proud (13 times) 
Why care if people protest an real election? (10 times) 
PM spoke just now to @realDonaldTrump to congratulate him (9 times) 
Dems forgotten the people who cared about them (5 times) 








election (187 times) 
women (185 times) 
trump (185 times) 
bring (182 times) 
thoughest(182 
times) 
trump,bring (182 times) 







May the election of Trump bring fiercest, smartest, toughest women 
(181 times) 
White women won the election for Trump. Call it like it fucking is (2 
times) 
Wakin up tmrw wishin this election just a bad dream🙏🏼😴 (1 time) 
4 March to 
Trump 
Towers 
trump (129 times) 
protesters (82 
times) 
cities (82 times) 
anger (71 times) 
hundreds (70 times) 
hundreds,protesters (70 
times) 
march,trump (70 times) 
trump,towers (70 times) 
towers,cities(70 times) 
cities,express(70 times) 
Protesters in NYC and Chicago march to Trump Towers (68 times) 
Protesters take to the streets in several cities (39 times) 
Trump won't be free from civil fraud trial (13 times) 
California Legislative Leaders ""We will lead the resistance"" (7 times) 





look (123 times) 
white (123 times) 
black (123 times) 
races (123 times) 
crying (123 times) 





crying,fear  (123 times) 
fear,right (123 times) 
White, black, all different races are crying with fear (122 times) 
Election showed us how prevalent hatred still is (14 times) 
The suicide prevention line is fucking busy. People want to die (1 time) 





election (95 times 
hillaryclinton (66 
times) 
win (26 times) 
whitehouse (20 
times) 
want (19 times) 






sorry,win (17 times) 
Not accepting election results: Protesters burn flags, block traffic (15 
times) 
This is not the outcome we wanted. I’m sorry we did not win (15 times) 
Our campaign was about the country (11 times) 
Young people, don’t think you can’t make a difference (7 times) 







trump (106 times) 
protest (101 times) 
against (96 times) 
rioting (92 times) 










trump,won  (88 times) 
Your behavior is why Trump won in the first place (86 times) 
Putin advisor: Election of Clinton would have led to world war 3 (16 
times) 
Crowds have gathered outside Trump Tower in Chicago (11 times 
They're literally protesting AGAINST a democratic election (3 times) 
If election had gone other way, Trump supporters will not protest (2 
times) 





protest (65 times) 
against (56 times) 
middle (56 times) 
east (56 times) 
countries (56 times) 
protest,against (56 
times) 
middle,east (56 times) 
countries,killing (56 
times) 
killing,gays (56 times) 
gays,democratically (56 
times) 
Cool if this was a protest against middle east countries killing gays? (52 
times) 
Protesting after a fair, documented democratic election? (21 times) 
Every immigrant driver scoffs at your outrage over a legal election (10 
times) 
Why care if people protest a real election? (8 times) 
I am willing to bet an overwhelming majority of protestors didn't vote (7 
times) 







guy (97 times) 
rigged (97 times) 
won (97 times) 
presidency (97 
times) 
votes (97 times) 
guy,election (97 times) 
election,rigged (97 
times) 
rigged,won (97 times) 
won,presidency (97 
times) 
second,votes (97 times) 
The guy who said the election was rigged won the presidency (96 times) 
The election results have shaken millions. (6 times) 
Been planning a post-election twitter break for a while. (2 times) 
The federal law enforcement agents who intervened in election (2 times) 









trump's (94 times) 
plan (94 times) 
ban (94 times) 
muslims (94 times) 
removed (94 times) 
donald,trump's (94 
times) 
trump's,plan (94 times) 





Trump's plan to ban Muslims from America removed from his website 
(93 times) 




Table 8: November 12: Most repeated words, word pairs and retweets 






Hate (194 times)  
















More than 200 hate incidents since Donald Trump's election. (190 times) 
Trump should call whoever he insulted and apologize (5 times) 
Trump’s election has emboldened white supremacists to target Clinton supporters 
(4 times) 
Hate crime spike larger than post-9/11, experts say #TRUMP #Fascism" (1 time) 
























whose,cover (162 times) 
shows,Clinton (162 
times)  
Newsweek recalls 125000 copies of its magazine with Clinton in the cover (160 
times) 
The greatest thing happened is the information we got from #WikiLeaks (11 times) 
Wikileaks mocks Dems after Election (1 time) 
Prepare for Resistance. Protect our Constitution. Autocracy: Rules for Survival (1 
time) 










giant (86 times) 





populism,giant (86 times) 
con,stood (86 times) 
election,night (86 times) 
Trump's populism was all a giant conn on Election Night (83 times) 
My favorite bit of Coen's takedownof Comey... 2016 Election Thank You Notes (9 
times) 
Voter suppression laws likely tipped the scales for Trump, civil rights groups say 
(7 times) 
This election pointed out that civics is not taught in our education system (2 times) 







help (14 times) 
white (13 times) 
house (13 times) 
donald,trump (16 times) 
dineshdsouza,white (13 
times) 





Will the White House have counselors to cope with Trump's election? (12 times) 
Donald Trump supporter laughing about election outcome. (10 times) 
Just had a very open and successful presidential election. Professional protesters (7 
times) 
Mrs. Clinton had a black vote deficiency dilemma, they would not come out for (3 
times) 
Congratulations to Donald Trump on winning the #US presidential election (2 
times) 
5 Reaction to 
the 
Election  
trump (80 times) 
supporters (38 
times) 
against (30 times) 
media (28 times) 
now (28 times) 
lots,media (27 times) 
now,ripping (27 times) 
pre,election (27 times) 
election,trump (27 times) 
trump,articles (27 times) 
Lots of media are now ripping off my pre-election Trump articles (23 times) 
2 all Trump supporters: threats against me or my family will be reported to FBI (23 
times) 
Mr. Trump: You have the power to start to heal our divides (13 times) 
Campuses Confront Hostile Acts Against Minorities After Election (4 times) 





coach (58 times) 





coach,Gregg (58 times) 
calls,Donald (58 times) 





Spurs coach Gregg Popovich calls Donald Trump's election ""disgusting"" (53 
times) 
Zuckerberg will regret saying that fake news on Facebook influenced the election 
(16 times) 
The books, music, movies, and TV shows soothed my election-damaged soul (2 
times) 
Ten of thousands in U.S. cities to protest Trump's presidency (2 times) 




trump (26 times) 
won (15 times) 
celebrities (13 
times) 
gop (8 times) 
Donald (8 times) 
trump,won  (15 times) 
won,election (9 times) 
donald,trump (8 times) 
post,election (7 times) 
celebrities,leave (7 times) 
Top 25 Celebrities On Leaving If Trump Won; Should We Force Them Out? (6 
times) 
Celebrities Who Said Would Leave Country If Trump Won Turned Into Bullies (6 
times) 
North Carolina GOP condemns KKK parade honoring President-elect (3 times) 
Even LA and NYC are getting hit with waves of racism post-election? (3 times) 










trump 20 times) 
clinton,blames (18 times) 
blames,fbi's (18 times) 
comey,defeat (18 times) 
call,donors (18 times) 
fbi's,comey (17 times) 
100 million people didn’t vote. We told them it was important (13 times) 
Clinton blames FBI's Comey for her defeat in call with donors (10 times) 
Tens of thousands in U.S. cities to protest Trump's presidency (8 times) 
Trump looking at fast ways to quit global climate change (6 times)) 
Comey’s letter shakes election (6 times) 
9 Electoral 
college 


















Irony... electoral college was created to reverse the election of an unfit candidate 
(41 times) 
Dear Liberals I don't believe that violent protesters represent you (5 times) 
For those saying Trump’s selection has nothing to do with White nationalism (5 
times) 
The server is her fault (4 times) 








gallup (56 times) 
2008 (56 times) 
2012 (56 times) 
2016 (56 times) 
election,outcome (56 
times) 
gallup,2008 (56 times) 
proud,election (51 times) 
2008,67 (51 times) 
67,2012 (51 times) 
% of Americans “proud” about election outcome, per Gallup 2008 (47 times) 
Don't tell me that I am overreacting from this election again (13 times) 
% of Americans “afraid” about election outcome, per Gallup (4 times) 
If election of man endorsed by white supremacists isn't enough to wakes you up (4 
times) 
Election of a KKK endorsed person (2 times) 
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Appendix C: Codebook for Tolerance and Intolerance 
Definitions of Tolerance 
 Tolerance refers to accepting other people’s “inward beliefs” (e.g. religion) 
and not interfering in other people’s lives rather than prosecuting or 
punishing them (Locke, 1690/1963). 
 People need to be equally tolerant of others’ freedoms as they themselves 
expect those other individuals to be tolerant of theirs (Mill, 1861/1999). 
 Tolerance is about “a willingness to ‘put up with’ those things that one 
rejects” (Sullivan et al., 1979, p. 785). 
 Tolerance is about rejection of prejudice at the cognitive level and acceptance 
of differences at the social level (Habermas, 2004).  
 “Tolerance is a person’s willingness to support the civic and political rights of 
fellow citizens with whom [he or] she disagrees” (Hiskey, 2013, p. 1). 
Definitions of Intolerance 
 Intolerance refers to unwillingness to accept (rejecting) those who have 
different beliefs and values from one’s self (Locke, 1690/1963; Sullivan et 
al., 1979). 
 It is about interfering in other people’s lives willingness to prosecuting or 
punishing them (Locke, 1690/1963). 
 It deals with discrimination and prejudice against other people on the basis of 
personal opinion, values, and beliefs (Coward, 1986; Yang & Self, 2015). 
 It includes defamation, hate speech, name calling, attempt to attack violently, 
attempt to provoke outrage, cursing and swearing at someone, discriminating 
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against one’s demographics or beliefs and values, and the use of fighting 
words (Smith, N.A; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942; Snyder v. Phelps, 
2011; Teeter & Loving, 2008; Texas v. Johnson, 1989).  
 It also includes alarm or resentment, invasion of privacy, infliction of 
emotional distress, accuse someone of a crime, and attack their personal 
business and reputation (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011; Smith, N.A; Teeter & 
Loving, 2008; Texas v. Johnson, 1989). 
 Tolerance is when there is expectation of in-group to accept out-group 
 Intolerance can be when in-group is telling any groups to think or act 
differently in accordance to specific norms, values, and ideas of in-
group. Or it refers to the rejection of views/acts of either in-group or out-
group and resorts to language that expects or demands the group to think 
or act differently.  
How to Look at the Content 
To code for tolerance and intolerance:  
1) Read the entire tweet 
2) Look for hashtags (#words) and mentions (@words) to identify promotion or 
persuasion.  
 If there are such hashtags or mentions, then code as neither or intolerant. 
 If one tweet has hashtags or mentions about both candidates or groups, 
consider the whole text and code accordingly.  
3) Identify the subject and the object of the tweet 
4) If there is an object in the tweet, consider traits associated with the object 
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5) If the subject has no direct/indirect objects (any person or group), then consider 
the traits associated with the subject 
6) If the tweet has more than one sentences (complete or clause), then a) code for 
the first one for tolerance and intolerance and b) if no tolerance or intolerance in 
the first clause, consider the second clause, etc.  
7) Tweets with questions 
a) If the whole tweet is a question, code as neither. Except if subject of the tweet 
is called names or accused of prejudice, corruption, or deceiving. Exemple, “The 
FBI now saying again nothing wrong with @HillaryClinton emails? All that 
drama before the election! ? ?Racist Trump close?” 
b) If the whole tweet ends with a question, code it as neutral. But if there is a 
question with an answer in the tweet, code for the answer. Exemple, “‘Daddy, 
why did Donald Trump win the election?’ Well son, our country had a hard time 
taking things seriously https://t.co/?” 
8) If you cannot understand the tweet, code it as neither. Example: “While ur 
following @wikileaks & election duality 24/7 -7th gen prophecy happenin-
Elders smoked from Crazy horse,Geroni?” 
Coding 
1. Intolerance: It can be identified in relation to any group, person, or set of ideas. 
 Creating the us” vs. “them” sense of competition: E.g., this is an election of 
Good vs. Evil  
 Name calling: Hitler, Crooked Hillary, stupid, Drump, ghost, corrupt, 
hipster, criminal, liar, bereaved, ass hole, afraid, evil, zodiac killer, 
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deplorable, immoral, whine, Nazi misogynist president, a bunch of fat-bags; 
sore losers, 
 Rejecting: Denying a person, group, ideology, etc. Examples: Let’s drain 
the swamp, not my president, never Hillary, I don’t want to hear your 
opinion, vote NO in gun control, forcing people out, I won’t accept this 
election, take someone down, distrust, gross, 
 Punishing: Go to jail, imprison, impeach, assassinate, block, Trump was 
dropped,  
 Attacking: Threatening, warning, display of symbols that arouses anger, use 
of fighting words, abolish 
 Accusing for: Corruption, rigging, deceiving, lying, suspicion, attempting to 
fix/manipulate, blowing the election, Dems posing as Republicans, cheating, 
stealing, slight of hand, gutting the voting rights 
 Cursing/swearing: F*** Donald Trump, shame on the candidate/party, the 
bitch nigga trump,  
 Discriminating: Expressing prejudice on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, 
sexual orientation, religion, political ideology –e.g. people of this group are 
stupid; go to Middle East, attack the Middle Eastern countries, expressing 
disgust and hate toward other people or groups, sick of Dems 
 Humiliating: Democrats, people scoff at you; Dems sat on their butts and 
lost; misled pigs; Trump will turn into pumpkin, slander, irony, laughing 
stock 
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 Using hashtags: Hashtags that contain intolerant words. Examples: 
#nastywoman, #neverhillary, #Drump 
 Using negative Emojis: Crying face, angry face, thumbs down or dislike, 
middle finger 
 If protests are clearly directed toward a specific person or group, code it 
as intolerant (e.g., Hundreds of people took part in a protests/riots to 
express anger against Trump or Lady Gaga protest against Trump in front of 
Trump Tower). 
 If protests are reported with no clear subject and object, code it as neither 
(e.g., Hundreds of protestors took streets after election).  
 
2. Neither tolerance nor intolerance  
3. Tolerance:  
 Acceptance of broad concepts: Democracy, social justice, equality, 
diversity, etc. 
 Acceptance of America as a whole: Let’s vote to better sever our civic 
duty.  
 It is not coded tolerant when there is acceptance of in-group or group of 
which one is expected to agree with. Example: Trump cluster –I support 
Trump  
 If attempt at promotion or persuasion toward in-group (campaign slogans) 
is expressed as a broad appeal, then code as neither. Examples: Let’s all 
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support Trump to same the 2nd Amendment, Make America Great Again 
(MAGA), Strong together 
 Acceptance of those who disagree or reject the communicator’s views: 
Example, I am a Democrat voting for Trump.   
  
